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 Abstract 
This doctoral thesis examined the paradoxically difficult integration of Social 
Network Analysis (SNA), as a principal analytical approach, in the supranational 
intelligence and law enforcement environment of Europol. This real-world problem 
was systematically investigated with the use of an exploratory mixed methods design. 
Initially, a questionnaire survey, focussing on the perceptions of the whole population 
of Europol’s operational analysts (N=77) and achieving a high response rate of 75% 
(n=58), helped identify key barriers to SNA integration. Thereafter, in-depth thematic 
analysis of five semi-structured interviews contributed to better understanding of the 
identified barriers. Lastly, a topical literature review facilitated the theoretical 
application of empirical results.  
In this way, the study traced the possible causes of the research problem and 
shed light into the highly constrained operational role of Europol making two important 
theoretical contributions: the “basic work phenomenon” and the “input (procedural) 
legitimacy-innovation” hypothesis. Specifically, it was found that Europol’s 
transformation into an EU Agency in 2010 – with a “light” criminal information role and 
a preoccupation with elementary intelligence production and input (procedural) 
legitimacy gains – actually weakened its epistemic authority and output legitimacy, 
impeding the integration of the innovative network paradigm. Alternative explanations, 
such as Europol analysts’ anti-epistemic inclinations and resistance to change, did 
not account for the magnitude of the observed phenomenon.  
The thesis fills an empirical and theoretical gap in extant literature on EU Agency 
governance and furthers understanding of the inner workings of Europol. Based on 
novel and quite informative evidence, the study argues that the dominance of 
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 Eurosceptic views and national sovereignty concerns has raised high political and 
bureau-political barriers sidelining Europhile orientations in the sensitive area of EU 
law enforcement cooperation. The findings suggest that the main policy challenge for 
this EU Agency is to find a better balance between its political and epistemic authority 
and input (procedural) and output legitimacy. 
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 Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The European Police Office (hereafter “Europol”) was established in The Hague 
as an Intergovernmental Organisation. After a lengthy phase of ratification, Europol 
began its fully-fledged operational activities in 1999 with the purpose of strengthening 
and improving the effectiveness and cooperation between the law enforcement 
agencies of European Union (EU) Member States against organised crime and 
terrorism.1 According to article 3 of the “Europol Convention” (Council Act of 26 July 
1995 drawing up the Convention based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European 
Union on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 1995, 
pp. 5-6), its principal tasks were:  
(1) to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States; 
(2) to obtain, collate and analyse information and intelligence; 
(3) to notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay via 
the national units referred to in Article 4 of information concerning them and of 
any connections identified between criminal offences; 
(4) to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant 
information to the national units; 
(5) to maintain a computerized system of collected information containing data 
in accordance with Articles 8, 10 and 11. 
 
On 1 January 2010, Europol was transformed into an EU Agency. According to article 
5 of the “Europol Council Decision” (Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the 
European Police Office (Europol), 2009, pp. 39-40), its principal tasks are:   
(a) to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information and 
intelligence;  
(b) to notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay via 
the national unit referred to in Article 8 of information concerning them and of 
any connections identified between criminal offences;  
1 Europol has its roots in the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) that commenced its limited activities in 1994. 
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 (c) to aid investigations in the Member States, in particular by forwarding all 
relevant information to the national units;  
(d) to ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned to 
initiate, conduct or coordinate investigations and to suggest the setting up of 
joint investigation teams in specific cases;  
(e) to provide intelligence and analytical support to Member States in 
connection with major international events;  
(f) to prepare threat assessments, strategic analyses and general situation 
reports relating to its objective, including organised crime threat assessments.  
 
Europol describes its new role as follows: 
Europol is the European Union law enforcement agency that handles criminal 
intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness and co-operation between 
the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating 
all forms of serious international organised crime and terrorism. The mission of 
Europol is to make a significant contribution to the European Union‘s law 
enforcement action against organised crime and terrorism with an emphasis on 
targeting criminal organisations.2 
 
The objective and principal tasks of the intergovernmental Europol pertaining to 
information exchange, intelligence analysis and notification of identified links between 
criminal cases look deceptively similar to those of the EU Agency. The institutional 
transformation of 2010, however, resulted in a major reform that changed Europol’s 
priorities3, the structure of its Operations Department4 and the nature of operational 
support, as it will be explained below.  
Ideally placed at supranational level but lacking executive powers, Europol since 
its inception relied on, and significantly developed, its operational analysis capabilities 
to assist the competent agencies of EU Member States. Among others, Europol 
looked into social science research methods that could potentially enhance its 
intelligence analysis function. In 2009, after three years of workplace and academic 
research, Europol adopted Social Network Analysis (SNA) as an innovative approach 
2 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/faq/what-europols-mission-77  
3 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/europol%E2%80%99s-priorities-145  
4 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/organisational-structure-157 
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 to criminal intelligence analysis. SNA is a scientific approach that deploys different 
mathematical techniques to analyse any type of relational and attributional data and 
facilitate interpretation and understanding of network structures. Specifically, the 
application of network thinking and techniques helps in: (a) mapping and measuring 
network relationships, interactions or behaviour (e.g. criminal links, calling activity, 
money transfers); (b) producing interesting leads to further criminal investigations; (c) 
developing working assumptions (hypotheses) to be tested through fieldwork; and, (d) 
establishing intelligence and enforcement priorities to support major pan-European 
investigations (Mainas, 2009). SNA can deal with complex and large data sets to 
assist in quickly identifying key suspects, groups and other hidden patterns that 
otherwise would remain unnoticed. Detection of network patterns, in turn, greatly 
facilitates the generation of insights into the covert structure of criminal and terrorist 
groups. Hence, SNA gives the power to know the hidden properties of “dark” 
networks (Raab & Milward, 2003). For these reasons, previous research concluded 
that “the SNA perspective and methods bring about a clear improvement to the 
efficiency, effectiveness and quality of intelligence analysis and investigation” 
(Mainas, 2009, p. 83). SNA is not panacea however. For the most part, it is a 
descriptive and structural approach relies on the availability of complete and accurate 
network data. Given those benefits and limitations, a lot depend on how SNA is used 
in practice.  
Parenthetically, SNA is different from the conventional approach to criminal 
intelligence analysis used by Europol and many other police and intelligence 
agencies around the world. “Link analysis”, as practitioners call it, consists of a set of 
data integration techniques (e.g. link, telephone call, event, flow, time and sequence 
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 charting), which were imported from the social sciences and thereafter lived a life of 
their own in the military, law enforcement and intelligence domains (see e.g. Harris, 
1976; Peterson, 1998; Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2000). Intelligence analysts 
routinely apply these techniques on crime data with the use of computer software to 
describe, for example, the criminal modus operandi and identify relationships and 
patterns of investigative interest. In 2000, Europol produced the Analytical Guidelines 
(Europol, 2000) to provide essential guidance on the intelligence analysis process 
and its numerous applications. In 2011, the UNODC also produced two manuals for 
criminal intelligence managers and analysts building on the existing doctrine (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011a, 2011b). According to Klerks (2001), link 
analysis and SNA represent the second and third generation of intelligence analysis, 
respectively. Van der Hulst, in particular, has aptly described SNA as the “scientific 
equivalent of link analysis” (2009, p. 103). Hence, conventional link analysis 
represents the old paradigm in criminal intelligence analysis and SNA the new 
emerging paradigm (see e.g. Carrington, 2011; Everton, 2012; Scott & Carrington, 
2011; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
From the beginning Europol faced the challenge of developing the SNA 
knowledge and skills of operational analysts through training, software acquisition and 
guidance (Europol, 2008b). An official Policy on Social Network Analysis was agreed 
in January 2009 to facilitate the implementation of the SNA programme (Europol, 
2009d). In-house expertise and experience was employed to develop and provide 
SNA training to 62 operational analysts in June and September 2009 (Europol, 
2009a). The aim of this introductory (one-day) course was to help analysts:  
(a) appreciate the importance of network thinking and applications; (b) identify 
various sources and types of network data in operational projects; and, (c) 
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 deploy a conceptual analytical framework consisting of components, sub-
groups (k-cores), cutpoints, centrality (degree, betweenness, closeness, 
eigenvector), and key player (disruption, diffusion, harvest) algorithms to 
analyse various network data sets using SNA software tools. (Europol, 2009c) 
Attendance on the specialised SNA course was a prerequisite for analysts to start 
using SNA concepts, tools and techniques. In parallel, both commercial and 
academic SNA software packages were acquired (i.e. Analysts’ Notebook 8, 
KeyPlayer 2, NetDraw, Organizational Risk Analyzer, Pajek, and Ucinet) for analysts 
assigned to the Analysis Work Files (AWFs) of the Operations Department. Hence, 
the analysts were assisted to reflect on their practice and appreciate the fact that 
network analysis applications can lead to real performance improvements; received 
guidance on SNA methodology, operational scope, data protection, analysis and 
reporting requirements (Europol, 2009d); and, were encouraged to use SNA, tools 
and techniques in their work. 
A small survey conducted in August 2010 to evaluate progress found 24 SNA 
users out of the 62 operational analysts who received introductory SNA training 
(Europol, 2010a). Eight of those analysts had produced several SNA reports receiving 
excellent feedback from their law enforcement partners in EU Member States. The 
results suggested a positive impact on analytical performance that confirmed previous 
research findings (Mainas, 2009). At the same time, however, it became apparent 
that more than half of the operational analysts did not use SNA. Europol identified 
four possible barriers to SNA adoption and use:  
First, SNA is a scientific approach and learning takes time and effort before 
analysts start using it to analyse data and produce reports (intellectually- and 
technically-demanding approach). Several analysts reported that they do not 
yet feel confident to employ network analysis and interpret SNA output. 
Second, certain analysts believed that conventional link analysis techniques 
were “good enough” and there was no need to learn new techniques 
(resistance to change). Third, a number of analysts seemed to be late adopters 
and will wait for others to pave the way (slow adoption of business change). 
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 Finally, some analysts reported a lack of network data in their operational 
projects that hinders their attempts to deploy SNA techniques (availability of 
network data).Despite the four issues mentioned above, the positive results 
achieved by those analysts who use SNA clearly show that there are 
considerable operational benefits as well as potential for significant 
performance improvements. It is expected that their example will be gradually 
followed by the remaining analysts. Through coordination, training, expert 
advice and encouragement more and more analysts will start using SNA tools 
and techniques in daily work. (Europol, 2010a, p. 2) 
 
Having in mind, the promising results and success stories reported by SNA users, 
Europol thus concluded that SNA enhances its analytical capabilities in support of 
major investigations against criminal and terrorist networks in EU Member States. For 
this reason, a team of experienced analysts was set up to develop a five-day SNA 
training course based on operational experiences gained across AWFs. The training 
team undertook the task to spearhead the development of SNA and integration inside 
the analysis environment. By the end of 2011, almost all 77 operational analysts of 
Europol had attended the extended SNA training. Moreover, an updated Policy on 
Social Network Analysis was released providing more detailed guidance to Europol 
analysts on the effective application of SNA (Europol, 2011c).  
Europol clearly acknowledged that innovative security applications of SNA 
improve analytical performance. However, the problem that the majority of its analysts 
did not use SNA raised some difficult questions, such as the fit between SNA and 
conventional link analysis and the analytical skills required to put SNA to best use. 
The limited success in the adoption and integration of SNA inside the analysis 
environment of Europol indicated the existence of other possible tensions between 
facilitators and barriers to change. The new Europol Council Decision (ECD), put in 
effect in January 2010, and the Europol Strategy 2010-2014 introduced a new vision 
and mission leading to a major operational reform that significantly affected 
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 operational intelligence analysis (Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the 
European Police Office (Europol), 2009; Europol, 2010c). Apparently, these 
significant developments have had a serious impact upon the innovative SNA 
programme of Europol. These changes raised a question about the organisational fit 
with SNA. 
Arguably, powerful factors systematically interfere with Europol’s analysis function 
and intelligence production. To find the causes of those effects one must examine the 
internal and external dimensions of Europol’s environment. The internal policies, 
operational management, processes and outputs are very important. But, these could 
be largely shaped by client needs and expectations collectively expressed at the 
operational and strategic level. The strategic influence of EU Member State partners 
exercised through their participation in the governance structure of Europol – that is, 
the Management Board and Heads of Europol National Units (HENU) – could be the 
single most important factor in explaining Europol’s operational role and functioning, 
in general, and the problematic SNA integration, in particular. Other variables – for 
instance, line manager-defined priorities, team-based or individual practices and the 
professional abilities of analysts – could offer only partial, or weak, explanations that 
cannot reasonably account for the magnitude of observed effects since those factors 
produce local effects only. Another explanation might be that since it takes 
considerable time and effort to produce high quality operational reports such as SNA, 
this slows down production and affects the adoption of the new method by analysts. 
Indeed, the level of analytic ambition and usefulness of operational reporting is 
inversely related to the frequency of reporting. Clearly, it takes longer to produce 
advanced analytical reports compared to elementary ones. Law enforcement and 
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 intelligence agencies, however, encounter such operational reporting challenges 
routinely. Organisational strategies characterised by a focus on “pure analysis” help 
address these issues effectively. Inside highly professional systems conflicting 
“frequency / usefulness of reporting”-patterns are either effectively avoided or made 
less pronounced through the convergence and coherence of established policies, 
priorities and processes. In the past, Europol analysts exerted greater effort to 
produce operational analysis reports in line with organisational policies and 
professional doctrine. Europol had an Analysis Unit (SC7) guided by the award-
winning Analytical Guidelines (Europol, 2000) and intelligence analysis standards 
(Peterson et al., 2000). Its analysts were guided by a key business assumption that 
advanced analysis reports make a real difference in terms of supporting investigative 
teams effectively and achieving important operational objectives. Europol, however, 
seems to have adopted a new “theory of the business” (Drucker, 1994).  
Official Europol analysis discourse has dramatically changed over the years. A 
careful reading, textual analysis and comparison of the Europol Annual Reviews 
covering the period 2005-2013 and other official publications provides sufficient 
evidence to support this argument. In 1998, the aim of Europol was “to become the 
European centre of excellence for intelligence exchange, crime analysis, cooperation 
and support in relation to the fight against international crime” (Europol, 2009e, p. 14). 
Europol achieved this aim and its Analysis Unit (SC7) became a recognised centre of 
excellence in crime analysis. Up until 2008, Europol continued to stress – in line with 
its stated aim and professional doctrine – its analysis and intelligence coordination 
capacity in support of EU law enforcement investigations (Europol, 2006, 2007, 
2008a). In 2009, a clear shift in analysis discourse was noticed. For the first time in 
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 official reviews, Europol devoted an unusually lengthy comment on its work on 
processing, storing and cross checking entities. Moreover, it stated that: “[a]ll analysis 
work files now use the new technology and a programme is being developed to allow 
member states and partners to share in the benefits”  (Europol, 2009b, p. 26). In this 
official source, one probably finds the first public indication of major changes in 
Europol’s analysis-related thinking and processes. Subsequent annual Europol 
Reviews and Work Programmes confirmed a change in its core business in pursuit of 
a “new vision” (Europol, 2010d, 2011a, 2011b, 2012b, 2012c, 2013b, 2013c, 2014d).  
According to Europol, its vision is:  
to contribute to a safer Europe by providing the best possible support to law 
enforcement authorities in the Member States. We will achieve this by 
delivering a unique set of operational services for the European Union, 
developing as its principal: support centre for law enforcement operations; 
criminal information hub, and centre for law enforcement expertise. (Europol, 
2010c, p. 8)  
 
Thereafter, Europol’s analysis function underwent two restructuring phases. In 2009, 
the majority of operational analysts were assigned to different specialist Units of the 
Operations Department and a new Analysis & Knowledge Unit (O2) was set up with a 
limited number of senior analysts (Europol, 2009b, p. 5). In 2010, Europol became a 
EU Agency and went through another restructuring process. Significantly, and quite 
surprisingly, Europol abolished its Analysis Unit becoming perhaps the only EU 
Agency in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice without a dedicated analysis 
structure and associated management function. Instead, a 24/7 Operational Centre 
was set up providing a “centralised cross checking service” with emphasis on “quick 
processing against all existing data and rapid feedback” (Europol, 2014f). At the same 
time, the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010 stated that Europol’s “main aims are to 
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 collect and exchange information and to facilitate cooperation between law 
enforcement authorities in their fight against organised crime and terrorism” 
(European Union, 2010, p. 17). Ever since, Europol explicitly stressed its data 
storage, processing and cross checking capacity – making only a passing mention to 
intelligence analysis itself – in its annual reviews (Europol, 2011a, 2012b, 2013b, 
2014d). Europol claimed that “analysis is the cornerstone of all modern intelligence-
led law enforcement activities and is critical to all Europol activities” but, in parallel, 
added that its operational analysts only try to “identify missing links in cross-border 
investigations” (Europol, 2014d, p. 19). Most likely, the former statement refers to its 
strategic analysis function given its new enhanced role in the EU Policy Cycle 
(Europol, 2014d, p. 14). In line with its new vision, Europol repeatedly acknowledged 
cross checking and cross match reporting as the prime objective (or core business) of 
its operational analysis function. What is more, Europol seems to define the simple 
provision of criminal information as crime analysis (Europol, 2013b, p. 17; 2014e). 
Due to its extremely narrow scope and nature, however, this activity can be called 
crime analysis symbolically, or euphemistically, only. Most importantly, Europol 
transformed its centre of excellence in crime analysis into a criminal information 
clearinghouse since 2010. Apparently, this operational restructuring not only had 
significant effects upon the intelligence analysis processes, outputs and coordination 
role of Europol, but also had broader implications for EU law enforcement cooperation 
in general. The research will examine the implications of the reform in relation to the 
paradoxically problematic integration of SNA into the analysis system of Europol, as a 
principal analytical approach. Specifically, it will investigate whether its integration, 
and the adoption of the network paradigm, is still possible inside Europol.   
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 In the process of gradually putting together the missing pieces from the picture of 
Europol’s governance and functioning – after its transformation into a EU Agency in 
2010 – an important question is raised about the operational justification behind this 
radical change. There is neither a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of 
the former Analysis Unit nor a detailed explanation of the rationale behind the new 
vision of Europol and the roadmap towards its implementation. The Europol Strategy 
2010-2014 (Europol, 2010c) and the Europol Wok Programmes (Europol, 2010d, 
2011b, 2012c, 2013c) provide a rather vague idea about this major reform. This lack 
of transparency leaves important questions unanswered. What really motivated this 
change and why? What is the added value of this reform? What happened to the 
Organisation that produced the Analytical Guidelines in 2000 and took pride in being 
a centre of excellence in crime analysis? Europol (2013c) gives us only some hints. 
For example: “Europol will focus on efficiently delivering products and services in line 
with operational needs as expressed by the Member States” (p. 2) and “Europol will 
invest, above all, in those services that best attend to the immediate needs of EU 
Member State investigators for responsive, tangible and streamlined support” (p. 10). 
Does that mean that the analysis services of SC7 did not attend to the investigative 
needs? What is the exact nature of those operational needs? Europol gives us 
another hint that its Strategy 2010-2014 has been formulated after extensive internal 
and external consultations with all stakeholders, including members of its 
Management Board, representatives of Member States, the European Commission 
and Justice and Home Affairs Ministers (Europol, 2010c, p. 6). In the absence of 
proper evaluation and justification, however, a sceptical observer would rather 
presume that Europol now performs a new role prescribed by the EU Member States. 
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 The EU Internal Security Strategy 2010 stressed that the response to present and 
future security challenges requires an EU-wide approach (European Union, 2010, p. 
15). This is most certainly the case. Is however, the operational vision, transformation 
and functioning of Europol from 2010 onwards the most efficient and effective answer 
to crime phenomena requiring a EU-wide approach?  
Nowadays Europol puts major emphasis on data exchange and the identification 
of simple links between cross-border cases and focuses much less on in-depth 
operational analysis and intelligence coordination. In other words, Europol engages in 
far less ambitious tasks and activities compared to the pre-2010 period. In line with its 
new role, Europol has collected a great amount of operational data in recent years. 
According to its Director, this represents  “an increase of 120% compared to 2005” 
(Europol, 2014d, p. 6). Obviously, this leads to the production of a greater number of 
elementary analysis reports (i.e. cross match reports and hit notifications) compared 
to the past. Unfortunately, comparable statistical data on Europol’s analysis report 
production are not publicly available to cover the whole period from its establishment 
in 1999 up to the present. Nonetheless, the available data show that the number of hit 
notifications and cross match reports exceeded the number of operational analysis 
reports on a 5:1 ratio in 2011 (Europol, 2012b, p. 30); 4.3:1 ratio in 2012 (Europol, 
2013b, p. 27); and, 7.5:1 ratio in 2013 (Europol, 2014d, p. 30). 5 Therefore, there is 
partial evidence of a consistent pattern linked to the systematic production of such 
reports at least since 2010. The evidence not only provides partial confirmation of the 
“frequency / usefulness of reporting”-pattern, but also raises concerns about the 
5 In 2011, Europol supported 13,697 cross-border cases (a 17% increase over 2010) producing 716 hit 
notifications, 984 cross match reports, 376 knowledge products and 340 operational analysis reports. 
In 2012, Europol supported 15,949 cases producing 1,621 hit notifications, 1,429 cross match reports, 
712 operational analysis reports and 470 knowledge products. In 2013, Europol supported 18,310 
cases producing 1,656 cross match reports, 220 operational reports and 385 other reports. 
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 operational functioning of Europol. Due to its principal orientation toward criminal 
information exchange and over-emphasis on lower level (quick / volume) reporting 
since 2010, advanced analysis now appears to be the exception rather than the rule. 
By prioritising the processing of “big (crime) data” and reporting of hits, Europol risks 
paying less attention to the standards and requirements of advanced crime analysis. 
This may be one of the critical side effects stemming from Europol’s role as a criminal 
information-processing platform.  
Moreover, Europol seems to utilise its Analysis System (EAS) as another 
Information System (EIS). In so doing, its data processing (and especially its analysis) 
capacity could be seriously overstretched. The EIS was launched in 2005 in order to 
host all high volume, low relevance data from EU cross-border cases (Europol, 
2013a; 2014d, p. 18). The Focal Points (formerly known as Analysis Work Files) were 
supposed to host the low volume, high relevance material for in-depth analysis and 
coordination of major pan-European investigations. Based on the magnitude of 
incoming and processed data since 2010, however, it appears that the Focal Points 
and the Operational Centre have been gradually building a parallel information 
system on serious and organised crime. In other words, the operational teams of 
analysts may be increasingly dealing with high volume, low relevance data in order to 
identify connections between cases. Besides duplication of effort, this begs the 
question why Europol and its EU partners did not use the existing EIS for automated 
cross checking purposes. Publicly available data show a tremendous increase in the 
number of operational cases and information exchanges in the period 2000-2013 
(Europol, 2009b, pp. 33-34; 2010b, p. 8; 2011a, p. 13; 2012b, p. 13; 2013b, p. 15; 
2014d, p. 15). As illustrated in Figure 1, this pattern is characterised by a significant 
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 growth from 2009 onwards (see also Appendix E, Table 2). It is hypothesised that the 
origins of the present preoccupation with cross checking and the reporting of hits can 
be found in 2008-2009 as the analysis capacity of Europol became overwhelmed by 
requests for analysis support and massive data flows. 
 
Figure 1: Total number of new cases  
and information exchanges per year (period 2000-2013) 
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 Unable to provide in-depth analysis support, Europol, at first out of necessity, and 
then as a practical solution perhaps, may have resorted to hit notifications and cross 
match reports as a way to provide a service to its customers. Apparently, this habitual 
response – caused by a functional weakness (i.e. the mismatch between its analysis 
capacity and workload) – turned into an official policy linked to the new vision and 
strategic objectives of Europol in 2010. Most likely, the reform was an attempt to 
improve the legitimacy of this EU Agency and gain the trust of EU Member States’ 
partners by turning an operational weakness into strength. The evidence is 
particularly telling; especially, if one considers the number of staff assigned to the 
daunting tasks of data processing and crime analysis. Europol staff increased from 
536 in 2005 to 858 in 2014, but the number of analysis staff remained almost the 
same throughout this period; that is, approximately 100 operational and strategic 
analysts in total (Europol, 2014g, 2014h). 
Of course, increased sharing of crime data is a good indication of EU Member 
States’ willingness to cooperate, but their expectation from Europol is simply to cross 
check huge amounts of data and provide lower level products and services. Hence, 
the dramatic workload increase possibly spread limited Europol resources too thin. 
How could it be otherwise given that almost 70-80 operational analysts that analysed 
6,761 new cases, coordinated intelligence and enforcement operations across the EU 
in 2005 had to deal with a flow of 18,310 new cases in 2013? Europol has been trying 
to do more with less for several years, but there are limits to what can be achieved 
through prioritisation, re-allocation of analysis staff and use of specialised data 
processing and reporting tools. To be sure, automated and semi-automated 
processing technologies are not well attuned to sophisticated analysis, deriving 
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 meaning out of voluminous amounts of data and accurate data processing and 
storage. Due to this increasing trend, it is likely that Europol will face particular 
challenges in handling massive data flows and avoiding delays and backlogs in data 
processing, cross checking and cross match reporting in the future.  
RAND (2012) identified this serious issue adding that: “[i]t is likely that this will 
require an increase in the number of Europol staff involved in data processing and 
analysis. However, the European Commission has indicated that staff costs should be 
reduced by 5 per cent by 2018.” (p. xxv). Consequently, an already problematic 
situation is likely to worsen due to budgetary cuts. The inherent complexity and 
volume of EU crime data simply exacerbates the challenges facing this EU Agency. 
Being in a politically weak position – totally dependent on the supply of crime data by 
European law enforcement – Europol has probably over-stretched its data processing 
capacity. Due to these mounting pressures, Europol could also face future problems 
with the integrity of crime data stored in its systems. Gradually, its operational 
databases could be populated with both high and low relevance data of uneven 
quality, hindering processing and analysis work significantly. All the above, suggest 
that operating a centre of excellence in crime analysis and a criminal information 
clearinghouse signify fundamentally different perceptions about the operational role of 
Europol. These roles are not only particularly challenging, but also strategically and 
practically incompatible to a very large extent. Arguably, the 2010 reform of Europol - 
and the almost exclusive focus on data processing and cross checking – has had a 
negative impact on its analysis function reducing its operational support and 
coordination role to the level of mere criminal information provider. 
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 These observations raise serious questions about the contemporary strategic 
vision, design and operational functioning of Europol. Does it justify the abolition of 
the centre of excellence in crime analysis Europol invested in between 1998 and 
2010? Why was the possibility of its further development abandoned altogether? 
Alternative interpretations may emphasise the merits of cross checking entities with 
reference to the legal obligations of Europol – that is, its duty to notify the Member 
States of connections identified between criminal cases (Council Act of 26 July 1995 
drawing up the Convention based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 1995; Council 
Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol), 2009). 
Essentially, such opinions would depend on what different stakeholders perceive as 
meaningful engagement for Europol’s analysis function and, significantly, on their 
bureau-political preferences. For analysts, there seems to be a clear tension between 
what they do and what they consider as most useful engagement, as we shall see in 
Chapters 3 and 4. In all probability, the operational functioning and outputs of this EU 
Agency since 2010 indicate the major influence of “bureaucratic politics” or “bureau-
politicisation” (see e.g. 't Hart & Wille, 2012; Groenleer, 2009; Peters & Pierre, 2012) 
upon its operational role, processes and outputs. This could explain why the SNA 
integration inside Europol’s analysis environment has been problematic despite its 
important operational benefits. The adoption of scientific analysis techniques and 
focus on advanced intelligence reporting seems to be incompatible with the policies, 
priorities and products of a criminal information hub. Europol’s operational reform in 
2010 was a reorientation towards the provision of “micro” answers to many clients 
rather than the provision of important answers to certain clients, which can positively 
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 influence the course of major criminal investigations in EU Member States. This 
suggests the dominance of particular views concerning the management of 
operational projects and the type of operational support expected by EU law 
enforcement. Hence, the strategic vision, design and operational activities of Europol 
are strongly linked to bureau-political debates about its role and design and 
subsequent decisions regarding the best way forward (Busuioc, Curtin, & Groenleer, 
2011). The Europol-commissioned report of RAND Europe expressed doubts about 
the new design implying that its inadequacy should be attributed to the influence of 
EU Member States (RAND, 2012). In particular, RAND (2012) noted that: 
[m]any of the issues raised in the evaluation demonstrate an underlying 
tension stemming from the fundamental design principle of Europol. The 
tension is between, on the one hand, the desire for Europol to be more 
operationally supportive to Member States and improve its operational focus, 
but on the other hand, an insistence on the primacy of Member States… 
Whether Europol is effective and has an impact is determined largely by the 
policies and actions of Member States, which provide Europol with information 
and decide whether to use Europol’s outputs and expertise in domestic law 
enforcement. (p. xvi)  
 
Furthermore, there is evidence in the aforementioned study of the principal 
motivations of key bureau-political actors. According to RAND (2012), the opinion of 
most Management Board members was that Europol should be treated as a special 
case meaning that its corporate governance and core business “…has to be in the 
hands of the Member States” (p. 40). Most likely, therefore, the 2010 reform marks a 
new chapter in the bureau-political governance of Europol.  
It should be borne in mind that an advanced intelligence analysis role implies a 
level of engagement, control and influence over national criminal investigations that 
may be undesirable to many, if not all, EU law enforcement agencies that traditionally 
view Europol and the increasing scope of its mandate with suspicion, scepticism or 
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 negativity. The focus on lower-level operational products and services could be a 
convenient solution for all Europol-sceptics as it creates a role of lesser importance 
with Europol functioning as an information processing and cross checking platform. 
EU law enforcement may be content with a less intrusive or antagonistic (i.e. 
“special”) role for Europol. Hence, the dominant bureau-political views of EU Member 
States appear to be an important variable that exerts systemic influence upon Europol 
and its analysis function. Following its transformation into EU Agency, the new 
operational role apparently had an impact on intelligence analysis, the SNA 
innovation and operational performance in general. This raises key questions: Is 
Europol heading in the right direction? Is it put to best use? To be sure, the likely 
answers have quite complex political / bureau-political and technocratic (functionalist) 
dimensions. 
In this context, the limited use of SNA by operational analysts thus emerged as a 
persistent problem. This was an important theoretical and empirical problem related 
to a population of 77 operational analysts tasked to provide analytical support to 
major pan-European investigations against serious / organised crime and terrorism. 
Even though all Europol AWFs could deploy SNA techniques and benefit from 
improved analytical effectiveness, this did not result in widespread use of SNA tools 
and techniques. With only a third of its analysts using SNA, two years after its official 
introduction, Europol faced a problem of unexplored, and unrealised, potential 
regarding the analytical capabilities and performance of its core staff. How had this 
occurred? Starting point for this exploratory research was the thorough examination 
and understanding of Europol analysts’ perceptions of the use and usefulness of SNA 
as a principal analytical approach. The idea was to better understand their views on 
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 SNA, and the difficulties associated with the intended business change, in order to 
identify factors that influenced the diffusion of the SNA innovation. Thus, the aim of 
this study was to systematically investigate this real-world problem; identify barriers to 
change; discuss their implications for security policy and practice; and, draw 
potentially important conclusions. 
An axiom for intelligence analysis practice in the 21st century is that professional 
knowledge and skills can be improved by the importation of scientific knowledge 
(Eraut, 1994; National Research Council, 2011). The intelligence analysis profession 
has seen many attempts to introduce scientific methods of inquiry and structured 
analytic techniques over the years (e.g. Prunchun, 2010). Researchers have looked 
into cognitive, problem-solving  and advanced analysis skills (Eck, Clarke, & 
Petrossian, 2013; Heuer, 1999; Jones, 1998) as well as intelligence (Clark, 2007; 
George & Bruce, 2008; Hall & Citrenbaum, 2010; Moran & Phythian, 2008) and 
knowledge management requirements for the intelligence enterprise (Waltz, 2003). 
Certain authors also drew attention to the “intelligence analyst as social scientist” 
(Prunchun Jr, 1996). Yet, the reality on the ground is quite different and so a lot more 
is required to improve the professionalisation and “scientification” of criminal 
intelligence analysis (Peterson, 1998). With a few exceptions, SNA remains a 
relatively unknown analytical approach in criminal justice and its potential as the 
“scientific equivalent of link analysis” remains largely untapped (Sparrow, 1991; van 
der Hulst, 2009, p. 103). Despite the well-known affirmation that “it takes a network to 
fight a network” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001), there is little 
sharing of information and best practice amongst law enforcement and intelligence 
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 agencies. Apparently, the existing security networks so far have had little impact on 
the diffusion of SNA innovation (Fleming & Wood, 2006).  
One could also ask: How receptive intelligence analysts are to new techniques? 
Or, how analytical analysts are? The difficulties encountered in SNA adoption and 
use could be attributed to the processes of natural human reasoning (Dewey, 1991; 
Epstein, 1994). Experience has shown that intelligence analysts usually opt for 
simple, practical and atheoretical approaches – as opposed to rule-based, scientific 
ones – in performing their daily tasks (see e.g. Wastell, 2010). That does not work 
with SNA however. A good grasp of network theory is a prerequisite for SNA use. 
One cannot safely disregard theoretical knowledge in favour of “pure practice” since 
this would seriously impair their ability to interpret and draw inferences from the data 
and so result in poor operational performance or intelligence failure. The tendency to 
see criminal intelligence analysis as a software-driven activity makes certain analysts 
perceive SNA as just another “tool”. SNA software tools, however, are just as good as 
the network knowledge and thinking of analyst-users. And, as McDowell (2009, p. 
233) puts it, there is a big difference between analyst-thinkers and analytical 
technicians – this is true for both operational and strategic intelligence analysts. In 
principle, familiarity with network concepts is crucial for the effective deployment of 
SNA tools and techniques, analysis and interpretation of network results. Hence, 
criminal intelligence analysts cannot afford to take shortcuts with scientific 
approaches. SNA, in particular, requires an appropriate knowledgebase coupled with 
practical experience and honing of network-analytic skills.  
But, these are just a few out of many possible explanations. Since the specific 
problem is extremely under-researched one can only speculate at this point about the 
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 influencing variables (e.g. cognitive, cultural, analyst-related, managerial, 
investigative, training or policy-related factors). One thing is certain though. 
Integrating scientific and professional knowledge and practices with the purpose of 
translating them into innovative action is not straightforward at all. Hence, the 
complexity, dynamism and nature of the researched do not permit the setting of too 
ambitious objectives. Due to the number of unknowns, only partial descriptions and 
explanations regarding the factors that possibly influence the behaviour of Europol 
analysts can realistically be aimed at. It follows that the choices of research design, 
methodology and techniques, no matter how inclusive, fit-for-purpose and well 
thought out, will only explain part of the whole. Nonetheless, the study has managed 
to locate this real-world phenomenon and capture its salient features by deploying an 
effective mixed methods design. Specifically, this exploratory research proceeded 
systematically through descriptive (quantitative) mapping, and theme identification, to 
in-depth thematic (qualitative) analysis and topical literature reviewing. Following the 
theoretical application of empirical findings, it became possible to engage in grounded 
theorising, propose ways to address the research problem and identify potential 
avenues for future research. The following chapters present the research process, 
findings and conclusions in detail. 
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 Chapter 2 
Research design and methodology 
Researchers need to start their research with a clear question, objective or 
hypothesis in mind (Bouma & Atkinson, 1995). This is not as easy as it sounds. 
Practitioner-researchers conducting real-world research face particular difficulties in 
narrowing down complex issues to researchable questions. Answering a “scientific” 
question would be an excellent outcome for professional researchers. But, such a 
contribution to the body of knowledge does not necessarily lead to practical 
application. Researching professionals may see this as a weakness (or failure) 
because they focus on answering both scientific and real-world questions that can 
make a difference in professional policy and practice and their research is evaluated, 
among others, on the basis of utility and external validity criteria (Scott, Brown, Lunt,  
& Thorne, 2004, p. 152). In other words, their results should hold in practice and pass 
the “so what?” test.  
Having a real-world question pertaining to the problematic integration of SNA in 
the analysis environment of Europol, the next challenge was to match the research 
purpose to the most appropriate design to obtain the best outcomes. In designing the 
research, the researcher initially provided answers to five important questions about 
the timeframe, coverage, environment, data, and theory underpinning the study 
(Denscombe, 2010b, p. 101). Table 1 below summarises the decisions made. The 
plan involved a survey with a cross-sectional (snap-shot) sequential mixed design; in 
particular, a sequential QUAN  QUAL study (see Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, pp. 
153-154). The main justification for employing this specific design is that it provided a 
better fit for examining and understanding the perceptions of analysts on the use and 
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 usefulness of SNA as an analytical approach. The QUAN part aimed at “mapping the 
terrain” and exploring the main themes in analysts’ responses in order to identify 
facilitating factors and barriers that hinder SNA adoption and use. Based on QUAN 
empirical observations, the QUAL part aimed at in-depth understanding and 
explanation of analysts’ perceptions on SNA. So, the idea was to identify 
quantitatively the main patterns and variety of opinions inside this distinct population. 
Then, important themes would emerge giving the necessary specificity and qualitative 
focus to this exploratory study. In line with the Grounded Theory Method (GTM), 
relevant theory was explored and developed after it was discovered during the 
research process (see e.g. Urquhart, 2013). The thesis discussed several theories 
and concepts that seemed to explain the emerging research findings (for an extensive 
methodological discussion see QUAL analysis sub-section in pp. 50-56 below) in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Subsequently, a thematic literature review in Chapter 5 allowed for 
the theoretical application of empirical evidence.  
 
Table 1: Key research design strategies 
 
 
Timeframe Cross-sectional (snap-shot) 
Coverage Complete population (QUAN survey) 
Purposive sample (QUAL interviews) 
Environment Natural (in the field) 
Data Mixed (QUAN / QUAL) methods 
Theory  Exploratory (descriptive) 
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 Since not enough was known to draw a hypothesis, the researcher decided to 
conduct a questionnaire survey to ground any ideas or assumptions on empirical 
evidence and observations. Having a factual basis is essential before taking the 
logical leap to draw a hypothesis. Developing hypothesis before having properly 
mapped out the territory is quite risky (even for “insiders”) and is difficult to defend. By 
default, such suppositions are susceptible to bias. Potential biases can be overcome, 
to an extent, if appropriate fieldwork and literature reviewing has been done prior to 
hypothesis development and testing. Arguably, a sequential QUAN and QUAL 
investigation is an effective strategy for the creation of “thick meaning”, hypothesis or 
new theory. Other researchers, of course, may take different approaches (e.g. QUAN 
hypothesis testing  QUAL investigation; preliminary QUAL interviews  QUAN 
hypothesis testing). Admittedly, there is no right and wrong way. It is a judgement call 
and it is never perfect (Denscombe, 2010b, p. 2). The choice of QUAN  QUAL 
design certainly related to the assumptions, preferences and positioning of the 
researcher. If sufficient time were available to study this under-researched topic, a 
more comprehensive mixed methods design would have been employed (see Table 2 
below).  
 
Table 2: Structure of comprehensive mixed methods design 
 
 
QUAL   QUAN  QUAL  QUAN study 
To develop research 
questions and a QUAN 
instrument and/or draw 
preliminary hypothesis 
Exploratory (descriptive) study 
aiming at theory building and 
knowledge discovery. How? 
Theory (hypothesis) 
testing, explanatory 
study. Why? 
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 The decision to survey the whole population of operational analysts gave every 
analyst the opportunity to participate in the survey. Since the population size (N=77) 
was not large, a complete population census was a realistic undertaking. Also, the 
group did not suffer from survey “fatigue” since very limited use was made of this 
method to collect data from operational analysts in the past. In this way, a sampling 
strategy – based, for example, on gender and role to come up with a representative 
sample – was avoided. As Gorard (2003, pp. 56-57) suggests, surveying a whole 
population is more preferable than a sampling strategy with its limitations and 
possible biases. The complete population strategy fit very well with a non-probability, 
purposive sampling strategy. Since not all analysts eventually responded to the 
questionnaire, data was obtained from an essentially purposive sample that matched 
the exploratory nature of this investigation better (Denscombe, 2010a). Purposive 
sampling was also used for the QUAL interviews (see QUAL Instrument Design & 
Use in Appendix D). Overall, the study adopted a flexible design characterised by a 
descriptive and exploratory focus (Robson, 2002, p. 58). Despite the exploratory 
nature of research, an explanatory focus was not ruled out from the beginning but it 
remained a possibility the viability of which depended on the empirical findings.             
          
Mixed methods 
Mixed methods (MM) research achieves an effective balance between 
detachment and involvement; objectivity and subjectivity; large-scale and small-scale; 
and, specific and holistic views (see Denscombe, 2010a, pp. 237-239; Mainas, 2009, 
pp. 32-34). MM is not simply a matter of mixing, combining or integrating methods 
(Morgan, 2007). The philosophical and methodological basis of MM is pragmatism. 
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 MM represent the third research paradigm next to the paradigms of QUAN and QUAL 
research. A paradigm is:  
a basic set of beliefs that guides action, whether of the everyday garden variety or 
action taken in connection with a disciplined inquiry. (Guba, 1990, p. 17). 
 
The notion of paradigm has been influential because it stressed the importance of 
scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1996). Kuhn proposed that scientific progress and the 
creation of new knowledge relate to the emergence of new research paradigms that 
challenge existing beliefs about the way “normal science” should be conducted. A 
new paradigm is an improved way of conducting academic inquiry and creating 
knowledge.  
Pragmatism is characterised by a real-world perspective and a problem-solving 
approach focusing on practical results and utility (Denscombe, 2010a). MM 
pragmatism avoids artificial dichotomies and one-sided approaches associated with 
“paradigm wars” between positivist / post-positivist and constructionist / interpretivist 
research (Feilzer, 2010, p. 7). Instead, it embraces both theory-driven (hypothesis 
testing) and data-driven (grounded theory or hypothesis building) approaches and 
benefits from hypothetico-deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning. Hence, 
pragmatism is a synthetic, more inclusive worldview that broadens existing research 
frameworks. There are many definitions of MM research reflecting somewhat different 
understandings. Definitions closer to my understanding are those of Bezeley, 
Creswell, Greene, and Tashakkori & Teddlie (see collection in Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). According to Greene, for example: 
mixed method inquiry is an approach to investigating the social world that ideally 
involves more than one methodological tradition and thus more than one way of 
knowing, along with more than one kind of technique for gathering, analyzing, and 
representing human phenomena, all for the purpose of better understanding.  
 (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 119).  
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 Despite its real-world orientation and focus on practical outcomes and usefulness, it 
does not lose its scientific rigour and character because it adopts an appropriate mix 
of QUAN / QUAL methods to enhance “complementary strengths [and] eliminate…[or 
mitigate] weaknesses” (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 127).  
In contrast, the divide between positivist and interpretative / constructivist 
approaches leads to competing assumptions about what science is and what is good 
and valid knowledge. Paradoxically, the associated philosophical (theoretical, 
epistemological and ontological) debate has created a divide between QUAN and 
QUAL research presenting these as rival schools of thought and incompatible types 
of research. Yet, as Russell Bernard (2006) argues, in reality “all methods belong to 
all of us”. Besides deepening the largely artificial ontological, epistemological, 
methodological and axiological chasm, the paradigm war between QUAN and QUAL 
research has little to offer however – instead of unproductive antagonism about the 
perceived superiority of research strategies and techniques, researchers should judge 
their merits and deploy them depending on their research purpose. Gorard (2010) 
convincingly rejects this artificial separation and “paradigm”-label on the grounds of 
exaggerated differences – in  his view, MM is the natural way of conducting good 
research. So, the ability to handle evidence (data) in the form of numbers or words 
does not justify the adoption of partial approaches to academic inquiry and the 
creation of a methodological “schism”. A contingency theory of research would cover 
all three paradigms and provide crucial guidance to help researchers design their 
studies and deploy the right mix of methods in different situations (Johnson et al., 
2007, p. 127). Such a theory would avoid overly prescriptive solutions and propose 
instead the creative use of methods to facilitate knowledge generation and discovery.  
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 MM research promotes a unified theoretical perspective for the conduct of 
scientific inquiry and it is this perspective that underpins the methodological position 
of this thesis. To the extent permitted by the researcher’s knowledge, skills and ability 
to control things, this position does not allow artificial dichotomies, or overstated 
dualisms, interfere with the pragmatist standpoint, choice of research design and 
ability to understand. Social science research should be committed to a vision of 
synergetic enterprise between research traditions. QUAN and QUAL methods are 
equally viable alternatives that can be combined, depending on the situation, to 
achieve better outcomes. The pragmatism of MM conveys a sense of maturity, unity 
of purpose and freedom that truly empowers the social sciences. Johnson et al. 
(2007, p. 129) state that the third paradigm “is cognizant, appreciative, and inclusive 
of local and broader socio-political realities, resources, and needs”. This approach is 
characterised by: 
a heightened reflexivity and responsiveness that may not be necessary in single-
method studies. This reflexivity fundamentally rests on openness to diversity, 
acceptance of difference, tolerance of uncertainty – a mixed-method way of 
thinking.  (Greene, Benjamin, & Goodyear, 2001, p. 41).  
Perhaps controversially, Gorard (2010) suggests that conducting MM research is 
more ethical for society than research conducted in QUAN / QUAL isolation. Through 
inclusiveness, integration of perspectives and a more holistic approach, MM 
establishes a new ethical paradigm for the conduct of academic inquiry. Johnson et 
al. (2007) offer a useful overview of various reasons that inform the theoretical and 
practical MM positioning and justification. The main advantages are: (a) an 
opportunity to conduct research pragmatically (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 7); 
and, (b) a “better understanding of the social phenomena being studied” (Greene et 
al., 2001, p. 30). Pragmatist research signifies an interest in real-world phenomena as 
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 well as policy and practice concerns (e.g. “what works” and notions of utility). Better 
understanding means more comprehensive findings and insightful explanations, 
increased value consciousness and diversity, and enhanced validity and credibility of 
inferences as a result of triangulation (Greene et al., 2001, p. 30). 
Other MM benefits include Web, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest’s (1966) 
“multiple operationalism” and Denzin’s (1978) data, methodological and between-
methods triangulation (cited in Johnson et al., 2007, p. 114). The use of multiple 
methods and triangulation produces finer interpretations through convergence, 
inconsistency, contradiction, confidence, creativity, richer data and thicker meaning, 
theoretical synthesis or development, complementarity, initiation, and expansion 
(Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Jick, 1979; Denzin, 1978 cited by Johnson et 
al., 2007, p. 115). All the above justified, albeit in varying degree, the choice of 
methods for this doctorate project. Among others, the study achieved sequential 
triangulation because the QUAN survey results informed the QUAL interviews 
(Morse, 1991 cited by Johnson et al., 2007, p. 115). Also, it was possible to evaluate 
the usefulness of QUAN / QUAL instruments in relation to the significance of findings 
(Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Sutton, 2006). Of course, there are additional reasons for 
conducting MM research (see typology in Newman, Ridenour, Newman, & DeMarco 
Jr, 2003) and, as researchers explore possibilities for their MM studies, new 
motivations will be proposed in the future.  
Finally, Johnson et al (2007, pp. 123-124) distinguished between three types of 
MM research; that is, QUAL dominant (QUAL+quan), equal status (pure mixed), and 
QUAN dominant (QUAN+qual). This study adopted a pure mixed type to avoid 
biasing the research process by favouring one or the other approach. Due to the 
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 exploratory nature of research, a QUAN or QUAL dominant approach could not be 
planned in advance. Driven by pragmatism, the study was flexible enough to adopt an 
emergent design (QUAN or QUAL dominant). And so, the research emphasis was 
determined by the nature of findings. 
 
Quantitative methods 
First of all, why a questionnaire? With so much published research using 
questionnaires as data collection instruments it is clear that this survey method is very 
popular in the social sciences. It is used so extensively that it tends to obscure the 
application of other methods such as observations and content analysis of 
documents. Gillham (2007, p. 1) argues that it has been much abused as a quick fix 
method and, in parallel, warns that it is easy to construct a bad questionnaire that 
collects poor data. It logically follows that the construction of a good questionnaire 
that collects good data is a difficult undertaking. According to Gorard (2003, p. 90), 
questionnaire surveys stand at the lower end of the hierarchy of research designs; 
are more appropriate for collecting simple demographic data than data on 
perceptions, opinions and attitudes; and, are a “last resort” solution that is “hard to 
justify”. Why questionnaires are so frequently used then? Perhaps since it is an 
economical method for surveying small groups and larger communities of 
respondents – thus providing panoramic coverage – it has been popularised among 
researchers and the general public. Its popularity can be compared to qualitative 
interviews only. This is hardly surprising as these methods are automatically 
associated with the simplicity of asking questions and of everyday conversation.  
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 In reality, the use of these methods in disciplined inquiry is quite different. The 
advantages of questionnaires are: self-completed (by the respondents at their own 
pace); voluntary participation and no pressure for an immediate response; respondent 
anonymity; no interviewer bias; cost-effective and efficient use of limited project time 
and resources; easy to survey a target group and obtain data quickly; technology-
based surveys automate data entry and improve data accuracy; standardised / closed 
(pre-coded) questions in structured questionnaires facilitate completion by 
respondents and subsequent statistical analysis of collected data; useful for theory-
driven (hypothesis testing) research; and, suitable for asking open questions and 
collecting qualitative data (Denscombe, 2010a, p. 169; Gillham, 2007, p. 6). The 
disadvantages of questionnaires are: pre-coded questions and tick boxes can annoy 
respondents; the nature and order of structured / closed questions might reflect 
researcher assumptions and expectations that can bias research findings; simplistic 
methodological assumptions and poorly constructed instruments negatively affect 
data quality (i.e. incomplete and inaccurate responses); the distance between 
researcher and participants creates communication problems, misunderstandings and 
poor motivation of respondents;  the honesty of responses (especially of anonymous 
ones) cannot be guaranteed but can be checked to an extent; and finally, problems 
with low response rates (Denscombe, 2010a, p. 170; Gillham, 2007, p. 8). 
Bearing in mind the pros and cons, Gorard (2003, p. 91) and Gillham (2007, p. 2) 
agree that it is better to use a questionnaire survey in the framework of a MM project 
and not on its own. The combination of questionnaire and interview methods allows 
for a more robust methodological design because each approach complements the 
strengths of the other effectively. This MM design can collect a variety of evidence 
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 along the continuum from unstructured to structured data (see Gillham, 2007, p. 3) 
and ultimately lead to better interpretation. Again, a strategy should be designed and 
used appropriately to meet a specific research purpose. Thus, one of the challenges 
is to eliminate, or mitigate, the effects of the inherent weaknesses of these methods.  
 
Analysis 
Due to space limitations, the detailed sub-section on the QUAN instrument design 
and use was placed in Appendix C. This part provides a comprehensive 
methodological and chronological account of the creation and deployment of the 
research instrument. Thus, it is advisable to read it first before proceeding further. 
The sequential MM design involved consideration of how to analyse questionnaire 
data before (and not after) collecting them, because it was absolutely necessary to 
have an idea of the analytical possibilities and limitations from the beginning (see 
Bryman, 2004, p. 219). This involved thinking of how QUAN findings will inform the 
QUAL interviews and how integration of both types of findings will be finally achieved. 
The survey instrument was created to collect mainly categorical (nominal and ordinal) 
data appropriate for univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis techniques as well 
as statistical significance testing. The analytical limitations mainly stemmed from the 
nature of this small-scale project, categorical (non-continuous or scale) variables and 
sample size. The plan involved analysis of questionnaire data with SPSS, which is 
one of the most popular statistical software packages. Initially, a SPSS spreadsheet 
was set up so that variable data could be accurately captured and analysed and, as 
Denscombe (2010a, p. 245) suggests, coding – that is, assigning numbers to 
categories of responses – was done prior to data collection. Codification of responses 
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 simplified a quite complex analytical task. The decision on how to summarise and 
present the data was made early on. The choice of tables and chart types depends 
largely on the purpose of analysis and presentation (see Denscombe, 2010a, p. 267, 
for example). But, there is always some room for the researcher to decide which 
specific table and chart types to use. Here the preference was for contingency tables 
and bar or pie charts to investigate relationships and illustrate proportions of a total 
respectively. Moreover, the plan involved: (a) analysis of measures of central 
tendency (mean, median, and mode) and measures of dispersion (standard 
deviation) to explore the distribution of data; and, (b) the extensive use of frequencies 
and cross-tabulations of variables to provide useful descriptive information to facilitate 
QUAN / QUAL investigation. Both were essential steps in getting to know the data set 
better. Various cross-tab combinations also allowed for systematic grouping and 
examination of data as well as pattern detection. Identified patterns, in turn, required 
different statistical significance tests for association (e.g. t test, Pearson chi-square 
test and one-way ANOVA) mainly depending on the level of measurement of 
dependent and independent variables (e.g. categorical, dichotomous/categorical and 
interval).6  
The chi-square test, for example, is frequently used to see whether a systematic 
(real) event has caused a directed or undirected (general) difference in the data or 
whether the difference is due to a random sampling error (i.e. chance) (Gorard, 2003, 
p. 126). Significance testing reflects an examination of the difference between 
observed and expected values that make one reject or retain the null hypothesis (the 
starting point). As regards the level of significance, the 5% probability threshold (p < 
6 The selection of appropriate statistical test was based on Buckingham & Saunders (2004) guide, 
which is available at http://www.surveymethods.co.uk/appendixe.pdf  
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 0.05) was used. In practice, chi-square analysis points to significant or non-significant 
results that might need to be followed up in order to lead to a useful interpretation 
(Gorard, 2003, p. 130). Gorard gives practical advice on how to conduct chi-square 
tests – for example, the comparison of categorical variables should involve a 
sufficient number of expected cases in each cell (something that favours larger 
samples) – but also suggests use of other non-parametric tests (2003, pp. 135-138). 
In addition, Bryman (2004, p. 237) cautions that significance tests should be run on 
samples derived through probability sampling only. In this way, however, he makes a 
generic claim of representativeness regarding probability samples that is not 
straightforward. Since this survey achieved a high response rate of 75%, and 
identified a representative sample, chi-square testing was employed. These results 
were treated as indications of possible relationships in the population of analysts. 
Given the nature of research and the limitations of its exploratory sample, a careful 
approach was adopted in the analysis of two (or more) variables by suspending 
premature judgements and resisting the drawing of inferences about cause-effect 
relationships. Due to space limitations, the detailed inferential analysis of 
questionnaire data – involving application of various statistical tests – was placed in 
Appendix F.  
 
Qualitative methods  
Qualitative methods shifted the focus from quantity (numbers), group attitudes and 
broad description to quality, individual perceptions and in-depth exploration. The 
questionnaire survey was a necessary step for the conduct of qualitative interviews. 
QUAN analysis helped in creating an overall research picture and identifying areas 
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 where interesting group patterns could be discerned. As expected, this initial 
collection effort generated a broad evidence basis to work with but lacked necessary 
depth because single methods cannot achieve both broad coverage and depth. That 
is why the study employed a MM design to collect and analyse both “numbers” and 
“words” and so benefit from methodological integration. Researchers employ survey 
methods, such as questionnaires and interviews, to ask people questions about their 
research problem. This activity is about different ways of researching social life to find 
answers to diverse societal and organisational phenomena. Metaphorically speaking, 
in the words of Oppenheim (1992):  
questioning people is more like trying to catch a particularly elusive fish, by casting 
different kinds of bait at different depths, without knowing what is going on 
beneath the surface! … We are sampling a particular universe of content in the 
respondent’s mind. (pp. 120-121)  
QUAN and QUAL analysis were seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing 
methods. Methodological synergy was achieved through answers to the closed 
questions of the QUAN instrument that helped identify QUAL themes and patterns 
and through answers to the open survey questions that provided additional QUAL 
material in the form of text. Consequently, the questionnaire survey assisted in 
organising the QUAL part of the research and in complementing the interview 
material effectively. A “progressive focussing” strategy was adopted, which is a 
process of discovery characterised by a move from divergent to convergent (or 
general to specific) aspects (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 18). In this process, the 
analysis of QUAN / QUAL data was crucial for a progressive shift in focus and the 
production of new explanations (theory). QUAN and QUAL analysis of empirical data 
helped integrate the whole research and avoid the problem of disconnect between 
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 methods, data, analysis and findings. Clearly, a MM design is held together through 
integrated analysis and interpretation of data collected by different methods. 
Specifically, interviewing is used to: (a) explore mainly individual, but also shared, 
meanings and feelings; (b) clarify questionnaire answers; (c) articulate 
understandings and perceptions and make them explicit; and, (d) explore the social 
dynamics of a target group (Arksey & Knight, 1999, pp. 32-33). Deep esoteric 
disclosures can effectively be elicited by interviewing people. The analysis of 
individual thoughts can help the researcher attain a better understanding of the 
researched. That advantage of interviewing can turn into a disadvantage, however, if 
used in ways that harm research participants. So, the ethical dimension of 
interviewing is a key consideration for researchers. Ethics is of major importance 
because “the softer a research technique, the harder it is to do” (Yin, 2003, p. 26). 
There is a general responsibility to conduct high quality research and protect 
participants from harm caused by the conduct and outcomes of research. The 
potential dangers are many. Both the interviewer and the interviewees engage inside 
the research context in subjective construction of themselves and this affects the 
reliability (consistency) of interviewing and the validity (accuracy) of collected data 
(Gillham, 2005, p. 6). Simply put, the challenge for researchers is to make sure that 
they “hit target consistently” and ethically. To collect the best data, in an ethical 
manner, a researcher should adhere to principles and rules of good practice 
(Denscombe, 2010b).  
Professional impersonality and anonymity of research can give a false impression 
of objectivity hiding the inter-subjectivity and social construction of reality (Gillham, 
2005, p. 6). The research process always has a personal character influenced by the 
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 views, assumptions, expectations, interests, questions and aims of researchers. Put 
differently, a “human” interviewer is the starting point, research instrument and 
interpreter of findings (Gillham, 2005, p. 7). In that sense, objective research 
conducted by a distanced interviewer is a controversial claim. A reflexive interviewer 
should be well aware of the problem of interpretive bias that creeps in when they 
confuse fact and opinion or when they ascribe certain meaning to interview data 
(Gillham, 2005, p. 9). Moreover, the power of face-to-face interviewing is such that 
interviewer skills and style can strongly influence interviewees – even though they 
have a mind and voice of their own – in making certain inappropriate disclosures 
(Gillham, 2005, p. 11). Another danger is that what people say, think and do may 
differ substantially. This can have an effect on the whole research process and 
particularly in the data analysis and interpretation phase. Even so, it is those 
subjective views of interviewees, collected and analysed through a subjective medium 
(the interviewer), that perhaps present the best chance of finding out about a 
research problem. So, since the ethical and inter-subjective dimensions of 
interviewing are interweaved, it is the responsibility of a researcher to consider their 
implications in the design, conduct and outcomes of their research. 
 
Analysis 
Due to space limitations, the detailed sub-section on the QUAL instrument design 
and use was placed in Appendix D. This part provides a comprehensive 
methodological and chronological account of the creation and deployment of the 
research instrument. Thus, it is advisable to read it first before proceeding further. 
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 Recording of interviews was done with a digital voice recorder that created audio 
files of high quality. Initially, a rough transcription with the freeware tool F5 was done, 
drawing summary points for each interview. Transcription is an analytical activity 
through which the researcher gets to know the interview material, surveys the 
meaning of what was said and assesses how this helps in achieving the research 
purpose (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 180). The transcription itself is a process of 
social construction because the transformation of audio-recorded oral speech to 
written text implies complex decisions, procedures and meaning-making (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009, p. 186). It is socially constructed, among others, because the 
subjective selection of “important” meanings represents an abstraction and 
approximation of lived experience. This is especially the case with partial 
transcription. Since this study required full transcription of interviews for a thorough 
analysis, professional transcription services were employed.7 In so doing, valuable 
time was saved and devoted instead to reading and analysis of interviews. The 
transcribed material was checked for accuracy resulting in minor corrections since the 
professional typists could not understand the specialist language of interviewees (e.g. 
AWF names).  
A crucial task in QUAL research is the identification of themes, sub-themes and 
the understanding of their interrelationships (Opler, 1945). This leads to the formation 
of various theoretical models, abstract descriptions and diagrammatic representations 
(Blaikie, 2010). To start with, a researcher must answer three important questions. 
First, what approach should be employed? Thematic analysis and the grounded 
theory method (GTM) are among the most inductive exploratory approaches (Guest, 
7  http://uktranscription.com 
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 MacQueen, & Namey, 2012, p. 36). Given the time constraints of this doctorate 
project, thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was mainly used focusing the 
analysis on meaning and coding of “meaning units” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Other 
relevant methodological literature that informed the QUAL part of the study included 
the works of Attride-Stirling (2001) on thematic networks, Ritchie & Spencer (1994) on 
thematic framework analysis, and Bendassolli (2013) on the generic analytic cycle 
and theory building. Nonetheless, the analysis benefited from an approach similar to 
(Cusimano et al., 2013, p. 2) who used GTM “as a framework for thematic analysis” to 
enhance methodological sensitivity, flexibility and the possibility of theory discovery. 
Since the methodological approach combined elements of both thematic analysis and 
GTM, this study neither makes claims about the purity of GTM used here nor agrees 
with the view that it should be employed only as a stand-alone methodology, as 
suggested by Glaser & Holton (2004, p. 2). The GTM – an approach associated with 
the work of Glaser & Strauss (1967) – aims at the development of theory grounded in 
field data. The approach fit well with my real-world investigation and its purposive 
sampling strategy (Robson, 2002, pp. 191, 193). Data analysis in the GTM tradition is 
performed in three distinct steps: (a) open coding (i.e. indexing); (b) axial (relational) 
coding; and, (c) selective coding (Robson, 2002, p. 194). Open coding identifies the 
main themes and nuances in participant responses. The researcher creates 
conceptual “entities” (categories) from the data. Such an approach offers flexibility in 
identifying any factor during the analysis of interviews that can assist in the process of 
drawing inferences and developing theory. Axial coding, in turn, identifies 
relationships between categories. Finally, selective coding draws attention to a core 
category or relationships among key categories that form a conceptual model of the 
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 phenomenon studied. Here the analysis need not include selective coding as rich 
explanation could be achieved through axial coding (Robson, 2002, p. 495). 
Nevertheless, the possibility of selective coding and theory development remained 
open throughout the analysis process. Moreover, even though the QUAL approach 
was not intended take the form of a narrative inquiry, it is worth noting that the 3D 
narrative inquiry space was considered during the analysis of interviews (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 2000). Being an insider-outsider in the field, studying the workplace and 
collecting rich narratives, the researcher actively experienced the stories of 
participants, the lived reality of Europol and its culture. That is why the methodological 
approach explicitly acknowledges my active presence in the research setting and 
exposure to its narrative space. This is in line with the belief that the use of 
appropriate MM can improve the quality of research and, in particular, Bernard’s 
(2006) pragmatism that “all methods belong to all of us”. 
Second, what is the role of theory in this study? Theory as well as themes and 
subthemes emerged from the data inductively without specifying a priori hypotheses 
(Glaser & Holton, 2004). In line with the GTM process, relevant literature was 
reviewed and considered during and after the QUAN and QUAL analysis to avoid the 
risks of theoretical and researcher bias contaminating the empirical findings. Bias 
based on theoretical grounds, researcher positioning or otherwise means that one 
runs the risk of finding out only what they are looking for to the exclusion of other 
potentially important patterns (see Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 92). This is due to the 
fact that an investigator acts as a selective filter having a particular worldview and 
constructing a particular answer to the research question. Researcher sensitivity, 
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 systematic application of thematic analysis and constant comparison were crucial in 
facilitating theme discovery and construction (Glaser & Holton, 2004).  
Third, which techniques should be used in this exploratory study? Numerous 
techniques exist for coding texts and identifying themes (see e.g. Owen, 1984) – 
selecting the most appropriate technique is no trivial matter. Ryan & Bernard (2003, 
p. 102) offer very helpful advice on how to select the right one. Certain scrutiny and 
processing techniques were singled out as particularly suitable for analysing rich 
interview material (i.e. metaphors, indigenous typologies, repetitions, forcefulness, 
transitions, similarities and differences). After careful consideration, the search for 
metaphors was chosen as key theme identification technique. The coding and 
analysis of interviews was performed with ATLAS.ti 6, which is a popular qualitative 
data analysis (QDA) software package. Computer-assisted techniques facilitate 
QUAL work, but the primary tool of the researcher is thinking complemented by acute 
awareness of analytical fallacies (Konopasek, 2008; Robson, 2002, pp. 459-460). For 
this reason, paper, pencil and coloured pens were also used to make notes and 
highlight interesting parts of text. The combination of computer-based and “old 
school”-approach greatly facilitated reading, understanding and the whole coding 
process. Boyatzis (1998) suggested three additional ways of developing themes: 
theory-driven coding (deductive); prior research-based coding; and, coding from raw 
data (exploratory). Here the latter two approaches were employed to develop codes 
based on the results of QUAN analysis and code raw interview material. Open and 
prior research coding together with the identification of metaphors enhanced the 
reliability and validity of QUAL results. Of course, coding leads back to the discussion 
about the relation between data and theory and the “right” way of conducting QUAL 
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 research that – especially in the framework of GTM – has created much controversy 
(see e.g. Bryant, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Kelle, 2005; Suddaby, 2006). In 
practice, however, the debate about this admittedly complex work is perhaps 
exaggerated to an extent. The reason is that a researcher can look at the collected 
material with a view to identifying new things (“emergence”) and, in parallel or 
sequentially, consider existing theories and concepts with a view to testing, extending 
and coming up with a new synthesis. In my opinion, overly prescriptive approaches 
limit the systematic process of discovery. QUAL analysis need not be a rigid 
application of rules of different schools of thought, but can be applied in flexible and 
eclectic ways (Robson, 2002, p. 492). An investigator who adopts a pragmatic 
perspective is free to use techniques from different traditions that are fit-for-purpose 
and facilitate systematic exploration and thinking. Real-world research can also 
benefit from the analysis techniques of Miles & Huberman (1994), content analysis or 
other ethnographic, phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches (see e.g. 
Robson, 2002, pp. 458, 498). The study considered the qualitative approaches taken 
in certain exemplar papers (e.g. Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Gersick, 1988; 
Isabella, 1990; Sutton, 1987). Finally, to ensure systematic application, analysis and 
reporting of qualitative results, the COREQ 32-item checklist (Tong, Sainsbury, & 
Craig, 2007) and Tracy’s (2010) criteria for qualitative research were also consulted. 
Overall, QUAL analysis as a holistic thinking process involves categorisation, 
summarisation and interpretation focusing both on manifest and latent meanings 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). A reflexive researcher must be systematically immersed 
in interview material. This is crucial since oral communication is full of diverse, and 
occasionally contradictory, meanings the interpretation of which is quite challenging 
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 (see list of issues in Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 151). Capturing the complexity of 
meanings ascribed to phenomena by assigning keywords to texts and forming 
categories is an ambitious exercise. But, through constant analytical searches and 
comparisons it becomes gradually possible to interpret texts and identify relationships 
and new concepts (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 162). Applied thematic analysis is an 
inductive method that follows certain steps similar to GTM and pays equal attention to 
building arguments on empirical data (Bernard & Ryan, 1998; Guest et al., 2012, p. 
12) . In this study, the combination of thematic analysis and GTM facilitated the 
purposes of synthetic and detailed elaboration while, at the same time, holding the 
potential for discovery and theorising from data.  
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the design and methodology for the whole thesis. The 
study deployed a cross-sectional (snap-shot) sequential mixed design to explore the 
research problem systematically. In this design, QUAN analysis (questionnaire 
survey) precedes the QUAL analysis (semi-structured interviews) to “map the terrain” 
and provide a thematic basis for deeper examination. The QUAN analysis will identify 
in analysts’ responses the main themes associated with the problematic SNA 
adoption and use. Building on initial observations, the QUAL analysis will then focus 
on analysts’ SNA-related perceptions and in-depth understanding of key themes.  A 
sequential QUAN and QUAL investigation is an effective strategy for the creation of 
“thick meaning”, hypotheses or new theory. For this reason, the analysis will be 
followed by a topical literature review and discussion aiming at the theoretical 
application of empirical results. 
56 
 
 Chapter 3 
Investigating analysts’ SNA perceptions quantitatively 
Consistent with the cross-sectional (snapshot) sequential mixed design of this 
study, the questionnaire survey data were analysed quantitatively using SPSS 22. 
Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s Alpha (a = .848) showed high internal 
consistency of the instrument. The statistical analysis encompassed a description of 
the whole sample, an investigation of possible differences within the group, and 
hypothesis / significance testing; with the intention of creating a model of SNA 
adoption and use by Europol analysts. Both descriptive and inferential analysis 
served well the exploratory nature of the research by facilitating systematic 
examination of the collected data, “mapping out the terrain”, identifying the main 
patterns in analysts’ perceptions and paving the way for the in-depth qualitative 
analysis in Chapter 4 and the topical literature review in Chapter 5. For effective 
presentation, the chapter highlights and summarises the key results only. All 
statistical tables have been placed in Appendices E (descriptive statistics) and F 
(inferential statistics) and cross-referenced in text. 
 
 
Descriptive analysis 
For analysis purposes the survey questions were grouped in eight categories of 
variables: that is, demographics; operational analysis and reporting; analysts’ “link 
analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions; analysts; SNA training; network data; managers and 
specialists; and, clients. Due to space limitations, the analysis of the latter four 
variables was placed in Appendix E. These categories helped in conceptualising and 
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 elucidating the main aspects of the research problem. Each category served as a 
broader indicator by which Europol analysts’ perceptions on SNA were examined, 
helping discern the role of specific barriers and facilitators. The relationships between 
these categories of variables and the key questions on SNA use, perceptions of SNA 
usefulness and SNA-induced change in analysis practices (see Appendix C, survey 
questions 12, 13 and 14) enabled the identification of a mechanism of SNA adoption 
and use by Europol analysts. Let us now consider the empirical findings. 
 
Demographics 
 
Table 3 below summarises the collected data by gender; age; country; years of 
service prior to Europol; education; Europol role (job); Europol years of service; and, 
Europol Unit of respondents. Although the demographic information for the whole 
population (N=77) is not available, it is noted that the impact of potential biases is 
minimal due to the high response rate of 75% and robustness of the sample (n=58). 
For this reason, the sample was treated as representative of the population for the 
purposes of this study. Eight demographic variables were included in the survey to 
describe the sample population and investigate possible differences between sub-
groups of interest (e.g. SNA users and non-users). A closer look at each of the 
aforementioned variables shows that the group is quite diverse and this, undoubtedly, 
characterises the whole population of operational analysts. Besides age and gender 
differences, the operational analysts are being recruited from all EU Member States 
and law enforcement / intelligence agencies, have various educational backgrounds 
and professional experiences, work for different Europol Units and projects, perform 
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 different functions inside the analysis environment and thus form a rather unique 
occupational group operating at supranational level.  
 
Table 3: Demographics of sample (n=58) 
 Number Percentage 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
13 
45 
 
22.4 
77.6 
Age  
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60 and over 
 
3 
26 
23 
5 
1 
 
5.2 
44.8 
39.7 
8.6 
1.7 
Country 
Argentina 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
1 
2 
1 
3 
9 
2 
3 
1 
5 
9 
4 
1 
8 
1 
2 
3 
3 
 
1.7 
3.4 
1.7 
5.2 
15.5 
3.4 
5.2 
1.7 
8.6 
15.5 
6.9 
1.7 
13.8 
1.7 
3.4 
5.2 
5.2 
Years of service (prior to Europol) 
Under 4 years 
5-9 years 
10-14 years 
15-19 years 
20-24 years 
            25 years and over 
 
4 
13 
13 
14 
7 
7 
 
6.9 
22.4 
22.4 
24.1 
12.1 
12.1 
Education 
Certificate 
Diploma 
Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
 
3 
12 
13 
29 
 
5.2 
20.7 
22.4 
50 
59 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this context, the considerable variation of analysts’ profiles complicated the 
investigation of the research problem. Specifically, it was found that the significant 
diversity makes it difficult to identify SNA-related demographic patterns in the sample 
population. Due to the heterogeneity of analysts’ profiles, and contrary to initial 
expectations, it was not possible to draw a clear distinction between the demographic 
profiles of SNA users and non-users. In other words, each sub-group reflected to a 
significant degree the demographic variation of the sample (n=58) and of the whole 
population (N=77) so there were no clear patterns to characterise SNA users or non-
users. This observation raised additional questions: how this quite heterogeneous 
group of professionals responded to the SNA innovation? Is diversity a barrier or a 
facilitating factor in this context? This exploratory study tried to answer these and 
other relevant questions.  
 
 
Europol work role (job) 
Seconded National Expert (SNE) 
Analytical Assistant 
Analyst 
Senior Analyst 
 
2 
22 
19 
15 
 
3.4 
37.9 
32.8 
25.9 
Europol years of service 
Under 3 years 
4-6 years 
7-9 years 
10 years and over 
 
17 
20 
16 
5 
 
29.3 
34.5 
27.6 
8.6 
Europol Unit 
O1 Operational Centre & Coordination 
O3 Criminal Finances  & Technology 
O4 Counter-terrorism 
O5 Forgery of Money 
O6 Criminal Networks (WE Hub) 
O7  Criminal Networks (NE Hub) 
O8  Criminal Networks (SE Hub) 
O9 Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme 
 
1 
12 
9 
6 
13 
6 
10 
1 
 
1.7 
20.7 
15.5 
10.3 
22.4 
10.3 
12.7 
1.7 
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 Operational analysis and reporting 
 
Mainas (2009), among other authors (e.g. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 2002; Sparrow, 1991), proposed SNA as an innovative and principal 
approach to criminal intelligence analysis. This stems from an appreciation of its 
benefits to intelligence work. With an increasing number of successful SNA 
applications against serious / organised crime and terrorism (e.g. Krebs, 2001; 
Mainas, 2012; McCulloh, Armstrong, & Johnson, 2013; Morselli, 2008, 2014; 
Schwartz & Rouselle, 2009; van der Hulst, 2009) there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that SNA integration in analysis environments is one of the best ways to 
improve intelligence analysis processes, practices as well as the quality and 
effectiveness of operational reporting. Hence, the specific views of Europol analysts 
on SNA use and usefulness were carefully considered as part of the broader 
framework of operational analysis and reporting. This variable was measured by the 
frequency of delivery and usefulness of five types of intelligence products Europol 
analysts provide to EU law enforcement. Namely, hit notifications; intelligence 
notifications; cross match reports; operational analysis reports; and, knowledge 
products (Europol, 2014b). SNA products, due to their scientific basis and content, 
are an advanced type of operational analysis report.  
In general, the analytical ambition and difficulty behind the production of 
operational reports significantly increases from simple hit notifications to complex 
operational analysis reports and knowledge products. Even though a lot depends on 
the specific objectives and priorities of operational project teams, as well as the 
professional experience, abilities and preferences of individual analysts, it is a fact 
that operational analysis reports and knowledge products are the most important and 
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 demanding analytical products. Intelligence managers, analysts and customers alike 
do not question the usefulness of the latter. Their production is part of the core 
business of analysis units and the hallmark of accomplished professional analyst-
thinkers (Peterson, 1998; Peterson et al., 2000).8 On the other hand, hit notifications, 
intelligence notifications and cross match reports represent the lower level of 
operational reporting that requires simple data processing by analyst-technicians (or 
data entry agents) and reporting of “hits”.9 According to Europol (Europol, 2014a): 
A hit or cross match is a situation where two member states (or third party) 
contributes the same piece of intelligence to Europol unaware of each other… 
The cross match report (CMR) is the most disseminated product of Europol. 
O1 – Operational Centre drafted almost 800 CMRs in 2013… The key word 
when informing about hits is ‘relevant’. It is impossible for me to give you a 
definition on what is relevant. This is a never ending discussion… A CMR is 
reporting on hits between different investigations and does not contain a 
hypothesis or conclusion. It does not go beyond the facts and does not contain 
any analysis. An Analysis report does contain a hypothesis and goes beyond 
the initial facts. The report should contain a full in-depth analysis… to 
disseminate identified important features such as criminal groups, individual 
targets, relevant locations, methods of communication, modus operandi etc. 
The report should include hypotheses, predictions, conclusions, intelligence 
requirements and possibly recommendations. It is advisable to include charts if 
they clarify the text. (pp. 1-2) 
 
In practice, it may be difficult to classify certain reports when they include elements of 
different types. For example, cross match reports may also include hypotheses of 
investigative interest and recommendations about the way forward that are typically 
found in operational analysis reports. Conversely, operational analysis reports may 
8 The legal basis for operational analysis can be found in the Article 3.1(1) of the Europol Convention 
(Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European 
Union on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 1995) and subsequently  
in the Article 5.1(a) of the Europol Council Decision (Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the 
European Police Office (Europol), 2009).  
9 The legal basis for the reporting of cross matches can be found in the Articles 3.1(3) and 13 of the 
Europol Convention (Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention based on Article K3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 
1995) and in the Articles 5.1(b) and 17 of the Europol Council Decision (Council Decision of 6 April 
2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol), 2009).  
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 also examine important cross-matches between cases in greater detail. Even though 
operational reporting demonstrates hybrid elements to a certain degree, the 
aforementioned hierarchy of importance of analysis products is widely known and 
accepted.  
 
Figure 2: Analysts’ perceptions on operational reporting - frequency of delivery 
 
 
 
With this in mind, let us now consider two closely associated reporting patterns 
discerned from the responses of participants. Figure 2 shows that cross-match 
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 reports were among the most frequently produced and disseminated reports followed 
by hit notifications. Specifically, 38 participants (67%) reported frequent / very 
frequent production of cross-match reports and 20 participants (34%) frequent / very 
frequent production of hit notifications. On the other hand, intelligence notifications, 
knowledge products and operational analysis reports were produced much less than 
cross match reports and hit notifications. Nineteen participants (32%) reported 
frequent / very frequent production of operational analysis reports, whereas 39 
participants (67%) reported average or rare production of such reports. Clearly, there 
seems to be an emphasis on lower level reporting by Europol analysts. Figure 3, in 
turn, shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents considered operational 
analysis reports as the most useful type of report followed by knowledge products and 
cross match reports. Significantly, 53 participants (91%) perceived operational 
analysis reports as useful / very useful. Participants considered hit notifications and 
intelligence notifications as the least useful products. For example, only 14 
respondents (24%) found hit notifications useful / very useful. Most likely, cross match 
reports were perceived as more useful than hit notification reports because the latter 
usually provide some basic contextual information about the identified crossovers 
between operational cases.   
What can be deduced from the these two patterns is that cross match reports are 
the most frequently produced type of report (Europol, 2014a), but operational analysis 
reports are the most useful product by far. Put differently, the most useful reports 
(operational analysis reports and knowledge products) are produced less and the 
least useful reports (hit notifications and cross match reports) are frequently 
produced.  
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 Figure 3: Analysts’ perceptions on operational reporting - usefulness 
 
 
 
This finding probably identifies a fundamental tension in intelligence analysis work. 
Apparently, Europol analysts systematically engage in less useful analytical work, 
contrary to their perceptions about what really matters in terms of operational 
reporting. This rather paradoxical reporting pattern suggests that the sample group – 
and most likely the whole population of Europol analysts – may be experiencing a 
work conflict situation. Given the importance of operational analysis and reporting, 
this finding suggests the existence of a “knowing-doing gap”-problem (Pfeffer & 
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 Sutton, 2000) with occupational sub-group and organisational implications, as 
discussed in the introductory chapter. 
 
Analysts’ perceptions of SNA 
 
In this section, the key survey questions on SNA use, analysts’ perceptions of SNA 
usefulness and change in intelligence analysis practices were considered together as 
they are complementary. Based on participants’ responses, the sample consists of 38 
SNA users (65.5%) and 20 non-users (34.5%), as shown in Figure 4. This key finding 
provides sufficient evidence to argue that SNA has been adopted by a considerable 
number of operational analysts despite the predominance of the old paradigm (i.e. 
“link analysis”) and the existence of powerful barriers. 
 
Figure 4: Analysts’ use of SNA 
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 Apparently, the number of SNA users increased over time due to the specialised 
training and analysts’ practical experiences and success stories, which added to the 
credibility and reputation of the method as a useful alternative. These statements 
should be qualified, however, because the relatively high number of SNA users does 
not necessarily imply highly effective application or familiarity with network thinking. 
Analysts’ abilities and practical performance is uneven and influenced by complex 
factors that are not immediately apparent. So, the emergence of the network 
paradigm in Europol should be characterised as a “work in progress”. The existence 
of the two sub-groups of SNA users and non-users within the sample population 
facilitated analysis with the purpose of identifying possible profiles; understanding 
better analysts’ perceptions and behaviours; and, detecting facilitating factors and 
barriers. 
As shown in Figure 5 below, 29 participants (50%) reported that SNA is useful / 
very useful, whereas 13 participants (22.4%) rated it as average. Eleven participants 
(19%) answered “don’t know” and only 5 participants (8.6%) rated SNA as not useful / 
not useful at all. These answers drew attention to the analysts who were unsure, 
neutral or negative about the usefulness of the new method. Also, the sub-group of 
SNA users consisted of analysts who have adopted SNA at different time periods as 
well as analysts not yet fully convinced about its usefulness. Even though this survey, 
and the 2010 survey (see p. 17), did not collect detailed data about this aspect, there 
is evidence that the sub-group of SNA users comprised an innovator, early adopters 
(e.g. the SNA trainers), early majority (i.e. the SNA users in 2010), late majority and 
laggards (see definitions of ideal types in Rogers, 2003, pp. 280-285). Based on this 
adopter categorisation, a risk taker, opinion leaders and broad sub-categories of 
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 deliberate, sceptical and traditional adopters could be identified. Moreover, SNA 
adopters could be placed on a continuum from more “cosmopolites” (i.e. innovator 
and early adopters) to more “localites” (i.e. late majority and laggards), as proposed 
by Rogers (2003, pp. 282-284).  
 
Figure 5: Analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness  
 
 
 
Hence, the adoption of the SNA innovation could be attributed to the different 
perceptions and attitudes of operational analysts towards change. This observation 
not only suggests that the adoption and integration of SNA into the analysis 
environment of Europol is still incomplete, but also that it has been progressing 
through phases of adoption, which is a typical sign of innovations and business 
changes in general (Rogers, 2003). 
 As shown in Figure 6 below, 28 respondents (48.2%) said SNA has changed the 
way they perform intelligence analysis, 13 (22.4%) responded negatively and 17 
(29.3%) answered “don’t know”. Again, the results suggested that a number of SNA 
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 users – possibly among the late majority and laggards – go through a learning phase. 
They did not perceive a change in analysis practices, or did not know what the SNA 
change means to their professional practice, because their skills and performance in 
conventional link analysis were apparently stronger. Moreover, their perceptions 
 
 
Figure 6: SNA changed analysis practices 
 
 
 
 
could be influenced by the new role of Europol and the over-emphasis on lower level 
intelligence products and services. The sceptical and traditional adopters, as well as 
the members of the non-users sub-group, could be particularly affected by the reality 
of their daily work (i.e. data processing, cross checking and cross match reporting). 
For this reason, they could be uncertain about, or reluctant to adopt, SNA. However, 
despite the existence of major barriers, there is evidence of progress. The analysis 
results showed at least 28 confident users – most likely, the early adopters, early 
majority and a few members of the late majority – who were apparently convinced 
about the usefulness of SNA and report a positive change in analysis practices. 
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 Nonetheless, the findings revealed a mixed picture. Participants’ responses to the 
key questions on SNA use, perceptions of SNA usefulness and change in analysis 
practices proved that SNA had a major positive impact. It changed the existing 
analysis practices and influenced analysts’ perceptions accordingly. Increased SNA 
use and positive perceptions facilitated its integration in the analysis environment. 
Neutral and negative responses, however, revealed a degree of scepticism, 
resistance to change and perhaps strong attachment to conventional link analysis (old 
paradigm). Arguably, the existence of barriers – for example, the existing operational 
policies and priorities, client expectations, and network data issues (see Appendix E) 
– hindered SNA adoption and influenced analysts’ perceptions of its usefulness. 
Consequently, further quantitative and qualitative analysis is required to better 
understand the relationship between variables and identify a mechanism behind SNA 
adoption and use. Among others, it would be interesting to see whether the “SNA 
user”-identity had broader effects upon the professional identity of the sub-group of 
SNA users. Let us now take a closer look into analysts’ perceptions.  
 
Analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions 
 
This section summarises analysts’ responses to questions about the acceptance, 
understanding and effective use of SNA; the existence of barriers (or not); and, their 
“link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions. Overall, the acceptance of SNA seems to be 
slightly higher than understanding of SNA (Figure 7 below). In particular, 26 
participants (44.8%) rated acceptance as high / very high, while 17 participants 
(29.3%) rated understanding as high / very high in their operational projects. Below 
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 average and poor ratings confirmed understanding (10 participants or 17.2%) as 
more problematic than acceptance of SNA (5 participants or 8.6%). 
 
Figure 7: Analysts’ acceptance and understanding of SNA  
 
 
 
However, a significant number of analysts characterised both SNA acceptance and 
understanding as average; that is, 20 (34.5%) and 25 (43.1%) participants 
respectively. Analysts’ responses pointed to a significant degree of acceptance, but at 
the same time raised concerns about its understanding. Limited understanding is 
certainly a barrier towards further integration of the method into the analysis 
environment. Acceptance, however, is a facilitator that can be employed to improve 
analysts’ knowledge.  
As shown in Figure 8 below, 18 analysts (31%) rated effective / very effective both 
questions on SNA use and reporting effectiveness. Fifteen analysts (25.9%) provided 
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 an average response to both questions. Twelve analysts (20.7%) reported below 
average and poor SNA use, whereas only 9 analysts (15.5%) reported below average 
and poor reporting effectiveness. The significant number of analysts who answered 
“don’t know” in both questions – 13 (22.4%) and 16 (27.6%) respectively – should be 
noted however. Paradoxically, the responses seem to suggest that the limited 
understanding of SNA is somewhat independent of the effective application and 
reporting of SNA results in practice. Apparently, the results reflected the differing 
perceptions of experienced SNA users (i.e. early adopters and early majority), 
inexperienced SNA users (i.e. late majority and laggards) and non-users. Most likely, 
the latter two categories of analysts expressed concerns about SNA acceptance and 
understanding as well as the effectiveness of SNA use and reporting.  
 
Figure 8: Analysts’ effectiveness of SNA use 
 
 
72 
 
 Surprisingly enough, participants’ views about the existence of possible barriers in 
relation to SNA use in their operational projects were almost equally divided. As 
shown in Figure 9 (below), 30 analysts acknowledged the existence of barriers 
whereas 28 analysts did not identify any barriers. A cross-tabulation by demographic 
variables did not detect any noteworthy patterns within the sample population. This 
peculiar pattern could be attributed to the highly idiosyncratic nature of analysts’ 
perceptions, which are influenced by numerous factors inside a complex analysis 
environment. 
 
Figure 9: Barriers in the use of SNA 
 
 
 
Next, the attention turned to analysts’ answers to five statements pertaining to the 
“old” (link analysis) and “new” (SNA) intelligence paradigm. As shown in Figure 10 
(below), in response to statement A, 23 analysts (39.6%) expressed a negative 
opinion (i.e. disagree / strongly disagree), 24 (41.4%) a neutral opinion and just 11 
(18.9%) a positive opinion (i.e. agree / strongly agree). So, the majority of analysts 
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 were either neutral or disagreed with the statement that link analysis is superior to 
SNA. In response to statement B, seven analysts (12%) expressed a negative 
opinion, 14 (24.1%) a neutral opinion and 37 (63.8%) a positive opinion. The majority 
of analysts viewed SNA as just another tool in the analyst toolbox. In response to 
statement C, four analysts (6.9%) expressed a negative opinion, 13 (22.4%) a neutral 
opinion and 41 (70.7%) a positive opinion. Hence, the majority of analysts adopted 
the view that SNA is not a cure-all. As regards statement D, 25 participants (43.1%) 
expressed a negative opinion, 20 (34.5%) a neutral opinion and 13 (23.4%) a positive 
opinion. The majority of analysts were either neutral or disagreed with the statement 
that SNA is superior to link analysis. And, in response to statement E, six 
respondents (10.3%) expressed a negative opinion, 29 (50%) a neutral opinion and 
23 (39.7%) a positive opinion. Most analysts were either neutral or agreed with the 
statement that SNA has the potential to shape the future of criminal intelligence 
analysis. 
As illustrated in Figure 10 below, the patterning of responses to statements B 
(SNA is just another tool in the analyst toolbox) and C (SNA use has advantages and 
disadvantages; is not a panacea) was strikingly similar – most analysts agreed with 
the statements with very few neutral and negative responses. Answers to the 
deliberately polarising statements A (link analysis is superior to SNA) and D (SNA is 
superior to link analysis) also displayed a nearly identical statistical distribution. Most 
analysts either took a neutral position or disagreed with the statements with very few 
positive responses. Taken together the results might indicate that Europol analysts 
see neither link analysis nor SNA as superior or competing paradigms, but rather as 
complementary tools.  
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 Figure 10: Analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions 
 
 
 
A. Conventional link analysis is superior to SNA because of its broader application areas 
B. SNA is just another tool in the analyst toolbox 
C. SNA use has advantages and disadvantages; is not a panacea (cure-all) 
D. SNA has a strong scientific basis and in that sense is superior to conventional link analysis 
E. SNA has the potential to shape the future of criminal intelligence analysis 
 
The patterning of answers to statement E (SNA can shape the future of 
intelligence analysis) stood out compared to the previous ones. Most analysts were 
neutral, but there were many positive responses (i.e. the third highest number after 
the positive responses in statements B and C) and just a few negative ones. Positive 
responses to statement E revealed the existence of a relatively strong support base 
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 among analysts who appreciated the great potential of SNA in terms of improving 
crime analysis in the future. Apparently, their views were motivated by a need to 
further develop and update their knowledge and skills in order to perform better inside 
a demanding professional environment.So, is the old paradigm dominant inside 
Europol? Yes, it appears to be dominant to a considerable degree despite the notable 
influence of SNA upon analysts’ perceptions. Adherence to the old paradigm is 
denoted by the positive responses to statements A, B and C; and, the negative and 
neutral responses to statements D and E. Besides negative views, the relatively high 
number of neutral responses to statements D and E is also telling. What can be 
discerned from the neutral position is that there is no change in many analysts’ 
perceptions. Neutrality may be a typical sign of passive resistance to change (i.e. the 
“silent” dominance of the old paradigm) with analysts behaving in a convenient 
“business-as-usual” mode. Also, the majority of Europol analysts identified with 
statements B and C; that is, SNA is just another tool with its advantages and 
disadvantages, not a magic solution. At first glance, those statements seem to 
suggest a healthy dose of realism and scepticism. But, those simplistic 
rationalisations also hide weaknesses of the analyst mindset. They imply cursory 
treatment and limited understanding of the topic. Moreover, the perception of SNA 
merely as a tool carries a subtle negative connotation.  
The dominance of the old (link analysis) paradigm is another barrier to SNA 
adoption because it entails a cultural way of seeing things that does not allow Europol 
analysts to fully appreciate the theoretical and practical importance of the network 
paradigm. SNA is reduced to the level of “just another tool in the analyst toolbox” 
because Europol’s approach to intelligence analysis, especially after its 
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 transformation into a EU Agency in 2010, is very much tool-driven, agnostic and 
mechanistic. Many analysts – both SNA users and non-users – do not see the merits 
of adopting a systematic, conceptually driven approach to crime analysis with a 
strong scientific foundation. Neutral and negative responses to statement D, in 
particular, probably indicate a lack of appreciation for the scientific basis of SNA and 
its intelligence analysis applications. Perhaps a scientific approach is deemed non-
relevant or unnecessary. The adoption of such a simplistic viewpoint could explain to 
an extent why many analysts expressed concerns about the limited understanding of 
the method. Moreover, such responses are expressions of a practitioner mindset that 
may contribute to the creation of an epistemic deficit problem. In general, the anti-
scientific perspective with its contradictions and limitations is not only outdated and 
ineffective – running contrary to the best interests of Europol analysts and their 
professional development – but can also prevent SNA from taking its place as a new 
paradigm in the field of criminal justice.  
 
 
Differences within the group 
To understand better the perceptions of the group, cross tabulations, means plots 
and correspondence analysis techniques were deployed to identify associations and 
patterns between the demographic variables (i.e. age, gender, total years of service 
prior to Europol employment, education, role, Europol years of service and Europol 
Unit) and analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions. An interesting pattern was 
found in relation to the occupational sub-groups of the sample population (i.e. 15 
senior analysts, 19 analysts, 22 analytical assistants and two seconded national 
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 experts). As illustrated in mean plots (see Figure 11 below), the sub-group of 15 
senior analysts (SA) thought, on average, that conventional link analysis is superior to 
SNA (statement A). Their perceptions differed significantly from the perceptions of 
analysts (A), analytical assistants (AA) and seconded national experts (SNE) that 
clustered together. SA perceptions also stood out regarding statement B (SNA is just 
another tool). In comparison, the perceptions of A, AA and SNE were moderate. 
Statement C (SNA is not a cure-all) was characterised by the nearly identical 
responses of SA, A and AA, with the exception of the two SNE. This was the only 
instance that the perceptions of the three larger sub-groups converged on average. 
As statements started to favour SNA, SA perceptions shifted to negative mode. In 
response to statement D (SNA is superior to link analysis), eight senior analysts took 
the view that SNA is not superior to conventional link analysis, five held a neutral 
position and only two agreed with the statement.  The perceptions of A and AA were 
again more moderate forming a perfect cluster. As noted above, the three main 
function groups did not seem to perceive conventional link analysis and SNA as 
competing approaches, but rather as analytical tools. Responses to statement E 
(SNA can shape the future of intelligence analysis) revealed a significant difference 
between the views of SA and the other three analyst sub-groups. For SA, SNA clearly 
cannot shape the future of criminal intelligence analysis. In contrast, the A and AA 
were in perfect agreement about their appreciation of the potential of SNA, whereas 
the SNE stood out as those who wholeheartedly embraced the new approach.  
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 Figure 11: Means plots of analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions by Role 
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This pattern suggested that those in charge of analysis projects were most likely 
proponents of the old paradigm while those who actually performed operational 
analysis on a daily basis favoured the new paradigm. This is graphically illustrated by 
the mean plots pattern of SA perceptions that displays a complete reversal from 
positive to negative responses (see Figure 11 [Statements A to E]). The finding was 
corroborated through correspondence analysis, which pointed at the close proximity 
of SA to negative SNA and positive link analysis perceptions in two-dimensional 
space (see Appendix E, Figure 7). Due to the fact that the SA demonstrated on 
average strong “link analysis” bias, it is possible that they represent a traditional sub-
group that resists change and innovation. This negative attitude cannot be easily 
explained since almost all SA attended SNA training together with A, AA and SNE. 
And, 10 of the 15 SA of the sample were SNA users (see Appendix E, Table 18). 
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 Following Rogers (2003), it is speculated that most SA resemble the ideal type of 
traditionalist actors; that is, “laggards [who] tend to be suspicious of innovations and 
of change agents” (p. 284). At the same time, however, it would be “a mistake to 
imply that laggards are somehow at fault for being relatively late to adopt. System-
blame may more accurately describe the reality of the laggards’ situation” (Rogers, 
2003, p. 285). In the role of “gatekeepers” of a link analysis-based system, SA might 
see in SNA a work method that is incompatible with the operational priorities, 
processes and practices of lower level analysis and reporting after 2010. Also, the 
SA, due to their role and proximity to higher management, could experience great 
pressure to make the new system work. From their point of view, it might be entirely 
rational and pragmatic – given the new organisational reality – to think that SNA is no 
longer a viable alternative. Nonetheless, the other analyst sub-groups shared a 
markedly different view. Apparently, the A, AA and SNE appreciated the 
developmental potential of SNA and believed that it can shape the future of their 
profession. So, they seemed to be the most progressive actors, open to change and 
innovation. Overall, the noticeably different mean scores between the SA, on the one 
hand, and the A, AA and SNE, on the other hand, reveal a lack of consensus on 
normative and methodological aspects of their profession, which carries implications 
for the effective management of operational analysis projects. 
Another demographic difference within the sample was found in relation to the 
variable “Europol years of service” (see Figure 12 below). The responses of a sub-
group of five analysts with 10 years or more of Europol experience demonstrated a 
clear reversal – similar to the aforementioned pattern – from positive to negative 
views about SNA and its potential (see also sub-group composition Appendix F, 
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 Table 8). Conversely, in response to statements D and E, the mean scores of three 
sub-groups of analysts with less Europol experience clustered together far apart from 
the mean scores of the “senior” sub-group. This means that long Europol experience 
correlated with negative perceptions and possible resistance to the SNA innovation.  
 
 
Figure 12: Means plot of analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions by 
Europol years of service 
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 So, two interesting differences within the sample population were found, of which 
the perceptions of SA represent a more serious barrier.  
 
 
Further statistical analysis 
The adoption and use of SNA adoption by Europol analysts is a complex 
phenomenon affected by numerous factors in varying degrees. Advanced statistical 
analysis produced a number of interesting findings, including some unexpected ones. 
Through a series of cross tabulations and significance testing, the analysis looked at 
important associations and differences in perceptions within the group. As noted 
above, the main questions of the questionnaire survey were those on SNA use, 
perceptions of SNA usefulness and SNA-induced change in analysis practices (see 
Appendix C, survey questions 12, 13 and 14). Their empirical measurement and 
testing was crucial to provide a better idea and evidence as to what actually 
happened in the analysis environment of Europol with regard to SNA. Hence, the 
need to look into their associations and subsequently compare against other survey 
variables (i.e. analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions and demographics) to 
identify potentially significant patterns. Due to their size and format, statistical tables 
on significant findings were placed in Appendix F and cross-referenced in text. 
Initially, significance tests were conducted to see whether important relationships 
exist between these variables. A t test was conducted to measure and compare the 
difference of the means of two sub-groups (i.e. the users and non-users of SNA) 
regarding their perceptions of SNA usefulness (see Appendix F, Table 1). ‘Test’ or 
dependent (interval level) variable was the “perceptions of SNA usefulness” and 
‘grouping’ or independent (dichotomous/categorical level) variable was “SNA use”. 
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 The null and alternative hypotheses were the following: 
H0: There is no difference between the mean scores of the groups of users and 
non-users of SNA regarding their perceptions of SNA usefulness. 
H1: There is a difference between the mean scores of users and non-users of 
SNA regarding their perceptions of SNA usefulness. 
The difference in the means of users and non-users of SNA was measured by taking 
into account the magnitude of the difference between the two groups and the degree 
of variation within each group (Marsh & Elliott, 2008, p. 176). The analysis produced a 
significant value t(28.359) = 3.987, p < .001, 95% CI [.944, 2.935]. An examination of 
the means revealed that SNA users’ perceptions of SNA usefulness were higher (M = 
3.79) than those of non-users (M = 1.85). More specifically, the independent samples 
table provided the t-statistic value of 3.987 with an associated probability significant at 
p < .001 (see ‘Equal variances not assumed’ row in Appendix F, Table 1). The t-
statistic suggested that the difference in scores between SNA users and non-users of 
SNA was nearly four times greater than we might have predicted from the spread of 
scores within the two groups. The significance level of p < .001, in turn, suggested 
that a mean difference in scores of 1.939 with 28.359 degrees of freedom would 
happen in less than one chance in 1,000 samples, if there was no difference between 
users and non-users of SNA in the whole population of analysts (Buckingham & 
Saunders, 2004; Marsh & Elliott, 2008). So, the null hypothesis that the means of the 
two groups were not significantly different was rejected. The t test, therefore, pointed 
to an important relationship between the analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness and 
the use of SNA. Both the standard deviation and Levene’s Test for equality of 
variances showed that a degree of variance existed within the groups of SNA users 
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 and non-users. In particular, the variation (standard deviation) of responses of the 
non-users group (SD = 1.954) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.318). 
Figure 13 below illustrates the variability in perceptions per use / non-use of SNA. 
Interestingly, a few non-users found SNA useful or very useful and a SNA user who 
found SNA not useful. In general, however, SNA use was strongly associated with 
positive perceptions of SNA usefulness. Moreover, the greater spread of responses 
within the non-users group could indicate the influence of the SNA innovation on this 
group. 
 
 
Figure 13: Perceptions of SNA usefulness by SNA use 
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 Afterwards, a Pearson chi-square test was conducted of the dependent 
(categorical) variable “SNA changed intelligence analysis” by the independent 
(dichotomous/categorical) variable “SNA use” (see Appendix F, Table 2). The null and 
alternative hypotheses were the following: 
H0: There is no association between the use of SNA by analysts and a possible 
change in the way of performing intelligence analysis using SNA. 
H1: The use of SNA by analysts is associated with a change in the way of 
performing intelligence analysis using SNA. 
 
The Pearson Chi-Square test showed that the relationship between the analysts’ 
use of SNA and the SNA-induced change in intelligence analysis was statistically 
significant at p < .001 (.1%). So, the null hypothesis was rejected. However, the 
results of strength and direction of association between the two variables suggested 
that the relationship could be reversed and that the two variables could also be seen 
as symmetrical. Both Lambda and Goodman and Kruskal tau tests reversed the 
strength and direction of association showing that “SNA changed intelligence 
analysis” actually predicted better “SNA use” (see Directional Measures in Appendix 
F, Table 2). It is worth noting that, for the purpose of this analysis, Goodman and 
Kruscal’s tau was used as a more reliable measure than Lambda (Buckingham & 
Saunders, 2004, p. 211). Stated differently, knowing that SNA changed intelligence 
analysis reduced the error in predicting SNA use by 45.8 per cent. Conversely, 
knowing that a participant uses SNA reduced the error in predicting a change in 
intelligence analysis by 26.1 per cent. Such a causal explanation made sense 
suggesting that the change in intelligence analysis practices by the introduction of 
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 SNA actually changed SNA use inside Europol. Symmetrical measures, in turn, Phi 
and Cramer’s V gave a higher value about the strength of association between the 
variables (see Symmetric Measures in Appendix F, Table 2). Is therefore this strong 
relationship asymmetrical or symmetrical? It seems that causal links work in both 
directions, but the effect is stronger with “SNA changed intelligence analysis” as the 
independent variable. Moreover, a symmetrical association is also possible as the 
variables affect one another. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, both results 
were equally considered. Figure 14 below illustrates the identified associations 
between the two variables. 
 
Figure 14: SNA changed intelligence analysis by SNA use 
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 Next, a t test was conducted of the dependent (interval) variable “perceptions of 
SNA usefulness” by the independent (categorical) variable “SNA changed intelligence 
analysis”. The null and alternative hypotheses were the following: 
H0: There is no difference between the mean scores of the analysts’ 
perceptions of SNA usefulness and the possible change in their way of performing 
intelligence analysis using SNA. 
H1: There is a difference between the mean scores of the analysts’ perceptions 
of SNA usefulness and the possible change in the way of performing 
intelligence analysis using SNA. 
The group statistics (see Appendix F, Table 3) showed that the mean of SNA 
users group who reported that SNA changed the way they perform intelligence 
analysis was much higher than that of those who responded negatively. The variation 
(standard deviation) of responses of the group that reported a change in analysis 
practices was smaller than that of the group that responded negatively. Thus, the 
responses of the former sub-group were more homogeneous as a whole. The 
analysis produced a significant value t(39) = 4.259, p < .001, 95% CI [.861, 2.419]. An 
examination of the means revealed that SNA users’ perceptions of SNA usefulness 
were higher (M = 4.18) than those of non-users (M = 2.54). More specifically, the 
independent samples table provided a t-statistic value of 4.259 with an associated 
probability significant at p < .001 (see ‘Equal variances assumed’ row). This means 
that the difference in scores between those who reported a SNA-induced change in 
analysis practices and those who did not report a change was more than four times 
greater than we might have predicted from the spread of scores within the two 
groups. The significance level of p < .001, in turn, suggested that a mean difference in 
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 scores of 1.640 with 39 degrees of freedom would happen in less than one chance in 
1,000 samples, if there was no difference between users and non-users of SNA in the 
whole population of analysts (Buckingham & Saunders, 2004; Marsh & Elliott, 2008). 
So, the null hypothesis that the means of the two groups were not significantly 
different was rejected. The t test, therefore, pointed to an important relationship 
between the analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness and the SNA-induced change in 
intelligence analysis. The variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users 
group (SD = 1.330) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.056). Moreover, 
considerable variability existed within the groups of those who reported a SNA-
induced change in analysis practices, those who did not report a change and those 
who responded ‘don’t know’. Figure 15 below illustrates this point. There were 
analysts who found SNA useful and very useful, but did not know whether SNA 
changed the way they performed analysis. Also, there were analysts who found SNA 
not useful, but, in parallel, acknowledged that SNA changed intelligence analysis 
practices. 
In summary, the results of empirical testing indicated statistically significant 
associations between the variables “SNA changed intelligence analysis”, “SNA use” 
and “analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness”. Most importantly, the significance 
tests could suggest that the strong associations found between sample variables exist 
in the whole population of operational analysts. These key findings indicate that SNA 
have had a major impact on intelligence analysis practices. Based on these reliable 
estimates, it is moreover postulated that the SNA innovation – which changed 
intelligence analysis practices inside Europol – and subsequent SNA use have had a 
combined positive effect on analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness. Gradually, this 
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 diffusion process led to the acceptance and use of the method by other analysts.  
 
 
Figure 15: Perceptions of SNA usefulness by SNA changed intelligence 
analysis 
 
 
Next, the analysis examined the analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions 
based on their responses to five statements (see Figure 10 above). These statements 
were crafted with the purpose of identifying possible polarisation, stereotypes or 
resistance to change. Since they reflected views ranging from strong support of 
conventional link analysis to strong support of SNA, the responses of participants 
shed light on their SNA-related perceptions. The results of correlation analysis of the 
five statements and “SNA usefulness” are listed in Appendix F, Table 4 (see also 
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 Figure 16 below). There was a negative association between SNA usefulness and 
statement A (r = -.289, p < .05). This made sense as statement A suggested the 
superiority of link analysis. Statements A and B, in turn, were positively associated (r 
= .335, p < .05). This demonstrated the negative connotation of statement B that SNA 
is just another tool. Statement A was negatively associated to statement D (r = -.409, 
p < .01) and E (r = -.405, p < .01). Obviously, this pointed to the polarising 
perceptions of analysts who favoured conventional link analysis or SNA. Next, 
statement B was negatively associated to statement D (r = -.345, p < .01) and E (r = -
.313, p < .05). This strengthened the previous interpretation about the negative 
connotation of statement B. Finally, statement D was positively associated with 
statement E (r = .454, p < .01). This made sense as the former suggested the 
superiority of SNA and the latter was about its potential to shape the future of 
intelligence analysis. How strong are these correlations? Even though there are no 
clear guidelines about the strength of associations, this analysis took the view that 
correlations between 0.20 and 0.39 are low and 0.40 to 0.69 are modest (Bryman & 
Cramer, 1990, p. 168). Hence, the abovementioned findings show that the five 
statements pertaining to the analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA perceptions” are either 
weakly or modestly correlated, in positive and negative way, as indicated. The finding 
that analysts’ perceptions are interrelated is not surprising, but the absence of strong 
(positive or negative) covariance should be noted. 
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 Figure 16: Histograms of analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions 
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Thereafter, a one-way ANOVA model was designed to compare the mean scores 
of the four job sub-groups of the sample (i.e. SNE, Analytical Assistant, Analyst and 
Senior Analyst) and examine whether their link analysis and SNA-related perceptions 
differed significantly. Only statement E produced a statistically significant value (F = 
5.106, p < .05) (see Appendix F, Table 5). The F ratio confirmed that there were 
significant differences in perceptions between the four sub-groups as the amount of 
variation between them was more than five times higher than that within them, and 
that a difference of this magnitude was likely to occur by chance less than five times 
in 100 (p < .05). It was concluded therefore with a degree of confidence that the four 
sub-groups really differed in their perceptions of whether SNA had the potential to 
shape the future of criminal intelligence analysis. Interested readers could also 
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 consider the cross tabulation “Analysts’ perceptions by Role” (see Appendix F, Table 
6). 
 
Discussion 
Through a series of inferential tests and cross tabulations, significant and non-
significant differences within the group were found shedding light into the 
relationships between the survey’s variables. Statistically significant associations and 
differences were found between “SNA use”, “analysts’ perceptions of SNA 
usefulness” and professional-level variables (i.e. operational analysis and reporting, 
network data, role, years of Europol experience, analysts, managers / specialists and 
clients). Surprisingly enough, no significant associations were identified in relation to 
demographic variables (i.e. age, gender, education and years of experience prior to 
Europol) (see statistical analysis in Appendix F). This suggests that the current 
analysis system, analysts’ role and experience, and interactions within and outside 
Europol probably exert the most important influence upon SNA adoption, use and 
perceptions of usefulness. Demographic factors seem to be less important in this 
context. This is also corroborated by the observation that the sub-groups of SNA 
users (n=38) and non-users (n=20) did not share distinct demographic characteristics. 
Yet another surprising finding was that the variables “respondent Unit”, “SNA training” 
and “barriers to SNA use” were not significantly associated to “SNA use” and 
“analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness”. Hence, these variables too seemed to be 
less important compared to the influence of professional-level variables. 
The aforementioned statistical results helped outline a mechanism for SNA 
adoption and use, which is illustrated in Figure 17 below. This diagram summarises 
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 the essence of inferential analysis findings (not to be confused with a structural 
equation model). In this mechanism, solid lines and direction of arrows do not 
necessarily represent cause-effect relationships. But, they indicate strong and 
potentially important asymmetric relationships between the key SNA variables, 
professional-level and demographic variables on the basis of statistically significant 
findings. Dotted lines, in turn, represent non-statistically significant findings and 
weaker associations between variables.  
 
Figure 17: SNA adoption and use by Europol analysts  
 
 
This mechanism suggests that the importation of SNA into Europol’s analysis 
environment changed conventional link analysis practices affecting SNA use and 
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 analysts’ perceptions of its usefulness accordingly. Double-head arrows connecting 
“SNA changed intelligence analysis” and “SNA use” denote a two-way relationship 
between these variables. This, however, is not a symmetric relationship because the 
statistical tests showed that the effect of SNA importation and subsequent change in 
analysis practices appears to be stronger than SNA use (see Appendix F, Table 2). 
The directed arrows from these two variables toward “analysts’ perceptions of SNA 
usefulness” symbolise asymmetric relationships, which imply that the change in 
analysis practices and SNA use affected analysts’ perceptions in an on-going way. 
Likewise, directed arrows illustrate the asymmetric relationships identified between 
professional-level variables and “SNA use” and “analysts’ perceptions of SNA 
usefulness”.  
“SNA use” has influenced professional-level variables, but the impact of the latter 
upon “analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness” seems to be disproportionately 
greater. These professional-level variables not only mattered a lot more than 
demographic ones but also offset and impeded SNA adoption and further integration 
into the analysis environment. This finding supports the argument that the new role of 
Europol as a criminal information hub since 2010 – and the over-emphasis on lower 
level operational products and services – exerted an all-encompassing influence upon 
the analysis function, its processes and outputs. 
Even though the different perceptions about the old and new analysis paradigm 
among the group of analysts are relevant, the analysis suggests that the problematic 
integration of SNA into the analysis environment was affected by external factors. The 
empirical findings indicated the presence of systemic effects upon Europol and its 
analysis function. Behind those effects were the political and bureau-political positions 
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 and decisions of the 28 EU Member States, law enforcement and European 
Institutions that ultimately led to its transformation into a EU Agency (Council Decision 
of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol), 2009). Those 
powerful institutional actors re-designed its mission and strategic goals and monitored 
top-down implementation. Thus, the new operational role of Europol was determined 
by the dominant political and bureau-political views. 
Although many analysts perceived SNA as a valuable approach that improves the 
effectiveness and quality of analytical work, the reality of their redefined work 
probably biased their actions and occupational ideology. Due to the 2010 reform and 
subsequent implementation efforts, Europol analysts’ professionalisation was shaped 
“from above” (domination of forces external to the group) and not “from within” their 
group (McClelland, 1990, p. 107). The radical reform of their occupation was a case 
of employer- and client-imposed professionalisation. This is not surprising since the 
construction of professions from above and the “government of professional practice 
‘at a distance’” happens quite frequently in modern service occupations (Evetts, 2003, 
pp. 405, 409; Fournier, 1999). Therefore, SNA, as a project aimed at achieving 
“professionalisation from within”, was effectively hindered by “professionalisation from 
above”. The level of divergence between these two interventions was extreme. 
Professionalisation from within saw analysts as knowledge workers (Brodeur & 
Dupont, 2006; Drucker, 1969) and was driven by a need to raise professional 
standards through the gradual adoption of the scientific network paradigm. But, 
professionalisation from above imposed a new organisational mission forcing the 
analysts to function as mere data entry agents. Following Saks (1995), this seems to 
be a case of “professional self-interest” at odds with “public interest” as expressed by 
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 dominant political and bureau-political actors. The 2010 reform did not aim to improve 
organisational performance by investing on analysts’ knowledge. Rather, the idea 
was to establish a system for data input, cross check and reporting of cross matches 
at industrial scale. An over-rationalised system that demonstrates the five 
characteristics of the McDonaldisation thesis: “efficiency, calculability, predictability, 
control through the substitution of technology for people, and, paradoxically, the 
irrationality of rationality” (Ritzer, 2011, p. 584).  An advanced intelligence analysis 
system based on the network paradigm could have served the public interest equally 
well, if not better than the criminal information hub, due to the strong emphasis on 
professionalisation from within. But, as McClelland (1990) convincingly argues, “just 
as there is nothing inevitable or irreversible about professionalization, one must 
accept the possibility of ‘de-professionalization’ as a natural part of the development 
of the service sector of the labour market” (p. 106). Hence, a relevant question is 
whether the operational restructuring – by which highly trained all-source analysts 
were transformed into data processing agents – has produced de-skilling effects too. 
The “natural decline” of the intelligence analysis function of Europol, and any de-
professionalisation effects, will be investigated in the next chapter.  
Table 4 below lists the identified barriers and facilitators of the SNA innovation. 
Since 2010 Europol analysts have been mainly focussing on the production of 
elementary intelligence products (i.e. hit notifications and cross-match reports) as 
opposed to highly useful ones (i.e. operational analysis reports and knowledge 
products). This revealed a tension between what analysts frequently do and what 
they consider meaningful engagement that puts their professional knowledge and 
skills to best use. But, the over-emphasis on lower level products is not simply a 
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 knowing-doing gap; neither an atypical or ad hoc pattern. It is a direct consequence of 
the new operational role and priorities of Europol and, significantly, of its bureau-
political governance.10 Under the new system, sophisticated methods, such as SNA, 
which are extremely useful in the framework of major pan-European investigations, 
are no longer a priority.  
 
Table 4:  Barriers and facilitators of SNA 
 
 Barriers Facilitators 
1 Excessive bureau-politicisation, 
Europol 2010 reform and its effects on 
analysis (professionalisation from 
above)  
SNA innovation changed link analysis 
practices and analysts’ perceptions 
(professionalisation from within) 
 
2 
 
Important differences within group 
- Negative perceptions of senior 
analysts, analysts with over 10 years of 
Europol experience, and non-users 
reveal adherence to the old paradigm 
(link analysis) 
 
Important differences within group  
- Positive perceptions of analysts, 
analytical assistants, seconded national 
experts and SNA users signify strong 
support by proponents of the network 
paradigm (SNA) 
 
3 
 
Limited understanding of SNA by 
analysts, managers / specialists and 
clients 
 
Relatively high acceptance of SNA by 
analysts, managers / specialists and 
clients 
 
 
The creeping tendency toward cross match reporting became an official policy with its 
transformation into an EU Agency. This simplistic approach impedes in-depth 
operational analysis, effective targeting and comprehensive understanding of criminal 
cases or crime phenomena (see e.g. Foust, 2012). In this redefined operational role 
context, Europol has assumed a peripheral role in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
10 See the strategic vision and goals in Europol Strategy 2010-2014 available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europol_strategy_2010-
2014_brochure.pdf and in Europol Work Programme 2014 available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/wp2014.pdf 
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 Justice as criminal information provider. This development signifies the weakening of 
its intelligence analysis and coordination role. Arguably, the new system offers little 
protection from the risks of poor performance and intelligence failure. 
As noted above, the likely source of this strategic shift in intelligence analysis 
practices is the bureau-political influence of its EU Member State partners, and their 
idea of operational support, which culminated in the implementation of Europol 
Council Decision 2009. It is speculated that the main intention of European law 
enforcement was to fully control the analysis function of Europol to suit their best 
national interests. The abolition of its Analysis Unit and the establishment of an 
Operational Centre specialising in data input and cross check is particularly telling. 
Europol’s governance structure – the Management Board, Heads of Europol National 
Units and Europol Liaison Officer network – points to its total dependence and control 
by EU Member States as well as deep-rooted intergovernmental functioning that, 
contrary to expectations, intensified after 2010. Of course, the influence of EU politics 
is much broader and further complicates the functioning of Europol. So, it seems that 
the politicisation and bureau-politicisation of Europol has shaped its operational 
analysis environment. This shows that technocratic considerations inside a too-
politically driven EU Agency are sometimes of secondary importance. This 
interpretation explains the paradox of the problematic integration of SNA.  
Given the competing imperatives of professionalisation from above and 
professionalisation from within, the operational analysts probably experienced a 
severe tension. Professional conflict and individual and group psychology are likely 
behind the almost equally divided opinions of analysts about the existence of barriers 
(or not) in the workplace and the markedly different views on SNA among the sub-
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 groups of senior analysts, analysts, analytical assistants and seconded national 
experts. Negative (and neutral) perceptions about SNA; adherence to conventional 
link analysis; and, limited appetite for learning are signs of an organisational 
environment that does not foster ambitious plans. The post-2010 implementation 
efforts created a McDonaldised analysis system with a single-minded “data input and 
cross check” focus. As Ritzer (1998, p. 3) explains, “McDonaldized systems (through 
rules, regulations, scripts, and so on) do encroach upon, and ultimately threaten, the 
ability of those involved in them to think intelligently. It is clearly dehumanizing to find 
oneself mindlessly functioning like a robot or an automaton in a McDonaldized 
system”. Inside such a system – and under “professionalisation from above” 
conditions – it would not be surprising to observe the natural decline of 
professionalism and the creation of an anti-epistemic culture. 
Despite the identified barriers, it was found that SNA had a positive impact 
changing intelligence analysis practices and influencing the perceptions of analysts, 
analytical assistants and seconded national experts. Even though methodological 
understanding lagged behind, the relatively high acceptance of the method by 
analysts, managers, specialists and clients promoted SNA within and outside 
Europol. SNA training increased awareness of the benefits and applications and 
facilitated wider diffusion of this third generation analysis innovation (see Appendix 
E). With factors for and against SNA the picture is certainly mixed – a typical real-
world problem. As noted earlier, however, the dynamic against SNA is stronger 
mainly due to the formidable power of bureau-politicisation and EU Member States’ 
control of resources. The situation not only offset “proof of concept” achievements, 
but also hindered further SNA development and integration. Nonetheless, had 
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 genuine professionalisation of crime analysis been the dominant variable, any 
obstacles would have been easier to overcome with proper leverage of facilitators, 
carefully targeted interventions and an open-minded approach. In this scenario, SNA 
could have transformed the analysis function of Europol.  
To sum up, the analysis identified two major competing themes regarding the 
problematic integration of SNA: the bureau-politicisation and the professionalisation 
(and scientification) of Europol’s analysis function. Ultimately, the SNA innovation was 
affected by the fundamental tension between these factors. Politicisation stems from 
higher hierarchical levels that determine the direction, content and pace of change. 
The powerful political and bureau-political actors (i.e. Europol principals) imposed a 
new organisational mission and criminal information system (“professionalisation from 
above”). SNA, as a “professionalisation from within”-project of the powerless 
occupational group of analysts was impeded by the implementation of the principals’ 
plan. In Chapter 4, those key themes will be investigated in-depth using evidence 
from five qualitative interviews of Europol analysts and open-ended responses to the 
questionnaire survey. The rich meaning of qualitative material will facilitate better 
understanding of the research problem. Both QUAN and QUAL findings will form a 
strong evidence basis in order to discuss relevant literature and engage in grounded 
theorising in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
In this chapter, descriptive and inferential analysis techniques were deployed for a 
detailed examination of the collected survey data. The empirical analysis shed light 
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 into the relationships between key variables. As it was revealed, professional-level 
variables pertaining to the re-designed analysis environment of Europol matter a lot 
more than demographic variables in this context. The analysis identified a mechanism 
for SNA adoption and discerned the role of specific barriers and facilitators, identifying 
two major competing themes: the bureau-politicisation and professionalisation of the 
intelligence analysis function. Powerful political and bureau-political actors behind the 
Europol reform of 2010 established a new organisational mission and criminal 
information system effectively engaging in “professionalisation from above”. The 
dynamic of this intervention hindered SNA, which was a “professionalisation from 
within”-project of the powerless group of operational analysts. The next chapter will 
investigate the relationship and effects of those themes and gauge the impact upon 
SNA, paving the way for the theoretical application of empirical findings in Chapter 5. 
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 Chapter 4 
Investigating Europol analysts’ perceptions qualitatively 
On a methodological note, a major limitation of the questionnaire survey design is 
that participants’ responses to key variables are not independent observations 
(Lubell, Scholz, Berardo, & Robins, 2012) because they occur in a complex setting of 
interactions and dependencies (Robins, Lewis, & Wang, 2012, p. 378). They should 
be seen as an approximation of reality conditional upon the independence 
assumption of questionnaire design. In this study, the networked reality behind survey 
responses could not be captured sufficiently, if at all, by the research instrument and 
analytical findings. Moreover, it is quite possible that the observations were influenced 
by the networked reality of Europol’s analysis environment. But, to what extent survey 
data are networked cannot be determined. For instance, how, and to what extent, do 
the sub-group of senior analysts influence the perceptions and behaviour of their staff 
regarding SNA? So, the collected data are not network-free (or rule- / value-free). The 
professional network operates at multiple levels inside and outside the EU Agency. 
Endogenous and exogenous network factors affect analysts’ perceptions and actions, 
but the assumption of independent observations fails to capture the complex whole of 
dependencies. So, the survey data and findings are incomplete, lacking the network 
perspective, which is based on the principle of interdependence. This highlights the 
importance of analysing empirical networks and communities of practice using 
appropriate network designs (see e.g. Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Hennig, 
Brandes, Pfeffer, & Mergel, 2012; Scott & Carrington, 2011). Otherwise, the 
underlying network structures and their effects will remain hidden. Europol analysts 
group and connections inside and outside the EU Agency is a complex network 
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 system that can be investigated using appropriate network design and techniques. 
Future research on this occupational group could benefit from the adoption of the 
network paradigm. 
Another limitation, at epistemological level, is the reductionist approach inherent in 
quantitative analysis tradition (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). The next chapter will 
offset the bias of technical rationalism (Schon, 1983) through in-depth qualitative 
analysis of five semi-structured interviews and responses to five open-ended 
questions of the questionnaire survey. Then, the quantitative and qualitative findings 
will be considered together to see whether they lead to convergent, divergent or 
complementary conclusions (Jick, 1979). Mixed methods are crucial in modern 
research because this approach allows for the holistic examination of collected 
materials. A researcher should consider combining independent and interdependent 
observations to capture essential features of the complex reality behind their research 
problem. Words and numbers should be considered in equal measure to tell 
compelling stories and provide close approximations of the “truth”. Exploratory 
research involves a degree of tentativeness in its interpretations and conclusions. In 
response to this tentativeness, future research should attempt to replicate the results 
of past studies, test hypotheses and / or answer new important questions.  
Consistent with the cross-sectional (snap-shot) sequential mixed design of this 
study, the five semi-structured interviews (see Appendix D, Interview Guide) and the 
open answers of the questionnaire survey (see Appendix C, questions 15, 21, 23, 27 
and 28) were analysed qualitatively with Atlas.ti 6. The starting point of the analysis 
was the results of Chapter 3. In particular, the two main themes: the bureau-
politicisation of Europol and the professionalisation of its analysis function. The 
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 analysis built on those themes and considered evidence for and against quantitative 
findings; identified other important sub-themes and their relationships; looked into the 
differing perceptions of analysts; examined unanswered questions; and, explored 
deeper the Europol landscape. Complementary to the questionnaire survey 
questions, the interview questions investigated broader aspects of the operational 
analysis environment – that is, the nature of AWF work; operational analysis and 
reporting; SNA use; examples of analysis work with SNA or link analysis techniques; 
quality assessment of analysis products; benefits and limitations of SNA; facilitators 
and barriers to SNA integration – in order to provide holistic coverage and achieve 
better understanding of the research problem. The QUAL analysis served very well 
the process of discovery paving the way for the literature review and theoretical 
application of empirical results in Chapter 5. Due to space limitations, this chapter 
highlights and summarises the key results only. 
 
 
Qualitative (thematic) analysis 
The model of SNA adoption (see Figure 17, p. 99 above) and the identified 
barriers and facilitators served as a basis for theme development and further 
investigation. The main coding challenge was that the qualitative inquiry opened up 
the whole subject of bureau-politicisation and professionalisation of crime analysis 
and their complex relationship. This extended the scope of coding and thematic 
analysis far beyond the “old vs. new crime analysis”-debate. Hence, focussing the 
analysis carefully around these two themes and their sub-themes was necessary to 
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 ensure that the analysis was both manageable and within the parameters of this 
study.  
Table 5 lists the demographic characteristics of the five interviewees at the time of 
interviewing (i.e. August 2011). The country of interviewees was deliberately omitted 
to guarantee their anonymity. As shown in the previous chapter, professional 
stratification is always an important dimension as it assists in understanding the 
perceptions and behaviour of occupational groups and getting insights into their 
“group self” (Ellemers, 2012). With this in mind, attention was focused on 
interviewees’ perceptions and responses both as representatives of their group and of 
their sub-groups.  
 
 
 
Coding, categorisation and conceptualisation became possible by deriving 
patterns and meaning from the data and progressively making sense of them as 
interlinked thematic (theoretic) webs (see e.g. Attride-Stirling, 2001). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, theme development techniques were employed, as well as Atlas.ti 6 and 
traditional pen-and-pencil approach, to code and analyse the interview material. The 
main technique and starting point of this exploration was the search for metaphors in 
Table 5: Interviewee profile 
 
Interviewee Age Gender Job (role) Education Europol 
years 
SNA 
user 
1 42 Male Analyst (A) - 9.5 No 
2 41 Male Seconded National 
Expert (SNE) 
Master 1.5 Yes 
3 47 Male Senior Analyst (SA) Bachelor 15.5 No 
4 35 Male Analytical Assistant 
(AA) 
Master 3.5 Yes 
5 45 Female Analyst (A) Bachelor 7 No 
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 participants’ responses (see e.g. Ryan & Bernard, 2003). Other scrutiny and 
processing techniques (e.g. transitions, similarities and differences, indigenous 
typologies, recurrence, repetitions and forcefulness) were less used to explore and 
identify sub-themes. Even so, it is advisable to employ such techniques in order to 
triangulate findings. The role of metaphor has been linked to significant differences in 
the way people make sense of, and construct, their social realities in general 
(Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). This means, for example, that the use of metaphor 
in serious and organised crime, crime analysis and investigation discourse most likely 
shapes our understanding of crime and our approaches to crime analysis, crime 
fighting and prevention. Stated differently, metaphors shape our perceptions about 
the world of crime and associated responses. In the same way, Europol analysts’ 
responses included stories and metaphors that gave special meaning to their 
professional context (see Appendix G, Table 1). After many years of “insider” 
experience, the researcher had deep cultural understanding and the ability to fully 
appreciate the meaning of metaphors and of the omitted information. For the same 
reason, he was in an ideal position to identify local terms in the text of interviews.  
Certain metaphors conveyed interesting images very relevant to the research 
problem. Among others, the interviewees felt that: they work inside a “box” or “shell” 
and suffer from “blindness” effects (Interviewees 1 and 5); they are seen as 
“magicians” (Interviewee 1) or “robots” in the workplace (Interviewee 2); they “play 
with the data”, “dump data in the system” and “dig” to identify patterns (Interviewees 
1, 3 and 5); they select “screwdriver or wrench” from their “toolkit” to perform 
analytical tasks (Interviewee 4); operational analysis is “dying” (interviewee 1) 
because analysis aimed at solving crime problems is “floating away” (Interviewee 3); 
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 and, the current organisational vision is to “press a button” to perform analysis 
(Interviewees 3 and 5). One of the most interesting metaphors was the view of crime 
analysis as if a process of typing in Microsoft Word. Interviewee 3 said “you can 
almost fly to the moon with MS Word, but basically using it for 95% is just typing” and 
then argued in favour of “basic work” compared to more ambitious analysis involving 
application of social science techniques and interpretation of findings. Immediately, 
his concept stood out from the collected interview material. The image of operational 
crime analysis as a MS Word processor, and of Europol analysts as mere “typists”, 
drew attention to the fit between SNA – an advanced (scientific) approach – and the 
basic work of crime analysis. Among other things, this business “philosophy” and its 
practices was evidence of the dominance of elementary analysis practices (i.e. data 
input and cross check / match reporting) and of Europol’s McDonaldised analysis 
system, after the 2010 reform. The explanation of Interviewee 3 (SA) indicated that 
this new approach had already been rationalised – albeit in simplistic terms – inside 
Europol and presented as justification for the business change. Interestingly, the 
interviewee’s metaphor implied that the main reform argument regarding operational 
crime analysis was that considerable results could be achieved by focusing on 
elementary work only. In that sense, it emerged as the prime barrier to the adoption 
and integration of sophisticated crime analysis strategies in the workplace. Basic work 
did not emerge “out of the blue” – quite the opposite as it seemed to be the core 
process of the criminal information hub. For this reason, it was used as an analytical 
sub-category for the thematic analysis of interviews.  
Overall, the qualitative analysis identified two important patterns. First, bureau-
politicisation manifested itself in the form of the “basic work” phenomenon inside the 
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 analysis environment of Europol. Second, the problematic professionalisation of crime 
analysis was characterised by an epistemic deficit. Specifically, it was found that 
these patterns were not mutually exclusive and there was an asymmetric relationship 
between the themes and sub-themes that pointed to the dominance of bureau-
politicisation. Indeed, the new role of Europol and its basic work implementation had a 
serious impact on the professionalisation of crime analysis, generally, and on the 
SNA innovation, particularly. 
Table 6 (below) lists the main themes and sub-themes. These conceptual 
categories helped organise the central meanings reflected in the experiences and 
views of participants. Let us now look into the empirical findings in more detail and 
assess their implications for the research problem. 
 
Table 6: Themes and sub-themes 
 
Themes (main  
conceptual categories) 
Sub-themes Discussion topics 
Politicisation and bureau-
politicisation (bureaucratic-
politics) 
Basic Work phenomenon Europol as a criminal 
information system 
after the 2010 reform 
 
Professionalisation of 
criminal intelligence 
analysis 
Professionalisation from 
above vs. Professionalisation 
from within 
SNA, conventional link 
analysis and the 
epistemic deficit 
 
The Basic Work phenomenon 
 
 Careful reading of interview texts identified basic work as a particularly important 
barrier to SNA integration and its further development inside Europol. This 
phenomenon symbolises an important transition in the history of Europol that is 
characterised by a seemingly inexplicable change to its core business – operational 
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 intelligence analysis. As noted in the previous chapter, Europol closed down its 
centralised Analysis Unit and created an operational centre focusing exclusively on 
the processing of crime data. Basic work is defined as a business approach 
associated with the prevalence of technical processes of data input and cross check / 
match reporting (i.e. minimum analytic ambition) and, in parallel, a dissociation from 
all-source, full-fledged operational crime analysis to a large extent. Officially, this 
business change took effect with the transformation of Europol into EU Agency in 
2010. The reform however was preceded by a gradual weakening of its Analysis Unit, 
which lost nearly 80% of its members to other specialist operational units (Europol, 
2009b, 2010b). This significant sub-theme emerged from the interview data.   
Quite often you can do a lot with the basics. Take Microsoft Word, with just typing 
you can use the programme …  you can almost fly to the moon with Microsoft 
Word but basically using it for 95% is just typing… You shouldn’t alienate from the 
work. So there shouldn’t be too big gap and want to act on academic level. The 
whole level should rise, but if the gap gets too big, you get products, which are 
very academic, and you use social science techniques, but in the end you alienate 
from basic work. So it becomes an objective in itself to create a product, it doesn’t 
solve anymore the problem or support the solving of the problem. (Interviewee 3) 
 
Interestingly, the interviewee (senior analyst) linked the “return to the basics” with 
the essence of crime analysis; the need to improve work-related performance; and, a 
conscious decision to take a distance from social science because “academic 
products alienate from basic work”. These reform assumptions are subtly linked to the 
main themes and sub-themes of the research problem and will be further discussed 
below. Yet another reform argument was the need to meet increased demand for 
service and support EU law enforcement accordingly (see Figure 1, p. 26). 
Confronted with the problem of delivering products and services that “support the 
solving of the problem”, as Interviewee 3 put it, Europol re-structured its analysis 
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 processes in order to provide elementary products and services to its customers. 
What did the operational analysts think about this change? Let us consider their point 
of view.  
In the post 2010 period, data processing and reporting of crossovers became the 
main analytical task for all Europol analysts. The new work method reduced analysis 
to a series of mechanical, repetitive tasks and the analysts were treated as if 
machinery resources in a factory setting. At the same time, managerial (basic work) 
ambitions remained high. All interviewees mentioned the problem of information 
overload that forced them to do “more with less”, over-stretching the whole analysis 
function. The huge flows of information did not necessarily improve the quality of 
information provided to Europol for analysis purposes. Also, the technical complexity 
and the administrative burden grew significantly reducing the time available for pure 
analysis work. The overly mechanistic work process affected the integrity of Europol 
databases and the quality of analytical processes and products. The separation of 
data processing from analysis – which rests on fundamentally flawed assumptions 
about criminal intelligence analysis – contributed significantly to the inefficient 
management of operational projects. By almost exclusively focusing on basic work, 
Europol’s capability to support major pan-European investigations was seriously 
affected because crime analysis was restricted to the initial stage of the Analysis 
Cycle (Europol, 2000). As a result, the operational analysts saw Europol 
management, and client, demands and expectations as unrealistic. 
The most important is to normalise the data we receive from the Member States...  
we insert the data to see if the person who made the suspicious transactions is 
known to other Work Files, if they are linked to other criminal activities.  Many 
appear to be known to be active in other criminal activities like drugs, smuggling 
human beings, child pornography and so on and so forth. (Interviewee 1) 
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 Roughly speaking, the administration - and I’m counting also the processing 
phase as administration, so when I process data into the database - I would say 
roughly maybe 60% of my work time, it could be 70%, when I receive the data and 
process it and mark it as sent and do all these administrative steps. So I would 
say it’s at least more than half. So it’s quite a heavy burden actually. (Interviewee 
4) 
 
Because of the overload of work, people … make their final objective to get all the 
data processed and to identify the cross-matches. That becomes their aim. … 
sometimes better just to stop processing a moment and analyse the data.  What I 
mean with analysing is come to an interpretation, come to a conclusion.  I think 
gradually we turned into a situation where … the objective becomes to process 
the data not any more to take further steps.  (Interviewee 3) 
 
If a country provides you just with basic information of an operation, you try to do 
everything but you cannot get a rabbit out of the hat if there’s no… So you can try 
to make a link analysis, time analysis, financial analysis. But if the information is 
very poor and limited, at the end you say “okay, I’m going to skip this one because 
it doesn’t make any sense”. It won’t give any additional value. So we can provide 
them with what is possible. But they have to give feedback… it’s a double side 
product. …It’s not that we decide it’s like this. We see what information they 
provide; we normally ask additional information. If they don’t reply or the 
information is still poor, say “Look we try to do our best but we’re not magicians.” 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
The analyst won’t be the one who’s trying to process the data.  The data will be 
pre-processed through the operational centre and from my experience and other 
colleagues’ experience this kind of pre-processing of data in an operational centre 
is not of very good quality.  So, 90% of the time you have to get back in the data, 
sort it out because the links were wrong or they missed something.  So, if you 
don’t trust the one who is pre-processing, it’s a waste of time and it’s a pity 
because it’s just a waste of resources…. I really like to be different because I don’t 
want to be like a robot.  I mean that’s not an analyst; an analyst has to be different 
from one to another. (Interviewee 2) 
 
 
It seems that Europol, and its EU partners, have failed to appreciate the fact that 
crime analysis entails difficult, systematic and sophisticated work. Intelligence 
analysis is not the result of some mysterious intervention. Interpretation and analytic 
insights result from material practices and data manipulation that allows one to bring 
qualitative information close together and see patterns and conceptual connections 
between entities / objects (Konopásek, 2008). The technical processes of analysis, 
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 however, are often confused with the essence of crime analysis. Data processing, 
storage and cross checking do not constitute analysis per se; these are just the initial 
steps of the analytic process. Data processing separated from analysis represents the 
work of data entry agents (or analytic technicians). Besides data processing, 
however, the work of analysts encompasses the application of advanced analytical 
techniques and systematic thinking with the purpose of producing quality analyses 
and supporting major investigations. Hence, there is a great difference between 
analyst-technicians and analyst-thinkers (see p. 33). The simplistic preoccupation 
with data processing, and the treatment of analysts as if “magicians” or “robots”, are 
particularly telling about the ineffective management of analysts and of the analysis 
function following the 2010 reform.  
Metaphorically speaking, basic work has been akin to “digging the wrong hole 
deeper”. Not only did it expose a rather poor vision, as well as flawed assumptions 
about the theory of the business (Drucker, 1994), but it was also extremely limiting. 
Even so, it turned out that it was not an easy task either and that Europol was 
unprepared to manage the challenges it posed in practice. A constantly increasing 
workload, in combination with an insufficient number of analysts and the ever present 
technical complexities, resulted in an overwhelming amount of data processing and 
cross check / match reporting work. Despite the general duty to notify (Council 
Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol), 2009), 
reporting had to be prioritised because it was impossible to report on all crossovers. 
To determine the relevance of cross matches, “keep the noise out” and narrow them 
down to a manageable number, the analysts relied on certain criteria such as 
information availability. But, there were just too many potential hits of interest 
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 between cases. The interviewees spoke of pressures to manage significant workload 
increases and difficulties in delivering quality products. This situation created a 
vicious circle characterised by recurring problems (e.g. poor reporting quality, 
processing and reporting backlogs). The inability to meet the simplistic objectives of 
basic work exposed further the inherent weaknesses of the new analysis system.  
I don’t know about the other work files, honestly speaking.  I can tell you about my 
work file [name omitted]. The information has increased enormously, 
enormously…. So we try to focus on the request by the customer… but we can’t 
do it in detail, we have enormous amount of data.  We have a lot of data in the 
system and we would be able to provide them with some hints on specific trends 
and patterns, which could be detected on the financial side.  But as I said, we’re 
just three people and we can’t cope even with that one. But we have it in the 
pipeline we try to do something with that. (Interviewee 1) 
 
It is not a problem to insert the data; it is a problem to reply to the hits…It is really 
impossible sometimes.  Sometimes we have to narrow it down because there is 
too many to look into.  So we have the criteria that if a person is identified with 
surname, first name and date of birth, we go further.  If not, we skip it.  The same 
for the address, if we have more detail we go further, if not, we disregard it. 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
Typically, the task of Europol analysts has been to transform crime data and 
information into actionable intelligence. Quite often they had to do this with insufficient 
contextual information and without direct access to the case officers. Since they were 
largely disconnected from the field, it has been difficult to derive meaning and 
relevant conclusions from voluminous linkages and patterns in the data. On the one 
hand, most analysts assumed by default that investigators have had much better 
visibility and knowledge of the crime context since they operated in the real world. On 
the other hand, the investigators who brought their cases to Europol only for data 
input and cross check were overconfident about their case-based knowledge and 
sensemaking abilities. In reality, however, neither side has a more privileged position 
and better knowledge than the other due to the fact that a comprehensive 
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 understanding of a criminal case can be achieved only when investigative and 
analytical knowledge are effectively integrated. Some of the participants – feeling 
rather uncomfortable in their role due the perceived power position of case officers 
(always more knowledgeable than them) – apparently underestimated their analytic 
contributions. They were particularly concerned with the technical challenges of 
handling different types of data and analysing great volumes of data (e.g. telephone 
call analysis). Drawing wrong conclusions that could potentially result in client 
criticism seemed to be one of their worst fears. In that sense, the focus on 
confirmatory hit reporting perhaps mitigated some of the stress of their work. And, 
significantly, they identified aspects of basic work, such as the “silos” of specialised 
crime areas, as performance and professional growth barriers.  
You might be completely misled because maybe this guy has 100 times called the 
pizza service. This is something of course you have to state … this is a possibility 
but - a big but behind - nevertheless it should give the investigator the possibility 
to look into this direction. And also maybe to search for other things he has noted 
already and say, “Oh, this confirms it.” (Interviewee 5) 
 
One…barrier is that now each analyst is working on one specific topic. Previously 
we were flexible, one analyst could be moved from drugs into financial, into child 
pornography, into whatever. Even to open your mind. Now you’re working on one 
field and that’s it… You see it’s a different view…. I don’t have a clue, I don’t know 
it. Yes. We are more in a box. I’m on the financial box, colleagues on the drug 
box, synthetic drugs. I don’t know how they are working on synthetic drugs. What 
are they looking at? …I don’t know it. (Interviewee 1) 
 
To make matters worse, the problematic situation created by the conditions of 
basic work not only limited analytical performance but also reached a breaking point. 
According to the participants, it became almost impossible to simultaneously carry out 
essential tasks of the analysis function (i.e. administrative, IT, operational and 
strategic analysis), prioritise and deliver quality products and services. Hence, they 
saw the organisational processes, and the logic behind, data processing and cross 
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 match reporting as flawed and ineffective. Their responses made clear that the new 
approach was not a much needed reform, but a deform of the conventional analysis 
system. Directly or indirectly, their descriptions suggested that operational crime 
analysis inside Europol – due to the way it has been designed and managed after 
2010 – has been in a state of decline:  
If we continue like this, honestly speaking, the figure of an analyst will die very 
soon.  We are on paper around 100 analysts, and actively working as an analyst, I 
mean using analytically the software, maybe 50%. … let’s consider them real 
analysts working on the data, analysing really the data.  All the others are doing, 
with all respect, don’t misunderstand me; they’re doing strategic which is still 
analysis I mean.  But they’re not using operational data; they’re doing strategic 
analysis. Others are doing administrative analysis because administration has to 
be done in a work file.  Others are techies; they are not analysts any more.  So if 
you take those people, the real, the operational working data analyst, what does it 
mean from my perspective?  That means that in the future the operational 
analytical products will be very few.  If there will be any, they will be small because 
we don’t have time to do it, due to the high amount of data to be processed.  You 
can’t do analysis just by click, make a report on the iBase, just make an analysis 
report, click it, which won’t provide any additional value for the Member States.  
(Interviewee 1)  
 
What I see in this organisation is an emphasis on figures and statistics and 
numbers of seizures. So we’re going down … at the moment I am not positive 
about the future. … in my team we really do try to do analysis. But … it’s now 
spread all over the place… I think intelligence policing and intelligence analysis 
should go so well together. So if you perform intelligence analysis not in the 
context of intelligence policing then it floats away... It floats away, because the 
new commerce, they see that the most important thing is to increase the number 
of SIENA messages and to get as many hit notifications and cross match reports 
as possible. And really the scale of analysis with an aim to solve the problem is 
floating away. So in that sense I am not too positive on the developments. 
(Interviewee 3) 
 
Here it should be noted that the logic of basic work has been formally introduced 
in the analysis process. The new AWF Manual, used by project managers, specialists 
and analysts, makes explicit reference to “basic support / processing” and “hit 
detection / management” as interviewees described it here (Europol, 2014c, pp. 15-
16, 21-22). This proves beyond doubt that basic work sets the operational paradigm 
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 for Europol. Interviewees’ accounts show that Europol created a crime analysis 
environment that bears the characteristics of McDonaldised systems (Ritzer, 1998). 
Its preoccupation with efficiency, quantification, product standardisation and control – 
through the substitution of analysts’ thinking by automated techniques for the 
identification of hits – is a classical case in point. As George Ritzer’s theory predicts, 
the rationality of Europol has produced its own irrationalities. Overemphasis on data 
input and cross check left out the most crucial aspects of crime analysis, meaningful 
operational support and coordination – that is, determining intelligence and 
enforcement priorities for major pan-European investigations – and created a 
dysfunctional and inefficient system producing low quality products and services. The 
new system distorted the established analysis doctrine and standards that once 
defined its core business (Europol, 2000). Since basic work processes deviated from 
conventional crime analysis standards, Europol analysts seriously questioned the 
added value of analytical outputs (i.e. “the new commerce”). Moreover, basic work 
has been a dehumanising and alienating experience. As noted previously, this 
change represented a “professionalisation from above”-intervention (McClelland, 
1990), which established a sub-standard work environment and conditions that had 
detrimental effects for the occupational group of analysts. Due to the severity of the 
organisational rules and constraints imposed upon the analysis function in the post-
2010 period, it appears that the analysts were actually disengaged by the actions of 
their employer. The preparatory actions for the de facto “decommissioning” of 
analysis, and its replacement by data processing, started with the significant 
weakening of Europol’s Analysis Unit, as previously noted. The impact on the 
professionalism of analysts, and its relevance to the research problem, will be further 
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 discussed in a separate section below. 
Closely related to basic work is the fact that Europol analysis and Member States’ 
investigations are, metaphorically speaking, worlds apart. There is a disconnect not 
only regarding physical distance, but also in terms of the problematic communication 
between analysts and investigators and unfamiliarity with each other’s operational 
objectives, work processes, constraints and outputs. The participants gave some 
hints about the reality behind the “focus on the customer request”. Their accounts 
illustrated the tensions and discomfort felt by “lower-level” analysts dealing with 
specific requests and trying hard to provide valuable contributions and explain 
operational findings efficiently to avoid criticism from “higher-level” customers. 
Customers’ power position has had an impact on Europol’s analysis processes and 
outputs. 
So we try to focus on the request by the customer. … There is no book that shows 
you what an investigator wants to see….Okay, nice chart, what is it?  Tell me.  I’m 
an investigator, I don’t understand.  What is it?  Tell me. … Yes, it has to be 
explained by the analyst. … The aim is to receive the data, analyse it and find 
additional valuable information for the counterpart, so for the investigator. … So 
we can provide to them what is possible.  We can try to propose to them different 
methods, different options they would like. … The fact is that when you’re 
recruited you have to be able to work with what they give you.  I think everybody 
should be open to new challenges; that’s my humble opinion I think. … If a person 
doesn’t like it, well I’m sorry, there are places outside, I mean you’re paid for that.  
I’m talking as a law enforcement, okay?  So we are here to work for the customer, 
we have customer, we are paid, we have to work.  Our bosses, they tell us what 
we do. We can agree or disagree, we can tell what it could be but we still have to 
do it I mean. (Interviewee 1) 
 
But we don’t live in an ideal world and then if you don’t apply the proper [analytical 
method] you probably miss something, you probably don’t get the result you 
should. Of course it matters, it also matters in the quality of the report you’re 
producing. Making it logically sound for an investigator because he’s not going to 
swallow everything you write in the report. Maybe he already knows more than 
you. So, you have to provide a really logically sound hypothesis… It’s so many 
factors because I always see myself as selling the product and always try to make 
it easy to read, easy to decipher. Not too many pages, not too many questions. 
Maybe… it depends on the investigator. So, yes providing… easy to read type of 
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 report and easy to get in to it or providing a summary, an executive summary at 
the beginning. Just point out the many important things because you never know 
where this report ends. I mean it’s really frustrating to work for one month and a 
report is 30 pages and you think you’ve solved a case. You get there and when an 
investigator is browsing at this, say “Oh God so complicated” and he is going to 
put it in a drawer, yes it’s really frustrating. Yes, it depends really on the analyst 
and how he can perceive things.” (Interviewee 2) 
  
Additionally, the reactive policing and limited sophistication of EU law enforcement 
customers was possibly another factor behind the creation of Europol’s McDonaldised 
analysis system. It was reported, for example, that certain customers perceived the 
production of an ambitious SNA report as an overly academic deviation from basic 
police work. Thus, it was suggested that, instead of high quality products, Europol 
should be producing analysis reports that “fit the customer” generally.  
There are…barriers… for traditional policing and more modern policing. If you are 
very traditional then I think you’re not interested in those things [use of SNA]. If 
your ambition level is cross matches then… You make a good product, you think, 
but then it is not – they don’t care. I have done…a strategic analysis based upon 
statistics and we spent really months on creating a nice report on the basis of this, 
all these high level statistical techniques. So we went there to the Chief of the 
Police and he had an action day and we came with this report and he said, ”Ah 
this is nice, but where do I have to put my police cars tonight?” Yeah, but that you 
didn’t ask. See you have this good report and the need of the investigator, or the 
team leader, and that should be balanced so that the product should fit your 
customer. And [name of analyst] as an expert on social network analysis [received 
good feedback] “this is a very good product”; but then the investigator, or police 
chief at the time, “Yes, this is a very nice report but tonight I have to deploy five 
patrol cars. Where do I have to put them?” Yes, that’s not on the report, that’s a 
discrepancy in expectations…. so it shouldn’t become too academic I would say. 
(Interviewee 3)  
 
Similar Member States’ behaviours, however, were observed in the past in relation 
to advanced link analysis reporting too. Careful examination of such issues revealed, 
in most cases, a far more complex reality involving hidden antagonisms, impression 
management and the pursuit of specific bureau-political agendas. Among others, it 
was noticed that EU Member States resisted Europol’s operational intelligence 
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 coordination in subtle ways, and at different levels, through their representatives (e.g. 
case officers and Europol Liaison Officers). On several occasions, EU law 
enforcement agencies unfairly criticised Europol products or undermined cooperation 
(e.g. by failing to provide the requested feedback) in order to make clear that they 
were in charge and did not want to be told what to do by Europol. Primacy was a 
constant theme even in routine exchanges. In their eyes, Europol was not an equal 
partner, but a subservient one. There were also cases of unnecessarily complicated, 
lengthy or sloppy Europol products but these were instances of poor quality 
assurance of operational reporting at project or unit level and not the result of 
systemic problems. So, whenever Member States expressed dissatisfaction in one 
way or another about analysis products, it was mainly because they wanted to make 
a bureau-political statement and/or assert their dominance. Sovereignty concerns, 
sensitivities or other interests pertaining to specific areas (e.g. counter-terrorism) or 
criminal cases (e.g. protecting sensitive crime data and intelligence) were behind 
criticism that Europol products were academic and thus “complicated”. Quality, in-
depth reporting was perceived as too intrusive. Hence, in such cases, Member States 
drew a line to show Europol the limits of acceptable (legitimate) cooperation. For 
example, there had been cases where operational analysis uncovered significant 
leads, overlooked at national level, which opened up new lines of inquiry or identified 
new suspect targets. Surprisingly, such good analyses were met with criticism and 
defensive responses on behalf of certain customers. The implied meaning was: “stop, 
we will take it from there”. Silence, non-disclosure or selective disclosures of 
information were other clear signs of customer dissatisfaction and bureau-political 
tactics to make sure that Europol cooperated in politically appropriate ways. Even 
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 though trust between Europol and EU law enforcement agencies has improved over 
time, cooperation problems remain. EU partners’ behaviour reflected their serious 
concerns about an autonomous Europol with advanced analytical capabilities. 
Operational analysis was a powerful competitive advantage for Europol that EU law 
enforcement had to control.  
So, the arguments about divergent Europol-customer expectations, customer 
sophistication and customer focus (i.e. “products should fit the customer”) are valid to 
an extent, but fail to appreciate what is really at stake in the relationship of Europol 
with its EU partners. Specific concerns about the usefulness and relevance of 
analytical products, and the need to meet EU law enforcement needs were addressed 
in the past at project, unit and departmental level by streamlining two-way 
communication and managing analytical outputs marginally better. But, as noted, the 
real issue was the antagonistic perspective of EU law enforcement vis-à-vis Europol. 
The mission and functioning of the latter was a profoundly political question since its 
establishment. EU law enforcement wanted to keep in check its operational projects 
and analysis system so that these did not pose a threat to their national role and 
activities. The transformation of Europol into a EU Agency in 2010 gave Member 
States the opportunity to achieve this by re-designing Europol’s mission and 
establishing a new analysis system that matched their bureau-political interests. As a 
result, the analysis function has been destabilised to such extent that operational 
Europol staff seriously doubt it is fit-for-purpose now. Arguably, therefore, the 
phenomenon of basic work did not stem from a genuine business need to improve 
customer focus and operational analysis support. (After all, basic work and the 
professionalisation of analysis are totally incompatible concepts.) That was mainly a 
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 rationalisation that concealed the true motivation. Rather, it stemmed from a bureau-
political desire to restrain Europol’s analytical capability (i.e. dealing with the overly 
intrusive “analysis threat”) and asserting the bureau-political dominance of EU law 
enforcement upon the EU Agency. For the Member States, it was a balancing act that 
settled their future relationship with Europol and promoted their interests in the best 
possible way. With the benefit of hindsight, and based on the accounts of participants, 
this seems to be a plausible explanation.  
As a former “insider”, the researcher had the opportunity to informally discuss on 
numerous occasions between 2010 and 2014 with many other staff members – 
analysts, specialists and project managers alike – about the new analysis system and 
its serious implications. Most of them, if not all, expressed scepticism, discontent and 
cynical views about the restructuring that echoed the views of interviewees. 
Repeatedly, they voiced the same conclusion that can be summarised as follows: the 
implementation of 2010 reform “destroyed analysis”. According to their viewpoint, the 
new system rendered ineffective the management of operational projects (Focal 
Points) and weakened performance. Many staff members added that, besides generic 
arguments such as information overload and customer focus, explicit operational 
justification for the creation of the new system was lacking and complained about a 
lack of transparency and consultation with staff on such a major business change. 
Top-down implementation efforts and the absence of meaningful dialogue 
exacerbated the uncertainty and stress felt by operational staff (especially of 
operational analysts) about their professional work and future. Hence, the qualitative 
findings have been corroborated by a significant number of operational staff.   
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 Europol bureaucratic politics 
 
Even though more (applied) science in police and intelligence work is required to 
counter the growing threats of serious / organised crime and terrorism (National 
Research Council, 2011), Europol has adopted a quite different approach. The 
analysis of questionnaire responses and interviews showed that basic work is the 
main barrier regarding the application of both conventional link analysis and SNA. 
This phenomenon reflects, to an extent, certain rationalisations (e.g. “the product 
should fit the customer”) and practitioner mentality content with elementary work, but 
deeper qualitative exploration revealed the main theme behind the research problem. 
To understand this business change – and its effect on analysis and the SNA 
innovation – one should consider the bureau-political functioning of Europol, initially 
as an Intergovernmental Agency and, currently, as EU Agency and how this factor 
permeates its operations. Above and beyond, the 2010 reform is an important event 
that resulted from a mix of parochial bureau-political orientations that prevailed in the 
multilateral environment within which Europol operates. How is such a complex and 
elusive concept as bureau-politicisation defined? Various terms, definitions and 
descriptions have been proposed. A term and definition closer to my understanding of 
this concept, and the empirical reality of Europol, is the following:   
Bureaucratic-politics [is] “the process by which people inside government bargain 
with one another on complex public policy questions” (Destler, 1972: 52; Kaarbo, 
1998: 69). Rather than being carefully aligned components of the executive 
branch of the state, government agencies, departments, and office-holders are 
better understood as stakeholders in their own right. They all have certain 
interests to preserve and policy views to promote. These priorities, and the 
conflicts they sometimes spark, influence the formulation and implementation of 
policy – not on the front stage of public debate and parliamentary discussion but 
on the back stage of executive processes. ('t Hart & Wille, 2012, p. 369) 
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 According to Rouban (2012, p. 381), the politicisation of civil servants may take the 
form of “participation in political decision making; control over the bureaucracy; and, 
political involvement”. Also, bureau-politicisation can be perceived as the relationship 
between bureaucracy and politics when, for example, policy formation requires 
administrative reforms, implementation and control through manipulation of 
organisational design (Whitford, 2012, p. 392). From this perspective specific 
observations can be made.  
First, Europol, its Management Board, the 28 EU Member States, the European 
Commission and the Council approved the policies and processes of basic work. All 
major stakeholders up to the highest hierarchical levels have provided political 
backing for the restructuring and its implementation. By restraining the core business 
of Europol these powerful bureau-political actors re-designed and transformed this 
EU Agency into a criminal information processing and notification hub. As a result, 
Europol is neither a centre of excellence in analysis matters nor has such future 
aspirations. Clearly, this intervention marks the politicisation of its criminal intelligence 
analysis function and outputs. In addition, the apparent politicisation of Europol’s 
management, and its submissive relationship with bureau-political EU patrons and 
law enforcement partners, has had serious implications for its analyst workforce. 
Europol analysis lost its direction and value because it was forced to focus on the 
micro issues of reactive policing and criminal investigations in the EU Member States. 
It became a type of reactive crime analysis; the simplistic and fail-safe nature of which 
appealed to certain analysts too. Given the bureau-political realities and pressures, 
the climate inside Europol changed dramatically. Member States’ orientations, tasking 
and unsophisticated solutions became the norm and professional expertise became a 
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 secondary consideration. Europol was too weak whereas its EU partners were too 
powerful and able to influence operational policies, managerial decisions and day-to-
day work. The fact that Europol did not manage and prioritise operational workload 
has contributed to the demise of its analysis function and the prevalence of basic 
support products and services. Ironically, basic work represents an ill-fated attempt to 
do too many things to serve and please all customers. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Europol has been accepting all incoming requests for operational support 
even though the existing resources cannot meet those requests. Perhaps the most 
striking aspect of this organisational pathology is an inability, and perhaps 
unwillingness, to exercise professional discretion. That is, to select the best pan-
European cases with the purpose of delivering quality products and services and 
maximising the impact of specialist analysis. In this way, Europol has been 
transformed into a non-autonomous coordinating EU Agency. 
It’s an easy thing just to process data and make cross-matches.  It needs more; 
yes it needs more to get beyond that.  So but that has to do with managing the 
projects or managing Europol.  What is your ambition?  Is Europol to become a 
place where all data is processed and short quick and dirty cross-matches or...  
And then you get to the intelligence cycle to the intelligence side of policing and 
there we fail at the moment. Yes the customers, the investigator in the street who 
wants to know who’s the driver of that car and I think our ambition should be on a 
higher level.  And then your products should change.  Because if you make a 
product not for the investigator who needs to know the subscriber’s telephone 
number… No, we need to make products for decision makers and then you need 
some higher quality products because the decision maker doesn’t need, doesn’t 
need to know who is the subscriber or telephone number, driver of a car.  The 
investigator need that data maybe but the decision maker needs higher level 
products ... [it is] one of the lousiest excuses … that they are too busy with data 
processing because you can control that and say, “Okay this is Europol, this is our 
task, we want to create a good quality product.  If you let us do 50 different 
projects you will get nothing.”  So it comes to prioritisation.  So that is 
management to say “Okay we focus on those five projects and we will get you 
quality products on those five projects.  And the other 45 it’s a pity because we 
can’t do all 50. So … you have to select your cases.  In cooperation with Member 
States but we have to make a prioritisation.  So you have to say “No” to be able to 
say “No”.  Even if you get five important cases and if that creates an overload then 
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 you still have to say “Okay these are five important cases but we perceive those 
two as the most important and we will provide you with quality products on those 
two”.  So it is a matter of yes, I think the human beings doing the work feel any 
more relaxed and safe to do data processing cross-matches because anyone can 
do that.  To get to the next step it needs more, it needs analysts support from your 
managers. It needs some analysis and intelligence that’s policing awareness and 
if that doesn’t exist, you will fail.  Because then you think as a traditional 
investigator and then you will try to find “Yes who is the subscriber” and then it 
stops there.  And so that is a lack of modern policing I would say. (Interviewee 3) 
 
The analysts’ opinion, however, is that Europol should be mainly supporting elite 
law enforcement units and not all EU law enforcement agencies. Moreover, Europol 
should shift its attention to the higher levels of serious and organised crime. This view 
is diametrically different from the present reality where Europol merely serves as a 
criminal information database that facilitates traditional investigative checks. The 
allocation of valuable specialist resources to trivial tasks hinders EU intelligence-led 
policing and blocks progress. Once again, this indicates the influence of bureau-
politics upon Europol’s functioning; that is, its organisational mission and design, 
customer specification, operational focus and analysis products. 
Of course what we can and what we are supposed to do and that needs steering 
from the highest level of politicians I think.  And then we have to identify our 
customers.  Quite often they say “The police and the Members States, this is our 
customers”.  But there may be one and a half million police officers in our law 
enforcement in the Member States altogether.  But I always say “No, our principal 
customers would be the national crime squads.”  So those investigation teams that 
investigate a highest level of organised crime.  And normally maybe for a country 
it can be different but in many countries you have some kind of national crime 
squad.  So our principal customer should be the national crime squads.  Our 
products should cater for decision makers decide on that level to say “Okay we 
will investigate with the national crime squad this group because it is the top 
level”… So you have to identify your customers, like 27 national crime squad 
bosses and maybe a little, you can have exceptions. (Interviewee 3) 
 
Second, there seems to be a preference over polycentric modes of organisation 
inside Europol rather than centralised ones. Arguably, polycentric operational 
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 structures and activities are linked to the bureau-political suspicion of EU Member 
States towards Europol and the need to control it (especially after its transformation 
into a EU Agency).  The fragmentation of operational governance is a characteristic 
inherited from its intergovernmental past, but now seems to be more problematic than 
before. A prime example of this approach was the weakening of its Analysis Unit, 
supposedly due to internal rivalry with several Specialist Operational Units. On the 
surface, the conflict was about the management of operational projects, the primacy 
of specialists over analysts and competition against “the Kingdom of Analysis” 
(Interviewee 3). It turned out, however, that the demise of analysis was very much in 
line with the bureau-political agenda. Soon after, another major restructuring marked 
the end of the centralised Analysis Unit. This political reorganisation of work and 
reshuffling of resources apparently did not make much sense to the occupational 
group of analysts and did not improve work processes and performance in practice 
either. In that sense, it was perceived as an unnecessary rebranding exercise. But, it 
seems that the real objective was a strategic re-orientation away from intelligence 
analysis for bureau-political purposes, as explained below.  
We lost that game.  (Interviewee 3)  
It has so many elements. You get to sociology or psychology on little kingdoms. 
We have now little kingdoms in work files, we will get little kingdoms in either units 
or in focal points or in target groups. (Interviewee 3) 
 
Member States don’t want analysis, they want hits. (Interviewee 3, personal 
communication) 
 
 
Power games, turf politics and silos are commonplace inside bureau-political settings, 
such as Europol ('t Hart & Wille, 2012). Ineffective organisational design interventions, 
basic work and polycentric functioning can be attributed to traditional bureaucratic 
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 pathologies that are magnified at multilateral level. Essentially, such preferences and 
pathologies are effects of EU bureau-politicisation, which is a principal characteristic 
of the “Europeanisation” or “agencification” process. As Flinders (2004, p. 539) 
argues, this is “the product of a complex power struggle rather than rational 
organizational design… The common outcome of such a political process is a 
compromise that achieves no one’s objectives completely”. Other commentators may 
offer alternative explanations depending on their unit of analysis or where they sit. In 
closer scrutiny, however, one can identify traces of this systemic problem even at the 
level of individual actors who hold positions that enable them to influence policies, 
decisions and/or implementation plans in line with Member States’ agendas. The 
importance of career control by the political patrons of Europol through a variety of 
tactics (e.g. infiltration in key operational positions, sporadic favouritism, and 
“gatekeeping”) should not be underestimated because it is an important means of 
bureau-political control and protection of vested interests (Rouban, 2012). A high 
profile fraud case in a recruitment competition, leading to the dismissal of a Deputy 
Director Operations, shocked Europol a few years ago (DutchNews.nl, 2010; van den 
Heuvel & Huisjes, 2010). This was a reminder of what may be happening behind the 
scenes. Even though other motives cannot be excluded, such behaviours eventually 
serve the attainment of bureau-political (power and control) imperatives. The effect of 
those pathologies and behaviours is harmful affecting organisational culture and 
performance. 
Third, Europol management demonstrates clear signs of experimentalist 
governance (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Member States’ bureau-political actors after 
consultations with EU Institutions put their ideas into practice and influenced 
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 Europol’s operational design. However, it is doubtful whether the chosen governance 
architecture can be called exemplary. As noted in Chapter 3, two major reforms have 
taken place without proper research or evaluation. Professionalisation (from within), 
expert knowledge and evidence-based approaches seem to have been ignored. The 
interviews and informal discussions with members of the Operations Department 
proved that operational staff were caught by surprise and were not consulted or 
informed about the content of reforms and their implementation. In other words, the 
new operational mission, as criminal information database, was imposed in top-down 
authoritarian manner. Hence, the new architecture is an example of experimentalist 
EU Agency governance in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. Objectively, it is 
difficult to justify the narrowing of the scope of operational analysis and the provision 
of low-level support services as the core business. As mentioned above, the view of 
analysts is that volume reporting of hits is of little value in most cases, and especially 
when this mechanistic (albeit prompt) response is not related to intelligence-led 
policing. This role implies that Europol is by-passed by its EU partners. After receiving 
hit information, the national law enforcement agencies conduct their own analyses, 
engage with their counterparts bilaterally or multilaterally, and pursue their cases 
while keeping Europol at a distance. The whole “hit experiment” could have been 
avoided had the bureau-political actors looked into alternative ways of providing cross 
check services to EU law enforcement without wasting limited resources and 
destroying the most valuable function of Europol – operational analysis. I take a 
sceptical view in this critique of 2010 reform and its implications because Europol did 
not learn from past experiences. As Groenleer (2009, pp. 361-362) notes:  
Europol…did not deliver results, and actually even built up a reputation for 
ineffectiveness, for instance through…the long delays, enormous cost overrun and 
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 fraud involved in setting up the Europol Information System.  
 
Europol seems to confuse the need for an operational analysis system with the long-
standing need for a criminal information system. But again, the key bureau-political 
objective of the 2010 experiment could be just that: to reduce the Europol analysis 
system into a criminal information database with human operators. 
Finally, the 2010 reform and its practical implications reveal limited acceptance 
(legitimacy) and support on behalf of its EU partners, which goes together with 
excessive politicisation. The whole analysis architecture – including the provision of 
basic support services (data input and cross check), at operational level, and the 
production of the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), at 
strategic level (Europol, 2012a) – is a result of bureau-political influences upon core 
business functions. This design helps Europol maintain a façade of success while 
being busy with politically-approved and legitimate, but rather inconsequential tasks 
and analyses in terms of their impact on EU law enforcement policies and activities. 
To describe the situation they are in and voice their concerns, many operational staff 
use statements such as “Europol is too politically-driven”, “Europol is the playground 
of Member States”, and “do they really want this place to work?” These and other 
strong informal expressions (e.g. “madhouse”, “kindergarten”) summarise a universe 
of behaviours that require lengthy discussion to cover fully. The core message of 
these local statements and expressions is that the political governance of Europol has 
turned into a major organisational pathology that hinders functionalist perspectives. 
Bureau-politicisation has become a cultural element that permeates every operational 
policy, process and activity of the EU Agency. Directly or indirectly, the EU Member 
States exercise ownership over the governance and operations of Europol at all 
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 levels. The key finding is that the EU Agency has been “hollowed out” by losing its 
analysis function; professional expertise, efficiency and action have been sacrificed 
for insufficient gains in legitimacy; and, the gap has been filled with “presentational 
strategies” (Cope, Leishman, & Starie, 1997; Piattoni, 2012; Terpstra & Trommel, 
2009). The latter refers to Europol’s “window-dressing” techniques such as: paying lip 
service to its unique analytical capabilities and excellent analysts; employing 
elementary statistical figures extensively; and, making frequent public statements 
about the successes (of its partners) against organised crime (Europol, 2010b, 
2011a, 2012b, 2013b, 2014d, 2014e, 2014g).11 The reality on the ground, however, 
seems to be much different from the “bureau-political marketing” picture. A theoretical 
and empirical lesson to draw here is that legitimacy and organisational mission can 
be designed and imposed but at the loss of efficiency. Under normal conditions, 
political goals can be met when efficiency (and expertise) is respected and properly 
managed. But, when efficiency is badly affected by a reform democratic concerns and 
questions should be raised over the state of supranational functioning. In the case of 
Europol, questions should also be raised because the responsibility for its 
governance is so diffused inside a complex “many-hands” process that possibly no 
one can be held accountable for the failure of reforms ('t Hart & Wille, 2012, p. 370). 
Legitimacy and accountability are crucial in addressing democratic deficit concerns. 
However, despite excessive bureau-politicisation and Member States’ close 
involvement with the mission and functioning of Europol the result is low legitimacy 
(see e.g. Groenleer, 2009, p. 348) and an alarming accountability deficit, especially at 
higher hierarchical levels. The power and “fail-safe” position of bureau-political actors 
11 See Europol press releases at https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_press_releases and news at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_news  
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 as decision / policy-makers at EU level together with a shared preoccupation with 
their national agendas has turned the “Europeanisation” and “Agencification” of 
Europol into a risky experimental process with uncertain outcomes. While other 
researchers have concentrated on the role and impact of supranational organisations 
as drivers of administrative reform at the national level (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 
2012) the case of Europol is rather unique in that it requires examination of the 
reverse question since Member States have shaped its mission, processes and 
outputs. This finding not only extends the “no convergence / adaptation”-thesis 
(Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2012, pp. 533, 535) but also provides evidence of active 
EU Agency management and coordination by EU Member States’ national authorities 
(“governance” thesis). The reality of politicisation and its “basic work”-symptom 
demonstrates that Member States resist, or are reluctant, to accept a coordinating EU 
Agency in the field of law enforcement and/or converge towards a truly European 
model of police and intelligence cooperation. So, did the Agencification process 
achieve Europeanisation? Not really. The operational business of Europol has been 
“nationalised” by the collective efforts and preferences of its partners. The formulation 
and implementation of this EU Agency’s business is very much a one-sided affair. Did 
the Agencification process improve business processes, outputs and outcomes? Not 
really. The net result of the latest restructuring is more symbolic functioning than 
before, dysfunctional processes and elementary products of limited value to both 
intelligence producers and customers. Apparently, the time is not ripe for a genuinely 
European structure of police and intelligence-led cooperation or ambitious plans in 
general. The reason may be that: ''everything in the police goes in an evolutionary 
way, not in a revolutionary way'' (Interviewee 3). The implications of bureau-politicised 
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 governance upon Europol analysts, the professionalisation of intelligence analysis 
and SNA integration will be discussed, in a separate section below. 
 
Professionalisation of analysis and SNA integration 
 
Even though no global standard exists on operational crime analysis a number of 
seminal works have offered valuable guidance to law enforcement agencies in terms 
of setting up, managing intelligence units and developing the skill set of analysts (see 
Bruce, Hick, & Cooper, 2004; Harris, 1976; Peterson, 1998; Peterson et al., 2000). 
Crime analysis, or criminal intelligence analysis, has gained popularity around the 
world because it was seen as a crucial component of “ intelligence-led policing (ILP)”  
(see e.g. Ratcliffe, 2008). Europol defined its professional analysis standards about 
15 years ago and set an example in Europe and beyond regarding criminal 
intelligence analysis (Europol, 2000). The new situation is a radical departure 
compared to the pre-2010 period. As the verbatim quotes of interviewees in the 
previous two sections have shown, the degrading of organisational performance in 
criminal intelligence analysis is particularly noticeable. In practice, Europol’s 
transformation designed out the old analysis paradigm, with analysis standards 
(Europol, 2000) symbolically associated with a defunct Analysis Unit. Now the focus 
has shifted on managing huge criminal information database and hits at industrial 
scale, with analysis and analyst being euphemistic terms to describe the reality of 
data input and cross check – or data entry agents. Following the 2010 reform the 
conventional analysis standards bore little relation to practice. Analysts’ professional 
identity and professionalisation have been seriously undermined inside an 
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 environment not conducive to conventional link analysis and advanced analysis in 
general.  
The occupational group of operational analysts have suffered greatly by the 
effects of bureau-politicisation. The new practices in combination with the 
intergovernmental culture and functioning of the Serious & Organised Crime 
Department and growing bureau-political influences upon operational work marked 
the end of analysis and the structural replacement of the “kingdom of Analysis” by 
“little kingdoms”, which complicated work processes further. 
Member States don’t want analysis, they want hits. (Interviewee 3, personal 
communication) 
 
If we continue like this, honestly speaking, the figure of an analyst will die very 
soon. (Interviewee 1) 
 
If you perform intelligence analysis not in the context of intelligence [-led] policing 
then it floats away… (Interviewee 3) 
 
I’m not sure, I think there will remain focal points and I don’t expect a revolution 
there either. Because you see the project managers and the work file managers 
will become the focal point managers with the same staff or a bit less staff 
because they go to central units. It has so many elements. You get to sociology or 
psychology on little kingdoms, we have now little kingdoms in work files, we will 
get little kingdoms in either units or in focal points or in target groups. And they 
already say now the focal points will have specific member states attached to this 
focal point and the same groups. (Interviewee 3) 
 
Managing a diverse analyst workforce of approximately 100 operational and 
strategic analysts without a dedicated organisational structure has created a host of 
practical issues (e.g., tasking, performance, professional development and training). 
The lack of analysis leadership and management became clear with analysts working 
for different specialist units and operational teams managed by non-analyst senior 
officers. The dominant work paradigm (i.e. data input and cross check) was set by an 
operational centre that focused on basic support products and services and 
139 
 
 influenced all operational analysis teams. Advanced operational analysis became just 
an exception. The polycentric operational structure, among others, signified a defeat 
for operational analysts. The failure to establish crime analysis as the core business 
of Europol was explicitly acknowledged by Interviewee 3 who noted that “we lost that 
game”. Now analysts perceive the system of “basic work” as an unsophisticated 
approach to intelligence analysis and a major professional drawback: 
No. I’m strongly convinced that from a development perspective, development 
regarding analysis should be centralised in one or another way. From a 
development perspective it’s better to have one unit and links to that, and flexible 
mobility between projects. And in my opinion it is totally wrong that analysts stay 
for three, four, five, six years in one project whilst in the member state you spend 
a year or half a year in that topic and then you do that and then you do that and 
you gain knowledge everywhere. And now you’re stuck in a project and you have 
a narrow view. We lost that game. (Interviewee 3) 
 
Apparently, both within and outside the Organisation, the contributions of the 
professional group of operational analysts have been generally misunderstood and/or 
underappreciated as the analysts were transformed from “magicians” (Interviewee 1) 
to “robots” (Interviewee 2). This provides evidence that the profession of intelligence 
analysis is neither well established nor sufficiently understood by the wider law 
enforcement community in the EU. The acceptance of crime analysis (and SNA) by 
managers, specialists and investigators has a dubious meaning following the 
restructuring. Indeed, the statement “this is what Member States want” reflected the 
general feeling inside the Serious & Organised Crime Department of Europol. 
Operational staff members seemed to disagree but complied with the business 
change. In any case, the implementation of the 2010 reform was for the operational 
analysts a “professionalisation from above”-initiative blurring their professional identity 
and role. To exacerbate the confusion, Europol maintained their old job profiles. In the 
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 course of this radical change from a centre of excellence in analysis to criminal 
information database Europol and the bureau-political actors grossly mismanaged 
this occupational group and crime analysis as a core business function. Change 
management and implementation activities revealed a limited understanding of the 
complexity and an inability to deal with hit management in practice. Also, the failure to 
justify the end of the analysis system (replaced by an information system) has further 
exposed the problem of bureau-political management in this EU Agency. The 
consequences were noticeable at departmental, unit, project team and individual level 
(e.g. fragmented and disjointed approaches, emphasis on statistical figures, 
confusion over work processes, managerial expectations and customer requirements, 
and elementary analytical outputs) and for the interviewees nothing short of a 
traumatic professional experience. 
The damage to intelligence analysis was irreparable as it became a de facto 
support (not core business) function. Analysis did not matter anymore, and analysts 
permanently lost their professional standing and “voice” inside Europol. As a result, 
they lost developmental opportunities and “professionalisation from within” was 
blocked since they were effectively distanced from Europol management (e.g. internal 
planning and decision-making) as well as disconnected from external business 
activities. As professional standards became almost entirely tool-based and tool-
driven – instead of conceptual and doctrinal – the analysts were seen as a lower-
status, technical assistance occupational group. Exemplary work was not recognised 
and best practices not shared inside the Serious & Organised Crime Department. 
Feelings of alienation, helplessness and practical inability to influence developments 
in the workplace were a recurrent theme expressed by the interviewees. In the new 
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 analysis environment, even experienced senior analysts did not have an overview of 
the analysis process, comparative performance and products. Professional cohesion 
and cooperation among analysts broke down. 
I don’t know. I have a limited view now on the 21 Work Files we have. I have no 
clue how good it is or how bad it is in comparison with the other twenty Work Files.  
So from that perspective it’s what I’ve seen over the last 15 years but I don’t really 
know what’s now. I don’t have a clue. (Interviewee 3) 
 
There’s not a platform anymore like before. You’re now divided in eight units and 
everyone - even within the units - we don’t communicate with each other anymore. 
To improve the skill set, toolbox, it’s completely gone. On that specific topic you 
have incidental or more frequent contacts but I have no clue about the analysis 
activities in [AWF name] although we share the same corridor. There’s no platform 
to exchange knowledge. (Interviewee 3) 
 
The bureau-politicisation of the analysis function consequently had a negative impact 
on the effective management of operational analysis projects, the professional 
development of analysts and the professionalisation and scientification of intelligence 
analysis. For Europol management, and its EU Member State partners, it seems that 
analysis simply ceased to exist since there was no such function on the new 
organigram. The professional development of analysts came to a halt due to a 
noticeable lack of interest about advanced analysis products on behalf of EU law 
enforcement; the prevailing conditions of basic work; and, very limited training 
opportunities (especially for newcomer analysts).  
I have not too much view anymore on the outside world. I know that for analysis it 
becomes more and more important to have this intellectualised policing in general, 
not only for crime but for anything, because you can use these techniques for 
other things as well, traffic accidents for example. I see there a development in 
more modern policing, but what I see from all the Member States as feedback on 
our report on the top 50 is extremely poor. (Interviewee 3) 
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 A closely related finding was analysts’ anti-scientific attitude that contributed 
significantly to a professional knowledge or epistemic deficit. Certain analysts 
preferred simple tool-based solutions and not systematic thinking and applications. 
SNA training and integration of the method into the analysis environment also faced 
this anti-scientific mentality of analysts. A preference for agnostic tool-driven work 
mitigated the risks and stress of analysis work. Ironically, however, these perceptions 
converged with the reality of basic work and contributed to its harmful effects on their 
professional situation.  
They [analysts] don’t go further to see; what does this do?  What can this do?  
What benefit does it bring to my analysis, to the Member State? Because they are 
the clients.  So I think we’re just, the majority of time, in a specific shell and they 
don’t want to get out.  For different reasons.  Time, resources, knowledge, willing 
to discover even what the problem can do, and even the fear to spend a bit more 
time on it. (Interviewee 1) 
 
As I said, some might be ready, some don’t want to be ready. That’s my personal 
point of view.  I think that if you propose an additional tool to the ones we already 
have, the first thing you will hear us saying “Prr, another one.”  I mean that due to 
pressure that we have, the workload that we have, we have some time to respect, 
we have to give feedback and to produce an additional possible option for the 
member state. Because it’s time.  Due to pressure that we have, we’re not always 
able to provide it.  I think some might say “I have a certain age” or “I have a certain 
knowledge and I’m fine with it, I can cope with it, I don’t need SNA because it’s 
new, I don’t need it.”  Some might say “Wow, that is cool but it’s too techie for me, 
it’s too scientific, I’m not a scientific person, I don’t like numbers, skip it.”  Some 
might say “Oh it’s not just one click?  Oh no, it’s too difficult for me.”… iBase, 
Analyst’s Notebook, it’s so easy to do, click, click, click, click.  It’s nice to see it 
move, da da da da, that’s it, it’s easy to understand.  Why don’t they show the 
different options Analyst’s Notebook has? The deeper analysis it can make. Then 
you think “Mmm, that looks quite difficult, you know?”  It’s like SNA, what if you do 
click, click, click, it’s nice to see it.  But you have to explain that you have these 
options, I don’t remember the names…They’re very difficult to understand and to 
remember the names if you’re not used to it.  If you do sell that, okay, you have 
these preset standard settings, it gives you this, this, this. …Yes, it’s a new 
language, a scientific language.  Not everybody said “I don’t care about scientific 
language.  It’s different.  What has it done?  Does it give me something nice?  No?  
I’m sorry, it’s too difficult.”  I think that’s one of the main barriers on the programme 
that the person doesn’t want to learn it. (Interviewee 1)    
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 People want to go for the easiest solutions…familiar solutions. So when you come 
with different backgrounds and you come to work at Europol and you try to be 
maybe even more than you are - how can I describe it? You try to stick with the 
information and you try to work with the tool box that you have when you come in 
house and you are not so willing to admit that maybe there is issues that you don’t 
know. And this creates conflict, that people don’t want that, they want to be 
perceived as professionals when they come to work here. If they see any 
threatening criticism around, it will be if you have the possibility to shut down that 
criticism, you will do it. (Interviewee 4) 
 
I think it also depends of course on the data which is contributed. But I think I got it 
in the past with discussions with colleagues, “SNA no, I get all the information I 
want with the tools I already use.” Some might also be afraid to use it, maybe they 
got the training but, “I don’t know how this works.” And they don’t dare to ask 
again, there’s also many of these. You shouldn’t be afraid to ask, if you don’t know 
how to do this, you can only learn from this. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Other analysts thought SNA is easy to use and attributed the willingness and ability to 
learn it mainly on individual analyst’s mindset and openness. While admitting the 
existence of barriers, they proposed that analysts should embrace SNA as a 
“corporate standard”. 
First you have to have the mindset to go into this world because it’s a different 
world and you have to have the mindset to go into it…I didn’t find it that 
difficult…But it of course took some time…Social network analysis has helped me 
to become a better analyst. I would say…if you look at link charting compared to 
social network analysis, if I had to pick... if I only had one chance of learning either 
link charting or SNA I would say SNA because it goes much further as an 
analytical tool and as an analytical method. And it covers so much inside also, so I 
would say that yes. (Interviewee 4) 
 
The innovation factor, I mean comparing the different versions of the tools at this 
analyst, it’s quite, let’s say quite impressive…So, the innovation of the tool is such, 
it was brought in such a user friendly way.  Even if you read the theory it seems 
very complicated, the tool can bring this theory at least at the tool level very, very 
user friendly.  So, I don’t see any problems or barriers in simply embracing the tool 
and the easiness use of it.  If you don’t master the SNA as you should, it’s simply 
just two clicks away.  I mean it’s that simple. You already have the data, which is 
in iBase, you should have it processed. Just simply one click export into the 
analyst, one click and you have the centrality measures there…It’s not rocket 
science…  I mean nobody could find excuses to say, “It’s too complicated or it’s 
too difficult for me.”  They could always say they don’t see the use of it of course.  
But that’s another problem because it’s also again that personal view. (Interviewee 
2) 
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 Apart from the individual perspective behind the adoption and use of SNA – and 
professional learning and development in general – other barriers were identified at 
team, unit and organisational level. That is, the attitudes of project managers, senior 
analysts and colleagues as well as a notable lack of organisational support. As 
regards the latter, it was suggested that creativity, constructive criticism and, 
apparently, innovation was not sufficiently respected, or supported, within Europol.  
Analysts should be creative. Analytical work should be creative work. And the 
organisation to support creativity is crucial… and the managerial understanding 
about creativity. Creativity is frustration, creativity is that you have a critical mind 
and you have to criticise things to sharpen things up. This is my perception of 
creativity. So you have to be constructively critical, a critical person. I would say 
that the organisation, as a whole, is not ready to face persons who are 
constructively critical and this is why I would say in the bigger picture the 
organisation…  (Interviewee 2) 
 
Support from the project manager is crucial… It may kill initiative if you go as a 
newcomer and you say, “There’s this SNA and I’ve heard very good things about 
it,” and your first response from your line managers is, “Ah, forget about it, 
concentrate on this and this.” It kills immediately any [initiative]… Of course as an 
analytical assistant, my senior analyst support is also crucial, that he is willing and 
sees the benefits. But the peer support is also very [important] because if in the 
team you’re working in there is an atmosphere of rejection of any new things it 
infects even if you’re willing to try it out. If the atmosphere is bad, whatever 
reason, is it some analyst who doesn’t want anybody to try new things, this is 
something that affects it a lot. So first support from the supervisor but then support 
from your colleagues… Especially when you’re a newcomer and you come in 
house, you’re not going to fight the windmills at first. So there’s crucial moments in 
the first months when you come in house, how will you professionally start 
developing here… I would say that the analysts are ready; in general they are 
ready for the change. Whether these organisations that they should work in - 
that’s the question - are they ready to adapt the thoughts of the analysts, that’s a 
different story. And I am doubting that. There is not enough organisational support 
for intelligence analysts, or the good use of it, let’s put it like that. (Interviewee 4) 
 
Next, in response to a question about the potential of SNA in shaping the future of 
criminal intelligence analysis, the general epistemic requirement was brought up. 
Certain interviewees believed that due to a growing need for intelligence analysis in 
the framework of intelligence-led policing, better education and scientific or vocational 
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 qualifications will be required to professionalise intelligence analysis in the future. 
Advanced education and training will be a prerequisite for the effective application of 
SNA in practice too. This progressive view seems to appreciate the scientification of 
intelligence analysis and the idea of law enforcement analysts as social scientists 
(Prunchun, 2010; Prunchun Jr, 1996). Other interviewees expressed traditionalist and 
anti-scientific views in this matter. Their view was that scientific knowledge was too 
difficult and not relevant to their practice, but some advice would be required.   
I would like to see that, I would really do.  I would really like to see that because 
yes, it would be such a change and probably in the direction the world is moving. 
(Interviewee 2) 
 
I would say it will increase in the future for sure. I would say intelligence analysis, 
my perception is that the role of it will grow from what it is now, because my 
perception generally - if you look at the European wide perspective on intelligence 
analysis - it is so scattered around. There are advanced countries and there are 
countries that are not very advanced in utilising this kind of approach. And I would 
say that in a bigger picture, it will in the future - especially with all the resource 
problems we are facing - at some point it will become a more important tool for the 
managers, for the crime preventative measures, to use this kind of approach, to 
have intelligence analysis to target selection and all these things… I would say 
that the demands for intelligence analysis are growing, so if you look from that 
background I would say that the demand for better education or a programme to 
develop intelligence analysis, I would say in the future there’s a need for that. So 
as a conclusion I would say that yes, in the future more intelligence analysts will 
be having a profession of their own maybe even through a programme of 
education. But under what institutions? That’s a different thing, should it be under 
police academy and go through that or should it be… This is how I see it.  [The 
impact of SNA on future professional practices and knowledge] will increase - one 
of those methodologies that will have a big impact to go in that direction that you 
need specific education.  (Interviewee 4) 
 
But it all fits in the whole concept of intelligence [-led] policing; I think intelligence 
policing and intelligence analysis should go so well together… You shouldn’t 
alienate from the work. So there shouldn’t be too big gap and want to act on 
academic level. The whole level should rise, but if the gap gets too big, you get 
products, which are very academic, and you use social science techniques, but in 
the end you alienate from basic work. So it becomes an objective in itself to create 
a product, it doesn’t solve anymore the problem or support the solving of the 
problem. (Interviewee 3) 
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 I don’t know if it’s that necessary to have this real big scientific background. I think 
it’s necessary that maybe you have someone by your side to give you advice…we 
can’t stand still otherwise there will be lots of information bypassing us and then 
with the few things we get you won’t be able to come up with a clear picture for the 
investigators of what’s going on. So you have to be ready for the next step for the 
future. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Yes, it’s a new language, a scientific language.  Not everybody said “I don’t care 
about scientific language.  It’s different.  What has it done?  Does it give me 
something nice?  No?  I’m sorry, it’s too difficult.”  I think that’s one of the main 
barriers on the programme that the person doesn’t want to learn it.  (Interviewee 
1) 
 
Most likely, the contrasting views of interviewees point to a considerable split between 
traditionalists and progressive analysts within the analyst population. The voices of 
the former (especially the senior analyst’s opinion) were particularly firm despite the 
identified learning and epistemic deficit issues. Arguably, the differing views suggest 
not only individual preferences, professional limitations, differences of opinion and/or 
sub-group tendencies, but also a degree of confusion regarding the best way to 
manage a fragmented analysis function following the closure of Europol Analysis Unit. 
Besides the structural void, the lack of leadership was immediately obvious. The kind 
of leadership that could provide operational analysts a clearly articulated, well-
informed and compelling vision of criminal intelligence analysis was missing. 
Nonetheless, the views of all interviewees were in stark contrast to the basic work 
reality, which was established after the restructuring of Europol. This was yet another 
sign of a serious conflict situation experienced by their occupational group. What can 
also be deduced from the views of interviewees, traditionalists and modernists alike, 
is that in order to embrace SNA, and achieve higher levels of professionalism in 
general, individual analysts had to surmount major organisational barriers as well as 
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 their own limitations. Since personal willingness and ability was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition, not everyone was able to overcome these barriers.  
The question about the future of intelligence analysis and the emergence of the 
network paradigm raised a broader issue. Namely, the fact that the profession is still 
underdeveloped (at least in Europe) and “analyst professionalism” – as a clear 
professional identity based on specific qualifications, knowledge, skills, competences, 
values and attitudes (see e.g. Dagilyte & Coe, 2014) – means different things to 
different people, both in theory and practice. Around the world, and especially in 
Europe, different profiles for criminal intelligence (or crime) analysts have been 
created in response to law enforcement strategies and diverse operational needs, 
such as those associated with intelligence-led policing. Analysts’ backgrounds too are 
typical of their diverse higher education, vocational or practitioner trajectories, as 
shown in this study (see Table 3, pp. 59-60). Unsurprisingly, specific sectoral / 
occupational qualifications linked to the Bologna Process do not exist for operational 
analysts (see e.g. Powell, Bernhard, & Graf, 2012; Usher & Green, 2009). 
Developments in the post 2010 period inside Europol exacerbated the fragility of their 
profession – due to the lack of globally accepted standards, and the uneven 
development of intelligence analysis in the EU – and susceptibility to bureau-political 
control and professionalisation from above. The interviewees, as well as many other 
analysts, the researcher had the opportunity to informally discuss with between 2010 
and 2014, were very concerned with the impact of the “analysis breakdown” (i.e. new 
mission, elementary analysis and declining performance) on their professional 
knowledge, skills and future employability.  
Once out of here, you are probably perceived as an ex-Europol employee working 
as an analyst.  There is not a trade union…we are not qualified analysts I think, 
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 we don’t have a qualification on paper or badge or whatever saying that Europol 
analyst, no.  I just have 10 or 11 years of Europol analysis work, that means that 
you are ready to be employed in that section as an analyst. Doesn’t exist. So the 
only thing you can do is to sell yourself on the knowledge you’ve gained here. For 
example I can try to sell myself on the financial side. As an analyst, yes. As an 
operational analyst I can do it only in the law enforcement agency.  Outside in a 
private sector I’m just a financial expert eventually. It could be good if I applied for 
another law enforcement agency.  If it would be for a private sector, I have my 
doubts that I can use operational analysis. It could be strategic analysis, which I 
haven’t done recently. So unless you’re going to work as an investigator for a 
private sector which eventually could give you possibility to use some experience 
on the operational side. (Interviewee 1) 
 
Analysts’ concerns and workplace tensions suggested that they experienced a 
professional identity crisis. Statements such as “the image of an analyst will die very 
soon” (Interviewee 1) and “analysis floats away'' (Interviewee 3) meant that analysis 
was disconnected from the primary mission it was supposed to serve (i.e. 
intelligence-led policing). Europol redefined its operational mission in the context of its 
Agencification process, but apparently paid insufficient attention to both criminal 
intelligence analysis and the human factor behind it. The available evidence suggests 
that limited support, if any, was provided to the analysts. They were treated as 
“resources” reallocated to mechanical tasks of data input and cross match “analysis”, 
not as valued specialists.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
Figure 18 (below) illustrates the web of conceptual themes and related sub-
themes emerging from the analysis of QUAL material. The research findings have 
shown these thematic categories and sub-categories are closely linked to one 
another and represent a simplified, yet functioning, mechanism. Given the power / 
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 dependence relationship between the two key themes of the thematic web, a question 
can be raised whether the de-politicisation of intelligence analysis would have greatly 
facilitated its professionalisation. Even though no one can predict what would have 
happened in this scenario, it is possible that de-politicisation would have been a 
crucial facilitating factor. Of course, such a development would rely on the 
progressive attitudes of bureau-political stakeholders and their decision to allow the 
de-politicisation of this specialist function in order to serve the attainment of strategic 
organisational goals. So, even in this positive scenario, the relationship would still be 
hierarchical and power-dependent. But again, as shown below in Figure 18, several 
other sub-themes would have to converge inside a dynamically evolving environment 
in order to achieve the ideal outcome. That is, the establishment of operational 
analysts as an occupational group with a clear professional identity and a valued role 
in the context of intelligence-led policing, unconstrained in the pursuit of 
professionalisation and scientification of their profession. 
The thematic web illustrates the higher-level position of barriers and the lower-
level position of facilitating factors. At bureau-political and organisational level, 
interferences have been constant to ensure Europol remains under Member States’ 
tight control and accountable. Inside this complex environment, professionalism gave 
way to bureau-politicisation and bureau-politicisation in turn created the conditions for 
basic work. Imposed top-down conditions eventually created an environment non-
conducive to bottom-up responses to improve analysis. The analysis above 
essentially found that the management of intelligence analysis inside Europol is a 
failure of bureau-politicised EU Agency governance. Taken together the accounts of 
the five interviewees suggest that Europol has lost a unique opportunity to further 
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 develop as a centre of excellence in analysis matters, opting instead for a limiting 
approach. At technical level, the clash between the hit (or target-centric) and network 
perspectives was noticed. Paradoxically, the fact that the network perspective 
encompasses more sophisticated notions of cross match (i.e. the network node) 
escaped the attention of the proponents of the idea of criminal information hub (and 
“hit management”). Arguably, the simplistic hit perspective prevailed since it is linked 
to the bureau-political reform agenda, traditional investigative and reactive policing 
approaches as well as the atomised way criminal justice is served. 
The effects of bureau-political orientations have led to the current situation, which 
was examined from the analysts’ point of view. The qualitative analysis results show 
that EU Member States’ unsophisticated vision and politicised governance of Europol 
has significantly weakened and constrained this EU Agency. Its operational mission 
and problematic functioning suggest that the main concern of its EU partners has 
been the protection of their national interests (however defined) from what they 
perceive as overly intrusive Europeanisation. Their negative attitude not only 
contributed to the demise of Europol’s analysis function but also hindered meaningful 
European police and intelligence cooperation through Europol by limiting its 
operational role to the population of a criminal information database and the 
elementary management of cross matches. Arguably, this orientation away from 
intelligence analysis reveals strategic short-sightedness and parochial beliefs about 
crime fighting and EU cross-border cooperation. The new operational role of Europol 
has negated its coordination role in practice by further promoting the primacy of EU 
law enforcement. Put differently, Europol’s agencification was a move away from real 
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 Europeanisation of EU police cooperation that instead consolidated Member States’ 
control over Agency governance and functioning.  
 
Figure 18: Thematic web 
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 Why bureau-politicisation is the main barrier to the SNA innovation and 
“professionalisation from within”-initiative? A tentative explanation is proposed that 
EU Member States’ law enforcement agencies experienced a continuous tension 
between antagonism and cooperation in their relationship with Europol. With primacy 
being the ultimate objective, Member States re-defined the mission of Europol, forcing 
an elementary functioning by design (dubbed “operational support” or “basic support 
services”) as the core business of Europol; so that the capabilities, activities and 
outputs no longer posed a threat to national interests. Thus “cooperation” continued in 
the post 2010 period entirely on Member States’ terms. This bureau-political theory 
posits that Member States’ national interests converged to a shared Europol-
scepticism leading to the creation of a simplistic (i.e. McDonaldised) cross match 
analysis system. In a different context, this development would have been a very 
good reason for reform. Curiously, in the case of Europol it became the essence of 
“reform”. It seems plausible that the bureau-political patrons of Europol opted for an 
operational minimum functioning that still gives an impression that this EU Agency is 
quite busy. There may be additional reasons linked to the aforementioned 
explanation. For example, the governance and control of an autonomous EU Agency 
would be increasingly difficult. In this scenario, bureaucratic politics would be lagging 
behind organisational developments driven by Europol staff. SNA, as a 
“professionalisation from within”-project, was a sign of what could happen in the 
analysis environment. The SNA innovation was apparently not in line with the bureau-
political agenda, which favoured slow and fully controllable evolution of Europol and 
replacement of the existing analysis system by a criminal information system. As 
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 noted by Interviewee 3, “everything in the police goes in an evolutionary way, not in a 
revolutionary way''. 
Arguably, therefore, EU Member States oppose the vision of an independent, de-
politicised and professional EU Agency in the field of law enforcement. The analysts 
put it simply as follows: “Member States don’t want analysis, they want hits” 
(Interviewee 3). The establishment of a criminal information system with simplistic 
operational support services – remotely linked to SNA (new paradigm) and 
conventional link analysis (old paradigm) – shows that the analysis function is 
undesirable by EU law enforcement. The phenomenon of basic work provides further 
evidence that Europol can operate within very limited boundaries only. As EU 
Agency, Europol (especially its operations department) continues to operate in 
practice as an intergovernmental organisation. Its governance architecture and 
culture is entirely dependent on the bureau-political priorities and willingness of EU 
Member States to cooperate and strongly positively correlated with basic work. 
Imposed limitations on policies, managerial decisions and work processes serve as 
barriers to organisational and professional growth and affect operational staff 
behaviour, perceptions and work accordingly. The findings suggest a theoretically and 
empirically important relationship between bureau-politicisation and the basic work 
phenomenon. The latter emerged after the 2010 reform.  
As noted previously, bureau-politicisation affected all core business functions and 
processes and determined the course of the SNA innovation too. Among others, the 
bureaucratic politics and emphasis on basic work is responsible to a significant 
degree for an anti-scientific operational culture and epistemic deficit. Yet, expert 
knowledge is now most needed due to the challenges posed by serious / organised 
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 crime and terrorism. At a time when intelligence analysis is getting more and more 
scientific, Europol has focused on simplistic data processing and hit reporting as the 
main form of operational support. Some obviously saw in this disappointing 
development a solution to their knowledge gaps, but in fact the opposite is true in 
most cases. Any experienced police practitioner knows that truly important hits are 
the exception, not the rule. In this re-designed environment the integration of scientific 
methods and innovation was incompatible with simplistic cross match analysis. All 
operational units, teams and individuals experienced severe limitations of action and 
thinking. Hence, the new mission, work processes and elementary products 
generated a lack of appetite for systematic modes of thinking and computational 
social science applications such as SNA. In this light, the quantitative and qualitative 
findings of this study converge. Demographic variables were insignificant compared 
to hierarchically imposed variables that determined operational work. Advanced 
analysis was optional. Both “traditional” and “modernist” operational analysts had to 
overcome formidable barriers as well as their own limitations in order to improve their 
professional knowledge and performance. Regardless, the harm caused to analysts’ 
sensemaking and intentional change efforts was considerable (Boyatzis & Akrivou, 
2006; Weick, 2004b). Basic work was contrary to analysts’ professionalism and 
professionalisation process effectively blocking learning and development and stifling 
the emergence of the network paradigm. 
The story of a business change is never simple. Even though basic work stemmed 
from bureau-politicisation, the evidence suggests that the operational analysts 
contributed to its prevalence too. Similar to the “traditional” perceptions and attitudes 
of investigators engaged in reactive policing (James, 2013), Europol analysts 
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 developed their own practitioner mind-set too. In so doing, they contributed to the 
creation of an anti-scientific culture and the ensuing epistemic deficit. Indeed, the 
interviews and the answers to the open questions of the questionnaire survey 
provided evidence that many operational analysts preferred natural-mode thinking, 
rather than systematic-mode (scientific or rule-based) thinking, in performing their 
analysis tasks (see e.g. Kahneman, 2011; Wastell, 2010). At this point, the 
elementary policies of the criminal information system converged with analysts’ 
practitioner mindsets and reinforced the basic work phenomenon further. In that 
sense, the identified epistemic deficit is an effect of the dominance of the natural-
mode thinking inherent in basic work, with the analysts describing their crime 
database as a “pot” (Interviewee 2) where information is stored. Then, they “play with 
tools / data” (Interviewees 1 and 5) and “dump data in…and see what comes out” 
(Interviewees 1 and 3). To an extent, their descriptions may suggest experience, 
familiarisation and confidence in performing routine tasks. But, the images conveyed 
by these and other descriptions and metaphors of participants (see pp. 112-113) point 
to the harmful effects of “data input and cross check” that contributed to the lack of 
conceptual and systematic analysis knowledge. Many analysts favoured simplistic 
approaches, otherwise a method was perceived as “too complex and difficult to learn” 
(Interviewee 1). “Traditionalist” views revealed that many were either not comfortable 
with or categorically against the scientification of intelligence analysis. It is unclear 
whether “modernist” analyst views will persist in this environment. 
Certainly, the post-2010 developments inside Europol have serious implications 
for European police and intelligence cooperation that merit further investigation. 
Paradoxically, the reform and the primacy of basic work inside its Serious & 
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 Organised Crime Department proved that neither the new paradigm (SNA) nor the old 
one (conventional link analysis) were established standards. This begs a question: 
what counts as valuable professional knowledge in this environment? This situation 
may suggest an EU-wide trend away from intelligence-led policing (ILP). Is it possible 
that ILP in the EU is perceived as Europol hit management to assist Member States’ 
cross-border investigations? Is the role of Europol then reduced to a semi-automated 
database system carrying out cross checks by “pressing a button”? If this is the main 
operational idea behind the 2010 reform, then it would denote a return to traditional 
reactive policing, with a bottom-line approach that does not appreciate the added 
value of intelligence analysis to improve national criminal investigations. If true, this 
would suggest both a Europol-sceptical and an intelligence analysis-sceptical attitude.  
Even though I cannot be more precise here, one thing is certain. The 
transformation and functioning of Europol not only represents a questionable solution, 
but also creates a path dependency obstacle to real progress (see Sydow, 
Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009). Currently, the analysis function is in a state of decline 
because it is being managed in a way that deviates from established analysis 
standards and good practices (see e.g.  Peterson et al., 2000). Due to the prevailing 
bureau-political priorities, Europol has dissociated itself from sophisticated 
intelligence analysis and the network paradigm. The current situation will persist, and 
real progress will be resisted, as long as EU Member States actively restrain the 
activities of this EU Agency. Obviously, with such a complicated issue several 
questions still remain unanswered. Nonetheless, this study offers a more nuanced 
understanding of the problematic integration of SNA inside Europol. The empirical 
findings raise new interesting questions for future research. For example, does the 
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 2010 reform indicate a return to traditional reactive policing? Will other EU Agencies 
follow the new operational model of Europol? What will be the implications for the 
future of criminal intelligence analysts, intelligence-led policing and the emergence of 
the network paradigm in the EU?  
Thereafter, Chapter 5 will focus on the theoretical application of the QUAN and 
QUAL results. By reviewing topical literature on the politicisation of international 
organisations, the study will assess the impact of bureau-politicised EU Agency 
governance upon intelligence-led policing, criminal intelligence analysis and the 
emergence of the network paradigm. The rich empirical evidence presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 will serve as a solid basis for the development of grounded theory. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
The empirical analysis found that bureaucratic politics and the phenomenon of 
basic work caused serious problems to the operational functioning of Europol. 
Member States exerted decisive influence on its mission, policies, analysis processes 
and outputs, aimed at ensuring this EU Agency remains accountable and under their 
control. Instead of developing further Europol’s centre of analysis excellence, and 
facilitating the emergence of the network paradigm, the powerful bureau-political 
actors opted for a limiting approach focussing on elementary data processing and 
cross checking tasks. Unsurprisingly, many operational analysts – “modernists” and 
“traditionalists” alike – perceived the 2010 reform of Europol as deform. They saw 
restructuring as a “professionalisation from above”-initiative that dissolved the 
structure and function of analysis, established simplistic analysis processes and 
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 treated both advanced link analysis and SNA as exceptions. The new criminal 
information system focused almost exclusively on hit reporting of relatively little 
operational value. By re-designing the intelligence analysis environment and 
practices, bureau-politicisation created the conditions for basic work leading to the 
collapse of the SNA (“professionalisation from within”) project. The prevalence of 
elementary intelligence norms and practices, the lack of a centralised Analysis Unit 
and leadership, and analysts’ preference for natural-mode thinking contributed to the 
creation of an epistemic deficit. The new analysis environment indicates the 
fundamental incompatibility between basic work and scientific knowledge and 
methods. Overall, the abolition of the analysis function of Europol, and subsequent 
analysis-related pathologies, could be seen as a failure of EU Agency governance 
and management. The next chapter will locate the empirical findings of the study 
within relevant literature providing an opportunity for the development of grounded 
theory. 
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 Chapter 5 
Politicisation, bureau-politicisation and EU Agency Governance 
After its transformation into a EU Agency in 2010, Europol abandoned its 
established role as a centre of excellence in criminal intelligence analysis and took up 
a new role as a criminal information hub. In this new legal and operational context, 
Europol mainly facilitates elementary cross check requests from EU Member State 
law enforcement (see detailed discussion in Chapter 1). In the previous two chapters, 
a sequential QUAN and QUAL analysis identified the basic work phenomenon and 
bureaucratic politics as the most significant barriers in the process of SNA integration 
and professionalisation (and scientification) of operational intelligence analysis. Other 
factors – such as an anti-epistemic inclination shared by many analysts – contributed 
to a much lesser extent to the difficult integration of SNA in the supranational 
intelligence and law enforcement environment. Consequently, the QUAN and QUAL 
evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4 clearly indicated the serious impact of the 
politicisation of Europol’s governance and functioning on the research problem. 
Methodologically, as explained in Chapter 2, this study used a progressive focussing 
strategy (see p. 48) and the GTM as a framework for inductive thematic analysis (see 
p. 52) to assist in the discovery and theory development process. Contrary to 
conventional hypothetico-deductive studies, this exploratory research identified 
themes and sub-themes as they emerged from the data and considered relevant 
theory both during and after the analysis phase (see pp. 53-54). Building on the 
empirical findings, therefore, this chapter will review literature on politicisation / 
bureau-politicisation and EU Agency governance in order to engage in grounded 
theorising and draw theoretically informed conclusions and recommendations.  
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 The politicisation and bureau-politicisation of International Organisations  
International Organisations (IOs) comprise all intergovernmental and 
supranational organisations (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2012).The latter includes the 
European Union and its Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Agencies (European Union, 
2014).12 Next to the definition of bureau-politicisation (see pp. 128-129), politicisation 
means “the demand for, or the act of, transporting an issue into the field of politics, 
making previously unpolitical matters political” (Schmidt, 2004 cited in Zürn, Binder, & 
Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012, p. 73). Politicisation and bureau-politicisation is common in 
national government, public administration and IOs. Typically, IOs (and their 
decisions and activities) are the objects of politicisation and all those involved in the 
politicisation process are the subjects or agents of politicisation (Zürn, 2014, p. 51). It 
should be noted from the outset that the existing literature on the politicisation and 
bureau-politicisation of IO is fragmented and supports the drawing of tentative 
conclusions only. The academic literature has not sufficiently investigated the actual 
functioning of IOs and their relationships in the diverse institutional contexts and 
socio-political systems in which they are embedded. Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 
(2012, p. 75) noted that the development of politicised international authority and its 
effects are under researched and partially understood even though there is evidence 
of an increasing politicisation trend. Given their importance as supranational 
regulatory or coordinating entities, the relative lack of empirical studies and academic 
scrutiny of the influence and consequences of politicisation signifies a rather 
12 That is, the European Police Office (Europol), European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
(Eurojust), European Asylum Support Agency (EASO), European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(Frontex), European Police College (CEPOL), European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA), European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), European Union 
Agency for large-scale IT Systems (eu-LISA) and European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). 
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 surprising research gap. This observation suggests the need to update the research 
literature with developments in this area.  
To start with, politicisation and bureau-policisation have both bright and dark sides 
depending on how they are exercised (e.g. they may drive or block progress).  As 
Worrall (2014, p. 49) argues, “though ’political’ often connotes dysfunction, favoritism, 
and influence, it can also be regarded as an essential element of government”. The 
politicisation of issues is one of the foundations of democracy and an essential 
element of any democratisation process. But, it can also be a fundamental barrier 
depending on its quality and effects. This happens when political (and bureau-
political) preferences, influence and decisions disregard evidence-based, technocratic 
and meritocratic approaches or lead to the politicisation of administrative functions 
that ought to be depoliticised to serve the common good efficiently and effectively 
(see e.g. Leicester, 1999; Naughton, 2005, pp. 53-54)13. Unfortunately, in the real 
world there is no guarantee that the agents of politicisation will be always exercising 
their democratic role and formidable hierarchical power appropriately or consistent 
with an ethical or societal utilitarian perspective (Schefczyk, 2015; Warnock, 2003).   
Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012, p. 70) proposed the authority-politicisation 
hypothesis, which states that as the political authority of IOs increases so does their 
quest for legitimacy, leading to politicisation. This occurs because nation states 
provide the necessary justification and legitimacy for international authority through a 
complex process of negotiation, power transfer and accountability control. A closely 
related idea is the resistance-utilisation hypothesis, which states that IOs experience 
both growing public resistance and calls for increased utilisation (Zürn et al., 2012, p. 
13 The seven enemies of evidence-based policy are: bureaucratic logic; the bottom  line; consensus; 
politics; civil service culture; cynicism; and, time, or lack of it.  
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 71). A recent empirical study on the relationship between politicisation and 
globalisation identified national resistance and contestation of international authority 
as a key aspect of politicisation “depending on whether it is framed as a threat or an 
opportunity” (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014, p. 1302). IOs possess the power to influence 
domestic administrative reform (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2012) but their authority, 
effectiveness and democratic legitimacy is questioned (see e.g. Dahl, 1999; Scharpf, 
1999).  
Specifically, the EU’s legitimacy has been the subject of considerable criticism. Its 
democratic deficit has been described as the: (i) “absence or incomplete development 
of political integration”; and, (ii) legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions 
such as “technocratic decision-making, lack of transparency, insufficient public 
participation, excessive use of administrative discretion, inadequate mechanisms of 
control and accountability” (Majone, 1998, pp. 14-15). Dahl (1999) characterised the 
EU as an “undemocratic bargaining system” driven by powerful globalisation forces 
that should be resisted and viewed its democratic deficit as a “likely cost of all 
international governments” (p. 34). The debate has been linked to four types of 
legitimacy; that is, input (procedural), output, social legitimacy and a multiple 
legitimacies variant (see e.g. Considine & Afzal, 2011; Follesdal, 2004; Jensen, 2009; 
Schmidt, 2013). Significantly, Scharpf (1999) suggested that EU integration could 
regain its democratic legitimacy by focusing on output legitimacy (i.e. efficiency and 
effectiveness). Also, certain authors argued against the existence of a democratic 
deficit because they saw the EU as an imperfect, special purpose system,  with 
sufficient checks and balances in place, tasked to implement policies and gain 
“legitimacy by results” (Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2006). But their views were 
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 challenged. Follesdal and Hix (2006), for example, argued that the contestation for 
political leadership and policy is a key democratic characteristic missing in the EU.  
The debate on the contested democratic legitimacy of the EU is far from settled. 
Scharpf (2007) observed the normative and empirical ambivalence of arguments for 
or against the democratic deficit of the EU. The existing literature has certainly 
advanced topical knowledge but it seems that the discussion has reached a plateau 
because it remains largely theoretical and rhetorical, disconnected from real-world 
developments. Moravcsik (2006), in particular, argued that: 
an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of a real-world international institution 
is as much social scientific as philosophical. If such an assessment is not to be an 
exercise in utopian thinking, then international institutions should not be compared 
to ideal democratic systems. Instead we must ask whether they approximate the 
‘real world’ democracy generally achieved by existing advanced democracies, 
which face constraints of limited public information and interest, regulatory 
capture, the credibility of commitments, and bounded consensus. (p. 337) 
 
So, the democratic deficit of IOs has been overly theorised disregarding the need for 
empirical research. That is why, Moravcsik and Sangiovanni (2003) proposed the 
adoption of empirical scientific analysis and constructivist interpretation as useful 
evaluation tools. The reality on the ground requires that researchers also consider the 
practical difficulties in determining the “general good” within a highly heterogeneous 
population; the possibility that the “average citizen is uninterested in foreign affairs 
and not fully competent to make informed judgments”; and, the imperfections of all 
procedural and substantive solutions (Dahl, 1999, pp. 25-26). Moreover, if we accept 
that all IOs are special purpose entities - the EU is an economic (not a political) union 
– that should be evaluated on the basis of their efficiency and effectiveness, then the 
criticism is perhaps exaggerated to an extent. In principle, the delegation of policy 
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 implementation to EU institutions should be a solid basis for the assessment of their 
democratic legitimacy and performance. In the words of Majone (1998): 
All democratic political systems solve collective-action problems by delegating 
authority to take actions in particular areas from individuals or institutions to whom 
it was originally granted – the political principals – to agents or trustees. The 
important issue for democratic theory is to specify which tasks may be legitimately 
delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and which areas 
should remain under the direct control of the political principals… In a nutshell: 
redistributive policies can be legitimated only by majoritarian means and thus 
cannot be delegated to institutions independent of the political process; efficiency-
oriented policies, on the other hand, are basically legitimated by results, and 
hence may be delegated to such institutions, provided an adequate system of 
accountability is in place… As long as the tasks assigned to this level are 
precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian sources of legitimacy – expertise, 
procedural rationality, transparency, accountability by results – should be sufficient 
to justify the delegation of the necessary powers. (p. 28) 
 
In reality, however, the principle of legitimacy by results seems to be overlooked. 
What is more, the output legitimacy of IOs is affected by the problematic relationship 
between their politicisation / bureau-politicisation and technocratic expertise. The 
increasing politicisation of IOs suggests the importance of global politics regarding 
major issues that require regulation, coordination and effective solutions. International  
authority and power is increasing because IOs are involved in rule setting, monitoring 
and verification, rule interpretation, rule enforcement and / or implementation (Zürn et 
al., 2012, pp. 90-95). These roles exemplify not only their political but also their 
epistemic authority. Driven by political beliefs about threats and opportunities, 
politicisation aims at the democratisation of IOs to improve political representation 
and avoid technocratic rule by putting control mechanisms in place (Considine & 
Afzal, 2011; Kelemen, 2002; Moravcsik & Sangiovanni, 2003). But, the excessive 
politicisation and bureau-politicisation of IOs can affect their role as depoliticised, 
epistemic authorities as well as their credibility and performance. So, as noted earlier, 
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 politicisation is associated with democratisation as well as possible harmful effects, 
especially when it is characterised by strong anti-epistemic beliefs.  
Zürn (2014, p. 47) acknowledged the benefits of politicisation for decision-making 
and policy formulation, but also argued that it can sustain inequalities in North-South 
representation and create a political chasm between globalist (“cosmopolitan”) and 
nationalist (“communitarian”) perspectives. A closely related issue is the politicisation 
and bureau-politicisation that challenges IOs driven by a need to protect national 
democratic sovereignty. The inviolability of national sovereignty is a key organising 
principle not only for individual nation states but also alliances of nation states (e.g. 
EU Member States). National reflexes against the “perceived undermining of 
democratic sovereignty” (Zürn, 2014, p. 48) from overly intrusive globalism (or 
“federalism” as in EU JHA matters) could be organised under a nationalist (or 
“Member State backlash”) strategy. Nationalist perceptions are expected to be 
particularly salient amongst certain political parties and public administrations, such 
as law enforcement and intelligence agencies, due to their characteristic “guardians 
of Kratos”-culture. The collective resistance of nation states against international 
authority and globalisation is a plausible scenario consistent with the observed shift of 
political attention from the national to the international level (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; 
Zürn et al., 2012). The latter has taken the form of “massive public contestation of 
international institutions like…the European Union (EU)…[and] has put their 
politicisation…on political and the academic agendas” (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014, pp. 
1275-1276, 1303). In other words, national identity and self-rule clash against the 
cosmopolitan identity of international authority. In the case of the EU, an exclusive or 
inclusive national identity explains the tendency toward Euroscepticism or European 
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 integration respectively (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 13). So, in response to the real or 
perceived influence of IOs in domestic affairs, nation states engage in politicisation 
and bureau-politicisation and communicate particular preferences that are usually 
shaped by an exclusive identity and associated notions of threat or opportunity. Their 
organised mobilisation and actions exert powerful influence upon IOs affecting their 
design, decision-making and problem-solving capacity. Consequently, nation states 
and their administrations can seriously harm the epistemic authority and ability of IOs 
to achieve results (i.e. their output legitimacy).  
Parenthetically, Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) proposed a conceptual 
model to think about the relationship between international authority, politicisation and 
legitimacy. They distinguished between epistemic and political authority, as 
explanatory variables, and politicised resistance and utilisation, as dependent 
variables, with legitimacy functioning as intervening or secondary independent 
variable (Zürn et al., 2012, pp. 96-97). Their analytical framework could be useful in 
empirically assessing the balance between political and epistemic authority, and its 
effects. Another idea would be to examine the performance of EU Agencies to see 
whether the principle of efficient and effective policy implementation holds true in 
practice. In this case, a researcher would reverse the independent and dependent 
variables in Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt’s model to examine the impact of 
politicisation and bureau-politicisation on EU Agency technocracy.  
To sum up, the politicisation and bureau-politicisation of IOs is associated with a 
key governance dilemma; that is, their role as legitimate political and epistemic 
authorities (Bevir, 2011; Considine & Afzal, 2011). Striking the right balance between 
these two roles is imperative for the efficient and effective functioning of IOs and their 
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 capacity to achieve the common good for the international community. Overly 
politicised or technocratic approaches, create asymmetries that can be particularly 
harmful for global order, democracy and progress.  
 
EU Agency governance 
During the last two decades the EU experienced the development of “Eurocracy”; 
that is, the establishment of EU Agencies and EU Regulatory Networks (Kelemen & 
Tarrant, 2011). According to Kelemen (2002), EU politics influenced the creation and 
design of EU Agencies more than functional perspectives and priorities. Specifically, 
“[w]idespread political opposition to the creation of a European ‘superstate’ has 
blocked the creation of a large, unified executive bureaucracy in Brussels” (Kelemen 
& Tarrant, 2011, p. 922). And so, EU Agencies emerged as compromise solution in 
response to the problem of “political resistance that precludes the creation of a 
Commission Eurocracy” (Kelemen, 2002, p. 112). JHA Agencies are a result of this  
“agencification” process (Rittberger & Wonka, 2011). A recent mapping exercise of 34 
EU Agencies identified their political governance structure as a key organisational 
attribute (Ekelund, 2012). Ekelund identified four types of Agencies categorising JHA 
Agencies as “advisory agencies under executive control” – the most common type 
with a Member State-dominated Management Board (2012, p. 44).  
In this context, Egeberg and Trondal (2011) examined whether EU Agencies 
contribute to European executive centre formation or are vehicles of national control. 
Their on-line survey of senior officials found a shift of the “political-administrative 
order further away from an intergovernmental order” because “EU-level Agencies find 
themselves much closer to the Commission than to the Council and national 
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 ministries” (Egeberg & Trondal, 2001, p. 882). But, real supranational autonomy – 
that is, independent action from the Council and the Member States – is difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve under national executive control and multi-level governance 
conditions. The EU Agencies are neither supranational nor intergovernmental entities. 
They do not constitute Commission Eurocracy per se, but a decentralised Eurocratic 
network operating mainly under Member State control. This means that they 
resemble more an intergovernmental than a supranational governance model. Since 
“national governments are still the prime source of legitimacy” EU Agencies have 
limited independence and are prone to political and bureau-political interferences 
(Christensen & Nielsen, 2010, p. 200). Their work is mainly determined by Member 
States’ political and bureau-political interests and preferences and how they exercise 
their role as political principals (Groenleer, 2009). In the real world, there may be 
situations where Member States “put on the brakes” through their representatives in 
EU Agency boards by way of procedural interventions (Christensen & Nielsen, 2010, 
p. 201) and major reforms. Moreover, a sceptical observer would suggest that EU 
Agency governance is an experiment with uncertain policy outputs and outcomes. 
Idema and Kelemen (2006), for example, noted that idealised “new modes of 
governance”, such as the open method of coordination, may actually harm output 
legitimacy and turn out to be “failed experiments” where the “new governance offers a 
cure worse than any old governance disease” (pp. 119-120). In that sense, the 
decentralised EU Agencies could exacerbate the EU’s legitimacy deficit by failing to 
deliver results. Hence, contrary to Egeberg and Trondal’s optimistic conclusion 
above, serious doubts are raised about the contribution of EU Agencies to the 
process of “Europeanisation”. Apparently, that is why Egeberg and Trondal (2011) 
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 added a sensible caveat that the “jury is still out with respect to whether European 
Union (EU)-level agencies act primarily as tools of national governments or not” (p. 
868). Clearly, empirical research on these relatively recent governance developments 
is required because “not much is known about how EU Agencies work in practice” 
(Groenleer, 2009, p. 15).  
A typical problem behind EU policy-making and Agency governance is the “joint-
decision trap” (Scharpf, 1988, 2006). Scharpf (1988) noticed that EU decision-making 
has been driven by self-interested “bargaining” (not genuine “problem-solving”) that 
systematically generates sub-optimum policy choices and results. Simply put, the 
joint-decision idea maintains that political principals do not favour optimum solutions 
and are instead trapped in least common denominator solutions. This governance 
style seems to occupy the middle ground between intergovernmental and 
supranational governance (Scharpf, 2006, p. 847) resulting in a paradox in the 
process of EU integration: “frustration without disintegration and resilience without 
progress” (Scharpf, 1988, p. 239). According to Scharpf (2007), the joint-decision trap 
can also be linked to the insufficient political transparency and functional justification 
for reforms. In that sense, the political decision to establish decentralised EU 
Agencies and Regulatory Networks – and not a Commission Eurocracy based on 
functional grounds – could be attributed to the joint-decision governance. So, the view 
of EU Agencies as non-majoritarian bargaining systems (Dahl, 1999) can explain their 
sub-optimal design and performance. Arguably, the joint-decision problem is closely 
related to the politicisation and bureau-politicisation of decentralised Eurocracy. 
Kelemen & Tarrant (2011) observed that: 
[m]uch of the literature on EU regulatory agencies has explained their 
creation in functional terms. According to this view, EU agencies are 
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 created to address the need for technical expertise and to enhance the 
independence and credibility of EU regulation (Everson 2005; Kreher 1997; 
Majone 1997, 2000, 2002). Majone (1997, 2000, 2002), in particular, 
emphasises that the growing politicisation of the Commission has increased 
the functional need to delegate complex, technical regulatory functions to 
‘independent’ agencies at the EU level. (p. 924) 
 
But, the theory and practice of EU policy formulation and technocratic implementation 
are two different things. EU Agencies are not immune to inter-institutional politics and 
sub-optimal design and implementation policies. Flinders (2004) has captured the 
essence of the problem as follows: 
Organizational structure matters because it influences who has power and it is 
therefore critical to appreciate that the discussion surrounding the future of 
regulatory agencies is enmeshed in wider and deeper debates about the future of 
the European project. The existing framework of agencies is the product of a 
complex power struggle rather than rational organizational design. European 
agencies have been created depending on the relationship between the 
Commission and Member States, and particularly the latter’s view of the capacity 
of the former to wield increased powers. The common outcome of such a political 
process is a compromise that achieves no one’s objectives completely. (p. 539) 
 
Hence, the pursuit of “European” missions by EU Agencies, and their control, is 
above all a political issue. The Member States have the power and mechanisms to 
influence, control and change both their formal structure and behaviour. Far from 
idealised conceptions of Eurocracy, the EU Agencies are not only a “second-best 
design choice” (Kelemen & Tarrant, 2011, p. 929) but are also politicised and bureau-
politicised to the extent that it affects their capacity to make “credible commitments” 
and achieve results (Christensen & Nielsen, 2010). Their output legitimacy can be 
systematically harmed by Member States’ imperative to establish their primacy across 
policy areas and constrain EU Agency action. EU Agencies operating in politically 
sensitive areas, such as JHA, and governed by Member State-dominated 
Management Boards experience the tight grip of national executive control. Kelemen 
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 and Tarrant (2001) argue that “sometimes such bodies [EU Agencies] may be 
designed to be ineffective” (p. 923). It follows that the functionalist argument and its 
premises (e.g. technocratic expertise, efficiency / effectiveness and 
professionalisation) may be normatively sound and desirable, but in reality political 
considerations prevail and promote the national self-interest (Kelemen & Tarrant, 
2011). For this reason, it is expected that EU and bureaucratic politics will actively 
resist EU Agency technocracy and related activities (e.g. “professionalisation from 
within”) when it could change the political equilibrium due to its “federalist” orientation 
and importance. In most cases, it is expected that the political (and bureau-political) 
equilibrium would be reached when an EU Agency is relatively weak and does not 
threaten the primacy of Member States. It follows that a stronger EU Agency with 
depoliticised expert functions that perform effectively and influence EU policies would 
meet national resistance and criticism due to the perceived imbalance in the principal-
agent relationship.  
Besides the fact that political orientations generally override “functional 
necessities” and notions of “federalist” learning and professionalisation, policy 
implementation can also be affected by bureaucratic politics due to the “primary 
loyalty” of national representatives to their administrations and the dependence of EU 
Agencies on Member State-held information (Eberlein & Grande, 2005; Eberlein & 
Kerwer, 2004; Kelemen & Tarrant, 2011, pp. 925-926). EU Agencies are embedded 
in a complex politico-administrative environment where success or failure may take a 
different meaning depending on the interests, preferences and cost-benefit 
calculations of political and bureaucratic actors. For Member States’ representatives, 
success may involve undermining technocratic functions, implementation efforts, 
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 innovation or EU Agency performance in general. Hence, the complex reality on the 
ground does not support normative expectations and hypotheses that Eurocracy will 
“transform locals into cosmopolitans”; improve cooperation with national authorities; 
and, lead to the harmonisation of professional standards (Eberlein & Grande, 2005, 
pp. 101, 103, 105). At both national and EU Agency level, overt and covert 
politicisation and bureau-politicisation exert pressures that affect administrative 
functioning and sometimes lead to deviations from professional standards (Peters & 
Pierre, 2004, p. 288). Directly or indirectly, political and bureau-political principals can 
impose their will on weak Eurocracy and affect its capacity to deliver results. Overall, 
the ebb and flow of nationalist and integrationist perspectives will determine the 
design, autonomy and performance of EU Agencies. 
In this context, the democracy-epistemic expertise dilemma in the governance of 
JHA Agencies has drawn particular attention with certain authors providing strong 
unequivocal support to democratic governance (see Eriksen, 2011). The idealistic 
requirement for democratic governance in this sensitive area has an unquestionable 
axiomatic position. In reality, however, it is far less obvious to what extent European 
“petty politics” and power games deviate from the normative ideal. In parallel, the JHA 
technocracy has been criticised with such fervour (Eriksen, 2011) to the point that it 
raises the question of whether European integration and results in this area are still 
considered a legitimate end and who, besides domain experts, should be entrusted 
with this task. Sophisticated normative discussions about democratic legitimacy and 
accountability dominate this higher axiomatic ground but fail to provide convincing 
answers to the serious problem of output legitimacy, which is also one of the 
foundations of democratic EU governance. Unwittingly perhaps, the over-emphasis 
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 on procedural legitimation and accountability mechanisms undermines the role of 
experts, technocratic knowledge and professionalisation, supporting one-sided 
political thinking and decision-making. Procedural-heavy Agencies can experience 
serious difficulties in terms of achieving policy goals effectively. Unavoidably, this 
leads to weak legitimacy by results and subsequent loss of credibility and public 
acceptance. The “democratisation / technocracy”-rift seems to be a source of tension 
between the European Commission, EU Agencies and Member States. While it is 
perfectly justifiable to prevent technocrats from building their “autonomous kingdoms” 
(Groenleer, 2009, p. 104), it should also be noted that an empirical study of the 
political attitudes of EU Agency professionals found that they perceived expertise as 
the basis of legitimacy and accountability and they were particularly sensitive to 
democratic politics and public approval (Wonka & Rittberger, 2011, pp. 904-905). The 
shaping of public opinion by Eurosceptic ideologies (see e.g. Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014, p. 
1283; Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 13) and political distrust toward experts, however, 
indicate the need to strike a balance between the political and epistemic authority of 
EU Agencies. A more nuanced understanding of their relationship is required 
because the democracy vs. epistocracy (Eriksen, 2011, p. 1184) is an artificial 
dilemma. Eurocracy should neither be effective and undemocratic nor democratic and 
ineffective (Olsen, Sbragia, & Scharpf, 2000). Eurocracy (and international authority) 
should be both democratic and effective.  
Given the political opposition to the establishment of a centralised Eurocracy, the 
structure and function of decentralised EU Agencies represents a power-sharing 
compromise in favour of the Member States. In effect, instead of a Commission 
Eurocracy, we now have a Member State-dominated Eurocracy. For this reason, the 
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 present analysis views EU Agencies more as vehicles of national control and less as 
independent Eurocratic structures. The imbalance between their political and 
epistemic authority and their susceptibility to nationalistic politicisation and bureau-
politicisation can be harmful for effective policy implementation, especially in the 
sensitive JHA area. Parenthetically, the discussion on politicisation, bureau-
politication and EU Agency Governance requires careful consideration of theories of 
governance (Bevir, 2011) and the “communitarisation” effects of the Treaty of Lisbon 
on JHA Agencies (Borrás & Radaelli, 2011; Ripoll Servent & Trauner, 2014). This 
requires extensive treatment, but due to space limitations it is not possible to 
elaborate here. 
 
 
Theoretical application and discussion of empirical findings 
According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), States act through IOs because they value 
their functional centralisation and independence and defer to their epistemic 
knowledge in order to achieve the desired ends more efficiently and effectively than 
States would on their own. In theory, the political neutrality of IOs expertise ensures 
that they are “less influenced by narrow national interests [i.e. bounded rationality] 
and differential power than direct intergovernmental bargaining” (Abbott & Snidal, 
1998, p. 16). What happens when the States decide for various reasons to violate 
these normative principles however? The answer is that in practice “IO independence 
is highly constrained: member states, especially the powerful, can limit the autonomy 
of IOs, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve 
them” (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 5). 
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  Europol is a case in point. Several authors have examined its role and 
performance against organised crime and terrorism. Their studies identified problems, 
such as: the bureaucratic resistance of EU law enforcement that prevented counter-
terrorism intelligence cooperation through Europol (Fägersten, 2010); the problematic 
cooperation of Member States that limited Europol’s autonomy as well as its 
performance and growth  (Busuioc et al., 2011; Busuioc & Groenleer, 2013); the 
limited operational successes and unfulfilled potential of Europol despite strong EU 
political promotion (Rozée, Kaunert, & Léonard, 2013); the limited influence of 
Europol on EU policy-making against organised crime due to legal and policing 
differences among Member States (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013); and, the democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of Europol (Kaunert, Léonard, & Occhipinti, 2013; 
Schmidt, 2013). The rich, and very informative, empirical findings of this study (see 
detailed QUAN and QUAL analysis in Chapters 3 and 4) provide compelling evidence 
regarding the highly constrained role and operational activities of Europol. Its radical 
transformation from an established centre of excellence in intelligence analysis to 
mere criminal information provider, the “professionalisation from above” of its analyst 
workforce and the strict control of its operational processes and outputs suggest the 
violation of normative principles (Abbott & Snidal, 1998) that would normally 
characterise an independent EU Agency with a strong epistemic authority. A common 
theme behind those problems is the de facto reluctance and resistance of Member 
States and national authorities to engage in meaningful cooperation with an 
independent Europol with the purpose of solving crime problems that transcend 
national borders and improving law enforcement cooperation and integration. This 
negative behaviour of Member States affects all JHA Agencies in various degrees 
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 (see Davis Cross, 2013; Mackenzie, Bures, Kaunert, & Léonard, 2013; Monar, 2013). 
A recent study that examined the legitimacy of Frontex (the EU border control, 
Agency) found that its limited performance was similar to its intergovernmental 
predecessor’s performance and thus did not justify its transformation into an EU 
Agency (Wolff & Schout, 2013). Consequently, the available literature, and the 
present study, suggest that bureaucratic resistance and political interferences can 
seriously distort the rational use of JHA Agencies as technocratic and depoliticised 
authorities. The importance of professional expertise and effectiveness in achieving 
the common European good is used as the main justification for their creation, but 
that remains a rhetorical argument. The growing evidence that certain JHA Agencies 
are underperforming mainly due to EU and bureaucratic politics, and associated 
politicisation pressures, is an embarrassing finding. As policy implementation tools, 
EU Agencies are supposed to deploy their technocratic expertise efficiently and 
effectively. In reality, however, Member States’ deference to Eurocratic expertise is 
conditional upon their national self-interests and preferences. This is very limiting and 
hampers the capacity of JHA Agencies, such as Europol, to deliver results and 
develop further. Obviously, the Member States are not ready for enhanced 
cooperation and integration in this politically sensitive area.  
The European law enforcement agencies, in particular, instead of committing to 
the maximum level of cooperation with Europol actually commit to the minimum level 
only. For the most part, they resemble “locals” that focus almost exclusively on 
domestic problem-solving, not “cosmopolitan” problem-solving. This could be 
interpreted as evidence that their “guardians of Kratos”-identity has a predominantly 
exclusive nationalist character inclined toward Euroscepticism (see p. 166). One 
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 could reasonably conclude that the “Europeanisation” of national law enforcement 
agencies will be a very slow process. But, this study found evidence of a more 
worrisome trend: ad hoc exposure to cosmopolitan perspectives using Europol as a 
“socialisation platform” and “test bed” of ideas (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013, p. 357) is 
insufficient to change, or “Europeanise”, local perspectives. Indeed, the 2010 reform 
and associated developments show that Member States actively “nationalise” the 
cosmopolitan environment and shape it according to their self-interested preferences. 
This finding supports Scharpf’s “joint-decision trap”-hypothesis (1998). Previous 
descriptions of Europol as “the proverbial ‘black sheep’ of the agencification process 
at the EU level” and “highly controversial body” that is overwhelmed by excessive 
accountability controls  and micromanaged by Member States (Busuioc et al., 2011, 
p. 863; Busuioc & Groenleer, 2013, p. 286) have provided some clues about its 
peculiar design, pathologic dependency on, and lack of trust by, its European 
Member State partners. For this reason, it was assumed that Europol should go 
through a “normalisation process” to become a proper EU Agency (Busuioc & 
Groenleer, 2013, p. 301) in order to function more effectively. That proved to be 
wishful thinking however. Following its transformation into EU Agency, Europol 
experienced Member State capture and total control of its operations much more than 
ever before. Since 2010, its executive governance, mission, design, management, 
and elementary operational processes and outputs speaks to this reality. Obviously, 
Member States and their national police authorities have taken powerful measures to 
reform it according to their preferences and avoid the development of, and 
competition by, a potentially strong Europol in the future.  
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 Most importantly, Member State capture led to a noticeable decline of Europol’s 
epistemic authority and output legitimacy. Arguably, its operational and strategic 
analysis functions – that is, its core business tools – now lack the sophistication and 
have became too politicised and symbolic (see Parkin, 2012, pp. 38-40)14 to fill the 
serious knowledge gaps between the “micro” level of operational cross checks and 
the “macro” level of political priorities against serious  and organised crime. Taken 
together, the QUAN and QUAL evidence – namely, the operational production and 
reporting patterns (see pp. 61-66), the results of significance tests that helped identify 
a mechanism of SNA adoption and use (see pp. 98-100), and the revealing accounts 
of interviewees (see e.g. p. 115) – suggest that Europol’s ineffective design, 
restructuring and excessive politicisation / bureau-politicisation in the post-2010 
period resulted in the basic work phenomenon. The fact that its operational analysis 
capacity has been hollowed-out reflects on the shortcomings of its governance 
(Peters, 2011).15 The main reason behind Europol’s epistemic deficit and elementary 
effectiveness is that Member States and their law enforcement agencies – motivated 
by a political need to protect their national sovereignty – lost sight of what is really 
important and undermined its role further. Hence, the transformation of Europol into 
an EU Agency, as an “experiment in [European] identity formation” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2009, p. 23), has failed because it consolidated the primacy of Member States and 
traded off effective technocratic functioning for minimum operational cooperation and 
political symbolism. Consequently, future law enforcement cooperation through 
Europol will likely remain Member State-driven and thus inherently incomplete and 
ineffective.  
14 Parkin’s knowledge criteria: objectivity, scientific rigour, reliability, relevance and accuracy. 
15 Peter’s good governance (decision-making) criteria: suitability, robustness, innovation and content. 
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 Clearly, the Member States do not want Europol to exercise a protagonistic role in 
the fight against serious and organised crimes that require a joint EU approach due to 
their cross-border and transnational nature (with some exceptions such as cybercrime 
and child exploitation). Only a very limited support role is foreseen. Then, as Scharpf 
(2007, p. 10) notes, “if the Union depends so completely on its member states…[the] 
effects may be positive or negative”. Here the effects will most likely be negative. 
Obviously, Member States believe that their police authorities can tackle cross-border 
and transnational threats on their own. But, a sceptical observer would seriously 
doubt that nationally-orientated police can achieve this ambitious goal without 
significant operational support (or steering) from a depoliticised and effective 
supranational body. Strong political – admittedly impressive – support for Europol 
cannot compensate for its elementary operational role and outputs. 
 
Table 7: Typologizing the politicisation and professionalisation of the analysis 
function of Europol 
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 In reality, the political and bureau-political principals have taken a sigificant risk by 
restructuring and weakening the agent. The main democratic issue here is not the 
agent’s accountability, but its ineffectiveness. The strong national police-weak 
Europol pattern is a major asymmetry that creates a dangerous security gap at EU 
level. The typology in Table 7 above shows that politicisation and epistemic deficit 
effects can turn paradigmatic intelligence analysis into a basic, symbolic or superficial 
function. 
In hindsight, the 2010 reform was apparently a stealthy deform aiming at the 
establishment of a new Europol with a significantly narrowed operational scope and 
minimal analysis capacity. Now Europol has a conveniently “light”-support mission 
merely managing a criminal information database and producing cross matches. As a 
result, the “federalist vision” of EU law enforcement integration and the “differentiated 
integration”-alternative now exist only in the sphere of fantasy (see broader 
discussion in Majone, 2010, pp. 173-174). This fait accompli effectively thwarted any 
ideas or hopes for a more serious federal response against serious / organised crime 
and terrorism at EU level. As noted above, preferences in EU and bureaucratic 
politics are shaped by the identities of actors and their predispositions toward 
European integration or Euroscepticism. Here developments imply the dominance of 
the latter. The model of intergovernmental cooperation – organised under a powerful 
and rigid nationalist position – has been so infused and institutionalised to the point of 
becoming a cultural element of this EU Agency and a defining feature of its 
governance and management. Unsurprisingly, political bargaining informed by a 
preference for fragmentation (not greater centralisation) has led to another 
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 “piecemeal approach” (Majone, 2010, p. 172) or sub-optimum policy in law 
enforcement cooperation and integration (Schaprf 1988, 2006).  
 
Table 8:  Hypothesised effects of strong input vs. strong output legitimacy 
orientations 
  
Legitimacy of JHA Agency 
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toward output legitimacy 
 
Design  
(structure) 
 
Ineffective Effective 
Governance Intergovernmental  
or joint-decision 
 
Supranational  
Decision-making style Bargaining Problem-solving 
 
Political ideology  
(culture) 
Eurosceptic  
(or nationalist)  
“Federalist”  
(or integrationist) 
 
Politicisation and 
bureaucratic politics 
 
High Low 
Agency independence 
(autonomy) 
 
Low High 
Accountability control 
mechanisms 
 
Excessive Appropriate 
Knowledge production 
functions 
 
Elementary  
(or symbolic) 
Technocratic  
(or epistemic) 
Expertise  
 
Low High 
Efficiency and 
effectiveness 
  
Low High 
Operational credibility 
 
Low High 
Innovation 
 
Low High 
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 An operationally weak Europol cannot gain legitimacy by results, but in the eyes of its 
political and bureau-political designers has gained input (procedural) legitimacy. The 
2010 reform reveals a strong orientation toward this latter type of legitimacy as well 
as the dominance of political and bureau-political authority over technocratic 
authority. Table 8 above summarises the hypothesised effects of reforms grounded 
on strong input (procedural) vs. strong output orientations against a set of 
organisational criteria. As Schmidt (2013, p. 19) argues, “input and output [legitimacy] 
can involve trade-offs, where more of the one may make up for less of the other”. 
Europol now experiences the effects of its one-sided legitimacy orientation; that is, 
Member State capture, basic work phenomenon, and epistemic and output legitimacy 
deficit. Arguably, this shows that the normative ideal for legitimation of democratic 
participation and agent control has been distorted in practice serving primarily 
national bureaucratic self-interests (Fägersten, 2010). 
The empirical findings of the study facilitated the development of grounded theory 
and provided confirming evidence about the effects of input legitimacy-driven reforms. 
The input legitimacy-innovation hypothesis proposed here states that a principal and 
a politicised agent in search of symbolic legitimacy will overlook functional and 
epistemic necessities and thus will not invest in innovation since it is a means of 
achieving output legitimacy. This proposition is informed by the finding that EU 
Agencies are primarily created to serve political, not functional, ends (Kelemen, 2002; 
Kelemen & Tarrant, 2011) and the fact that these ends are based on dichotomous 
legitimacy requirements. Indeed, Europol did not embrace valuable innovation (i.e. 
SNA) even though it could have helped in achieving the professionalisation (and 
scientification) of intelligence analysis and improving its operational performance 
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 significantly. Instead, it focused on restructuring, accountability controls and political 
support to make procedural legitimacy gains. Consequently, it dissolved its analysis 
function, engaged in “professionalisation from above” and failed to support the SNA 
(“professionalisation from within”) project. Political mobilisation resulted in excessive 
levels of politicisation / bureau-politicisation that constrained its functional autonomy 
further. Its pathologic dependence on political principals resulted in Member State 
capture, failure to produce quality knowledge and thus limited effectiveness. Locked 
in this mode, Europol and its partners became path dependent (Sydow et al., 2009) 
and their joint decisions created the basic work phenomenon (Table 7 above). Given 
its output legitimacy deficit, Europol relied on corporate communication strategies 
presenting the reform itself as innovation, and the outputs of basic work as evidence 
of its operational successes, thus obscuring its dysfunctional situation. The 
hypothesis predicts agent entrapment in a spiral of input legitimacy and procedural 
accountability that constructs and lives a life of its own. It is expected that this will 
cause tensions and criticism (e.g. deviation from professional standards and 
elementary results) by those who demand that the agent functions as a depoliticised 
epistemic authority and demonstrates its added value and commitment to 
effectiveness, knowledge creation and progress. The principals will likely defend the 
change as politically legitimate, justified and appropriate as they consider the harm to 
agent’s technocracy and effectiveness less important than the need to impose their 
primacy and control. Nonetheless, the dysfunctional state of the agent will require 
additional procedural reforms that will not address its output legitimacy problem and 
thus perpetuate its politicised behaviour. The hypothesis could be generalised under 
similar conditions to other JHA Agencies, EU Agencies and IOs. Overall, it explains 
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 how IOs could lose their valuable role as depoliticised and epistemic authorities and 
become politicised (and bureau-politicised) bargaining systems the performance of 
which depends each time on the level of political equilibrium (Elgström & Jönsson, 
2000). 
 
 
Chapter summary 
 This chapter reviewed the literature on politicisation, bureau-politicisation and EU 
Agency governance to facilitate the theoretical application of the findings of the study. 
Both the empirical findings and the literature suggest that the national barriers to EU 
law enforcement cooperation and integration through Europol are high. Under the 
influence of nationalist (Eurosceptic) perspectives and strong anti-epistemic bias, the 
technocratic authority and democratic output legitimacy of Europol were significantly 
weakened after the input (procedural) legitimacy-driven reform of 2010. The basic 
work phenomenon that now characterises its operational activities is an effect of 
Member State capture (or “nationalisation”) and excessive politicisation and bureau-
politicisation following its transformation into an EU Agency. The SNA innovation with 
its scientific basis is totally incompatible with the logic, processes and outputs of basic 
work. The problematic integration of SNA in the re-designed analysis environment not 
only signifies a difficult symbiosis with basic work but also a missed opportunity to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of analytical support to major pan-European 
investigations. In this way, Europol has failed to improve its role as epistemic 
authority and become a catalyst for a much needed paradigm shift in intelligence 
analysis and investigation by promoting the network paradigm. The input legitimacy-
innovation hypothesis proposed here states that a principal and a politicised agent in 
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 search of symbolic legitimacy will overlook functional and epistemic necessities and 
thus will not invest in innovation since it is a means of achieving legitimacy by results. 
The output legitimacy deficit of Europol raises concerns about its ineffective design, 
operational functions and the principal-agent relationship. The active resistance and 
reluctance of European law enforcement agencies – motivated by a need to assert 
their primacy and control over a weak Europol – has created a potentially dangerous 
asymmetry for the security of the EU. The study’s findings suggest that alternative 
policy options could be considered with the purpose of re-designing and empowering 
Europol to achieve a better balance between its political and epistemic authority and 
its input (procedural) and output legitimacy. Overall, the case of Europol raises 
concerns about EU Agency governance and management in the politically sensitive 
JHA area. 
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 Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
The doctorate research deployed a cross-sectional sequential mixed design 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) to investigate the problematic integration of SNA into 
the analysis environment of Europol. According to the research plan, it proceeded 
through descriptive mapping and theme identification (questionnaire survey) to 
inductive thematic analysis (semi-structured interviews) and theoretical application of 
empirical results (topical literature review) to explore this real-world problem 
systematically 
The starting point was an examination of the perceptions of operational analysts 
on the use and perceived usefulness of SNA as a principal analytical approach. 
Focussing on the whole population of operational analysts (N=77) the questionnaire 
survey achieved a relatively high response rate (75%) identifying a purposive and 
representative sample (n=58). Detailed statistical analysis of the survey data, using 
both descriptive and inferential techniques (e.g. frequencies, cross tabulations, t test, 
chi-square and one-way ANOVA), assisted in “mapping the terrain” and identifying 
the associations of three key variables (i.e. SNA use, SNA-induced change in 
analysis practices, and analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness) with different 
professional and demographic variables.  
Interestingly, it was found that professional-level variables (i.e. role, years of 
Europol experience, operational analysis and reporting, availability of network data, 
and analysts, project managers / specialists and clients’ acceptance and 
understanding of SNA) mattered a lot more than demographic ones regarding the 
adoption and use of SNA. Surprisingly, the analysis did not identify distinct 
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 demographic profiles amongst SNA users and non-users of this diverse occupational 
group (e.g. based on their age, gender or education). The majority of participants 
stated that SNA improved analysis practices and performance significantly and 
agreed that it has great potential to become a principal analysis standard and to 
shape their profession’s future. But, their responses also suggested that SNA 
integration was side-lined by major organisational changes that affected the analysis 
function as a whole. Particularly telling were the operational analysis and reporting 
patterns (see Chapter 3 above) regarding the barriers posed by Europol’s 2010 
reform and its role as criminal information hub (Council Decision of 6 April 2009 
establishing the European Police Office (Europol), 2009; Europol, 2010c). This new 
orientation altered the essence of operational support from advanced intelligence 
analysis to data processing and cross check / match reporting. Specifically, an 
inverse relationship was observed between the frequency of production and 
usefulness of intelligence products (see Chapter 3, Figures 2 and 3). By prioritising 
low level products (i.e. hit notifications and cross match reports) Europol produced 
significantly less high level ones (i.e. operational analysis and knowledge products). 
This revealed a fundamental tension where Europol analysts routinely engaged in 
less useful (quick / volume) analytic work, contrary to their professional judgement 
about what really mattered in terms of intelligence reporting. That is, producing 
actionable intelligence of high quality and coordinating pan-European investigations.  
The reform created a new operational reality whereby the AWFs were used as yet 
another criminal information system. Europol changed its analysis policies and 
processes so that it merely functioned as an information provider’(Europol, 2014c), 
and tasked its analysts to deal with a massive increase in the volume of operational 
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 data contributed by EU law enforcement (see pp. 24-26). The results showed 
unprecedented information overload and work-related pressures precluded 
sophisticated and ambitious intelligence reporting to a very large extent. Perhaps the 
most radical change was the abolition of its centralised Analysis Unit – a centre of 
excellence established in 1999 – and the creation of Information Hub Unit to 
spearhead the data processing and hit reporting business. Inside the re-designed 
analysis environment, the Information Hub Unit and the Focal Points focussed almost 
exclusively on the elementary “data input and cross check”-priority. It was seen that 
the operational restructuring was imposed in a top-down way creating formidable 
difficulties not only to the emerging network paradigm (i.e. SNA) but also to the old 
paradigm (i.e. conventional link analysis). Obviously, these developments influenced 
the SNA-related perceptions and behaviour of a significant number of Europol 
analysts. Simply put, their attention concentrated on the tasks and requirements of 
the new core business. Comprehensive descriptive and inferential analysis helped 
identify strong and weak associations between variables (see significance tests in 
Appendix F); creating a model for SNA adoption and use (see Figure 17, p. 99); and, 
discerning the role of specific barriers and facilitators (see Table 4, p. 103). Several 
factors affected SNA integration (i.e. senior analysts held on average negative views 
on SNA; certain operational teams faced problems with the availability of network 
data; project managers / specialists and clients had very limited understanding of 
SNA; and, many analysts expressed anti-epistemic views). But, none of these issues 
could match the impact of 2010 reform. Moreover, it could be argued that these 
issues were influenced considerably by the reform itself. Overall, the empirical 
findings pointed at the systemic role of the political and bureau-political preferences of 
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 the 28 EU Member States, law enforcement and EU Institutions in shaping Europol’s 
new mission and operational support role that culminated in the 2010 reform. 
Consequently, the research focussed on two major competing themes: the 
politicisation / bureau-politicisation and the professionalisation (and scientification) of 
criminal intelligence analysis.  
Thereafter, in-depth qualitative analysis of five semi-structured interviews with 
Europol analysts provided holistic coverage of the operational landscape, facilitated 
deeper examination of the key themes and allowed for better understanding of the 
research problem. Thematic analysis with elements of the grounded theory method 
(GTM) helped generate rich meaning and new theory. The search for metaphors in 
interviewees’ responses revealed a number of analysis-related weaknesses (see pp. 
112-113) that apparently stemmed to a considerable degree from the politicisation / 
bureau-politicisation of intelligence analysis (“professionalisation from above”) and the 
radical restructuring (see also Appendix G). Their stories proved the pervasive 
influence of the “data input and cross check”-priority and an over-emphasis on hit 
reporting of relatively minor operational value. Also, it seems that the analysts 
perceived their operational disengagement as unjustified and experienced a 
professional conflict (or crisis). In their view, analysis became disconnected from the 
intelligence-led policing mission and so concluded that “analysis floats away'' 
(Interviewee 3) and “the image of an analyst will die very soon” (Interviewee 1). 
Unrealistic customer and Europol management expectations made them feel they 
were treated either as “magicians” (Interviewee 1) or “robots” (Interviewee 2). 
Significantly, the new operational analysis practices after 2010 led to the emergence 
of the basic work phenomenon. This concept emerged from the interview data (see 
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 Interviewee 3 quote, p. 115) and is defined as: the institutionalisation of elementary 
data processing and cross match (or hit) reporting practices. Basic work is seen as a 
key effect of the politicisation / bureau-politicisation of Europol’s analysis function that 
reflects the preferences of EU Member States and law enforcement about operational 
support. Interviewee 3 put it as follows: “Member States don’t want analysis, they 
want hits”. This phenomenon shares important similarities with McDonaldised 
systems (Heslop, 2011; Ritzer, 1998), but there is a crucial difference here: basic 
work signifies the politicisation / bureau-politicisation of intelligence analysis and 
serves as a control mechanism for asserting the primacy of Member States over 
Europol. 
The fact that powerful political and bureau-political principals established Europol 
as an EU Agency with a criminal information mission had profound effects that not 
only permeated the operational culture but also marked the decline of the analysis 
function at Europol. The powerless occupational group of analysts could not influence 
the changes that steered the EU Agency away from the old and the new analysis 
paradigm. The study found that they were not consulted at any stage of the reform 
process since the future of criminal intelligence analysis in Europol was determined at 
the political and bureau-political level. Effectively, this “captive” group was 
“professionalised from above” in line with the mission and requirements of the 
criminal information hub. In parallel, the dynamics of reform – and basic work as the 
main characteristic of the re-designed analysis environment – impeded the SNA 
innovation, which was a “professionalisation from within”-project (McClelland, 1990). 
The fact that highly trained all-source analysts were almost exclusively assigned to 
“data input and cross check” tasks gradually led to the decline of high-quality analysis 
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 and expertise. The prevalence of elementary norms and practices pointed to the 
incompatibility of basic work and SNA – a scientific approach itself. By underusing 
analysts’ skills, and not investing sufficiently in their professional development, the 
restructuring had serious de-skilling and epistemic deficit effects. Of course, analysts’ 
preference for natural-mode thinking contributed to a certain extent to the anti-
epistemic culture of the criminal information environment. But, this could be attributed 
to the abolition of the Analysis Unit; lack of analysis leadership; and, deviation from 
professional analysis standards in practice. It should be noted that the management 
of the analysis function after 2010 has been in the hands of non-analyst line 
managers and directorate members. Apparently, this added to the identified 
shortcomings. Considering the empirical results together, it seems that many 
“modernist” and “traditionalist” analysts perceived the 2010 reform as deform by 
which the structure and function of analysis were dissolved and both advanced link 
analysis and SNA were treated as exceptions. Hence, the study found that the new 
Europol mission and operational restructuring post-2010 offset the positive – albeit 
short-lived – effect of SNA on analysis practices and prevented its further 
development as principal analysis paradigm. 
The theoretical application of empirical findings, and due consideration of the 
political landscape and governance of Europol, helped understand the research 
problem better. Europol, and its centre of excellence in criminal intelligence analysis, 
operated at arm’s length from EU and bureaucratic politics since its establishment in 
1999 as an intergovernmental organisation. Technocratic development and 
operational efficiency was conditional upon the limited willingness of Member States 
to delegate epistemic authority and engage with it meaningfully (Zürn et al., 2012). 
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 Europol was functionally constrained by self-interested nationalist perspectives and 
thus lacked the autonomy to engage in purposeful, expert-driven action and the 
achievement of “legitimacy by results” (Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2006). Following 
the legal transformation of Europol into an EU Agency in 2010, it experienced the 
effects of a stronger wave of Euroscepticism and Europol-scepticism. Member States 
and EU law enforcement consolidated full political and bureau-political control over 
Europol shaping its mission, policies, analysis processes and outputs. Instead of 
functioning as a coordinating EU Agency, Europol was subjected to Member State 
capture (or “nationalisation”). It became a “vehicle of national control” (Egeberg & 
Trondal, 2011) with its Serious & Organised Crime Department operating in 
intergovernmental mode more than in the pre-2010 period. The dominance of 
nationalist perspectives over genuine Eurocratic (“federalist”) ones had an adverse 
effect, as discussed above. Rather than developing further the centre of analysis 
excellence, Europol’s principals abolished it and opted for the limiting approach of the 
criminal information system. The excessive national control together with a strong 
orientation toward input (procedural) legitimacy and accountability strengthened 
Europol’s political authority and weakened its epistemic authority and output 
legitimacy (effectiveness). Simply put, it seems that the Member States applied the 
brakes harder after the 2010 reform hollowing-out Europol’s technocratic authority 
and affecting its operational performance accordingly. Under the elementary core 
business of “data input and cross check”, functional necessities and considerations of 
advanced intelligence analysis – such as, the production of high-quality operational 
knowledge, the professionalisation (and scientification) of intelligence analysis, and 
the SNA innovation – did not receive sufficient attention.  
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 The identified asymmetry between Europol’s strong political and weak epistemic 
authority reflects on the asymmetry of its democratic input (procedural) and output 
legitimacy. These types of legitimacy are axiomatically unquestionable and contribute 
equally to operational credibility. In this case, however, it appears that the 
effectiveness requirement became the subject of political bargaining due to national 
sovereignty concerns and bureaucratic resistance (Fägersten, 2010). The 2010 
reform was a compromise solution to the complex political / bureau-political problem 
of how much political and epistemic authority to delegate to Europol. The political 
principals did not delegate analysis authority and re-designed Europol as a JHA 
Agency of limited effectiveness with a criminal information system only (Kelemen & 
Tarrant, 2011). Curiously, instead of making full use of the existing Europol 
Information System (EIS), the Europol Analysis System (EAS) – that is, the AWF and 
FPs – was transformed into a criminal information system. Apparently, the Member 
States and their police authorities perceived analysis as an “intrusive” means of 
achieving output legitimacy (effectiveness) and thus opted for minimum involvement 
of Europol in national investigations. In that sense, basic work redefined the meaning 
of operational support in line with EU Member States’ preferences (i.e. provision of 
cross matches only). Objectively, Europol needs both criminal information and 
analysis systems to improve the effectiveness of European police cooperation and 
serve its mandate. This is due to the fact that the existing hit management system is 
incomplete and its operational value is rather limited on its own. The vast majority of 
the study’s participants confirmed this point by emphasising the limited usefulness of 
its main output (i.e. cross match reports). Normally, cross matches are used as input 
to an all-source analysis process that generates actionable intelligence. But, the 
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 participants stressed that their day-to-day work rarely takes an advanced analysis 
approach. Consequently, Europol cannot engage in intelligence coordination of major 
pan-European investigations as in the pre-2010 period. This also means that the EU-
wide intelligence picture on criminal and terrorist networks – that would otherwise be 
pieced together by Europol analysts – remains largely fragmented with important 
pieces of intelligence left in the hands of Member States and managed bilaterally. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that cross match notifications will be acted upon 
appropriately because not all EU police agencies have advanced analysis capabilities 
to support their investigations. Finally, the chosen approach suggests a flawed 
assumption that significant results can be achieved by resorting to the “basics”; 
however, the replacement of the all-important function of intelligence analysis by 
elementary practices suggests the opposite (Interviewee 3). These observations draw 
attention not only to the limitations of the criminal information system but also to the 
potential for intelligence failure. Arguably, the harm to Europol’s epistemic authority 
and output legitimacy has EU-wide security implications. The radical operational 
restructuring was a step back at a time when the EU needed to step up its efforts 
against serious / organised crime and terrorism. Europol now is in a state of 
operational decline because its analysis function is underused and underperforming 
and its criminal information function cannot fill this serious performance gap.  
Now let’s consider some countervailing positions. It could be argued, for example, 
that the reform aimed at achieving incremental progress given Member States’ 
reluctance to support genuine Eurocratic policies and cooperate with Europol to the 
fullest. The latter is a well-known problem and although the practical difficulties of EU 
negotiations are understandable the final outcome is unjustifiable and perhaps 
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 unprecedented. One would be hard-pressed to identify another JHA Agency or IO 
that curtailed a well-established epistemic function. The logic of “evolutionary” 
progress would signify a failure to address the present need to improve effectiveness 
in the face of growing crime threats until the political and bureau-political climate 
becomes more favourable. Another argument could be based on a “managerial need” 
to focus limited analysis resources better. This line of reasoning would indicate an 
attempt to deal with the symptoms and not the real causes. It would bypass serious 
management questions retreating behind the hierarchical safety of political and 
bureau-political preferences. For example, why the total number of Europol analysts 
has been approximately the same since 2005 while the total number of Europol staff 
increased from 536 in 2005 to 858 in 2014 (see p. 27)? Or, what is the real added 
value of managing a criminal database to produce hits only? Both arguments are 
unconvincing because they do not address the problem at hand. Far from being 
pragmatic, these piecemeal approaches imply a flawed or incomplete “theory of the 
business” (Drucker,1994). Such faulty rationalisations can draw attention away from 
the problematic principal-agent relationship. As noted above, self-interested 
nationalist perspectives can be traced behind the politicisation and bureau-
politicisation of criminal intelligence analysis and the weakening of the agent’s 
technocratic authority. Despite its functional shortcomings, the “nationalisation” of 
Europol seems to be in line with EU Member States’ political and bureau-political 
preferences. Behind Europol’s reform, there seems to be a political and bureau-
political reality that does not support ambitious plans or raises formidable barriers to 
EU police and intelligence cooperation. Post-2010 developments and the basic work 
phenomenon in particular, reflect the sub-optimal operational cooperation between 
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 Europol and its EU partners. The protection of national sovereignty and bureaucratic 
interests explain better why its epistemic authority is kept in check. This is a case in 
point of the so called “joint-decision trap”-problem (Scharpf, 1988). That is, the 
political and bureau-political preference for least common denominator solutions in 
the sensitive policy area of EU law enforcement. In that sense, the link between 
Europol’s “nationalisation” and the joint governance mode may indicate a systematic 
tendency of this Member State-dominated Eurocracy toward the preclusion of more 
epistemic and Eurocratic (“federalist”) policy options (see pp. 177-178). Obviously, 
the improvement of EU police cooperation and further integration through Europol is 
impeded by the fact that truly European security politics, norms and values are 
currently underdeveloped (see discussion on EU Agency Governance in Chapter 5).   
The study found that the aforementioned themes were insurmountable barriers 
that eventually prevented Europol from fully integrating and benefiting from the SNA 
innovation. The input (procedural) legitimacy-innovation hypothesis proposed here 
states that a political / bureau-political principal and a politicised agent in search of 
symbolic legitimacy, control and further consolidation of political authority will overlook 
functional and epistemic necessities and thus will not invest in innovation since it is a 
means of improving effectiveness and achieving legitimacy by results. The hypothesis 
predicts that an epistemic paradigm shift is unlikely to succeed in a Member State-
dominated Eurocracy, such as Europol. Self-interested nationalist, Eurosceptic and 
bureaucratic perspectives in a sensitive policy area will increase the levels of 
politicisation and bureau-politicisation; cause disproportionate growth of political 
authority; and, demonstrate overly strong orientations toward input (procedural) 
legitimacy and accountability. In such contexts, the dichotomous relationship of the 
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 political and epistemic authority will eventually restrain the latter and affect output 
legitimacy accordingly. Viewed from this angle, therefore, the problematic integration 
of SNA as a “professionalisation from within”-project, was a missed opportunity to 
improve the epistemic authority and output legitimacy of Europol as well as promote 
the network paradigm in criminal justice.   
Current developments seem to support the empirical evidence and inductive 
conclusions of the thesis. In his speech, First Vice-President Timmermans of the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2015b) stressed the need to improve 
the effectiveness of JHA Agencies to protect EU citizens from serious / organised 
crime and terrorism, adding that:  
[o]ur analysis suggests that Member States are still underusing this framework 
for coordination, information exchange and cooperation. There is still mistrust 
and reticence to cooperate even more closely by using the tools in place to the 
full. We need to change the culture and modus operandi of our law 
enforcement community. (p. 1) 
 
The unusually direct statement that Member States are “underusing the tools in 
place” confirms the European Commission knows well the problem of sub-optimal 
policy implementation and limited effectiveness of Europol. But how can the “culture 
and modus operandi” of EU law enforcement change for the purpose of improving EU 
police cooperation and integration? Since its establishment Europol has been facing 
the mistrust and limited cooperation of its partners and, as argued here, the issue has 
become more acute after 2010 due to the adverse effects of the intensification of EU 
politics and bureaucratic politics. Despite the political affirmation above, the new five-
year European Agenda on Security (European Commission, 2015a) could be yet 
another piecemeal approach that will not address the deeper causes behind the 
operational weakening of Europol because it will “focus on the better use or 
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 sharpening of the existing instruments before proposing new ones” (European 
Commission, 2015b). The fact that “analysis” is missing from the EU security 
“framework for coordination, information exchange and cooperation” (European 
Commission, 2015a) is evidence that Member States are unwilling to delegate 
substantive authority to Europol. Hence, there is no indication that its epistemic 
authority deficit will be addressed soon. The recent appeals of high ranking European 
Commission officials to improve cooperation and effectiveness (ABC News, 2015) 
denote the presence of major political differences and bureau-political resistance that 
hinder EU security cooperation. 
This thesis – while acknowledging the great potential of Europol as a coordinating 
JHA Agency and the results achieved so far against serious / organised crime and 
terrorism – expresses a sceptical view about its new operational role, design and 
performance. It joins other academic works that have examined various shortcomings 
of this EU Agency (see pp. 175-176) that stem from being a highly politicised and 
constrained project. The hollowing-out of its epistemic authority, and its elementary 
outputs, indicate a mismatch with performance-related expectations. Even though it is 
difficult to make scholarly recommendations on such a complex, multi-level and 
persistent problem affected by the impediments of Eurosceptic politicisation and 
bureau-politicisation, the following key points should be taken into account. First, the 
available empirical evidence suggests that Member State-dominated Europol cannot 
make significant performance improvements based on an incomplete criminal 
information system designed primarily for making input (procedural) legitimacy gains 
(i.e. securing Member States’ cooperation on information exchange). Improving 
security in the EU requires a stronger Europol that produces actionable operational 
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 intelligence of high quality and acts as a truly coordinating JHA Agency. Second, 
Europol can achieve output legitimacy and fully serve its functional ends by 
depoliticising and strengthening its epistemic authority. Since operational 
effectiveness is crucially linked to democratic legitimation, analysis technocracy 
should be protected from harmful politicisation effects. Concretely, the political 
principals should consider the need to re-establish its analysis system to complement 
the existing criminal information system. This will help in making the crucial step from 
basic to paradigmatic work (see p. 180). Third, activating its technocratic authority 
through deference to intelligence analysis expertise, sophisticated knowledge 
generation processes and support of valuable innovation seems to be the best way to 
improve performance. Embracing SNA and the network paradigm, in particular, would 
be essential for the successful implementation of an effectiveness-orientated policy 
and the professionalisation (and scientification) of criminal intelligence analysis. 
Finally, a Europhile or Eurosceptic orientation is crucial in determining Europol’s 
future role and direction (see Figure 19 below). The delegation of epistemic authority, 
operational intelligence coordination and the professionalisation of analysis through 
SNA, depend on more “Europhile” EU politics and bureaucratic politics. Europol’s 
political authority need not be in conflict with, and constrain, its epistemic authority. 
However, this entails political choices and a determination to overcome nationalist 
orientations to EU law enforcement cooperation. In any case, Europol’s principals 
should consider alternative policy options with the purpose of re-designing this EU 
Agency to achieve a better balance between its political and epistemic authority and 
its input (procedural) and output legitimacy. The challenge is to design a 
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 democratically-legitimate, accountable and highly effective agent to serve the 
common European good. 
 
Figure 19: Hypothesised effects of Europhile or Eurosceptic orientations on the 
epistemic authority of Europol 
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 The originality of this study is that it deployed a sequential mixed methods (QUAN-
QUAL) design to systematically examine the problematic integration of SNA in the 
analysis environment of Europol. This approach coupled with theoretical application 
of empirical results added to the significance, relevance and timeliness of its 
conclusions. The research not only identified and critically discussed the role of key 
themes in-depth (i.e. the politicisation / bureau-politicisation of criminal intelligence 
analysis and the influence of Europol's 2010 reform), but also generated new insights 
and developed grounded theory – that is, the “basic work phenomenon” and the 
“input (procedural) legitimacy-innovation” hypothesis – proposing that these new 
conceptualisations essentially result from nationalist orientations about the political 
and epistemic authority of Europol. In terms of significance, this thesis made a 
constructive contribution to the body of knowledge by filling an empirical and 
theoretical gap in extant literature on Europol, EU Agency governance and the 
politicisation and bureau-politicisation of IOs. It has critically evaluated and 
challenged the rationale and usefulness of established analysis practices in Europol, 
arguing in favour of a paradigm shift. In so doing, it has demonstrated the added 
value of professional doctorate research regarding the effective integration of 
professional and academic knowledge (Scott et al., 2004). Besides filling a knowledge 
gap at the forefront of EU internal security / criminal justice policy, it has made two 
important recommendations: (a) Europol should find a better balance between its 
political and epistemic authority; and, (b) depoliticised criminal intelligence analysis 
and adoption of the network paradigm can strengthen its technocracy and improve 
operational effectiveness. The validity and reliability of the study’s findings is also 
reflected in the recent calls and initiatives of the European Commission to improve 
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 the effectiveness of JHA Agencies against serious / organised crime and terrorism. 
This is perhaps one of the most useful types of research because the exploratory 
mixed methods design and inductive analysis approach helps in theme identification 
and theory development of relevance to policy makers, academics, practitioners and 
the general public. For these reasons, the design, quality and results of the study 
satisfy peer review requirements and merit publication. 
Turning to the limitations of the study, it should be noted that this was an initial 
exploration of an under-researched problem that is affected by numerous variables in 
complex ways. For this reason, the thesis focussed on the most important themes. 
The empirical part of the study was exclusively based on the perceptions of 
operational analysts without considering the viewpoints of other Europol stakeholders. 
This small-n study does not claim to have the statistical power of large-n studies in 
terms of detecting statistically significant effects. This is an issue with any small-scale 
survey research (Gillham, 2008). However, QUAN and QUAL triangulation helped 
address this limitation and detect real effects (e.g. operational reporting patterns and 
SNA-induced changes in analysis work practices). Moreover, an empirical exploration 
coupled with an inductive analysis approach always entails an element of risk 
regarding the tentativeness of its conclusions. Different researchers and stakeholders 
may reach different conclusions in relation to the Europol 2010 reform and its effects 
on criminal intelligence analysis. On such a complex political and technocratic issue 
there will surely be alternative interpretations. It is expected, for example, that 
stakeholders’ views will be coloured by their political orientations (i.e. Europhile or 
Eurosceptic), bureaucratic role and specific nature of their relationship with Europol. 
Even so, the thesis provided an inductive explanation based on detailed QUAN / 
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 QUAL analysis and literature review. It offers an honest account of the empirical 
reality of Europol and its analysis "black box" (see Note on Research Experience in 
Appendix H). Clearly, its conclusions apply to the setting of Europol only.  
Future research could focus on other EU Agencies, or IOs, to see whether the 
findings can be generalised beyond Europol and under what conditions. Europol-
based research could test the study’s hypotheses and interpretations, take stock of 
any changes, or investigate other themes and sub-themes by considering the views 
of other stakeholders too. The hypothesised effects of Euroscepticism and input 
(procedural) legitimacy orientations upon Europol’s epistemic authority and the SNA 
innovation could not be conclusively (dis-)proved here. Since nothing perhaps can be 
conclusively verified in the social sciences, this requires a specially designed 
research aiming at falsification that addresses the problem of induction, as Popper 
argued (Magee, 1975). Other research avenues could involve the examination of 
politicisation, bureau-politication and EU Agency Governance through the prism of 
different theories of governance as well as the “communitarisation” effects of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on JHA Agencies. From the outset it was stated that it will not be 
possible to capture all aspects of the problem and address all emerging questions in 
a single exploratory study. Hence, unanswered questions such as analysts’ 
preference for natural-mode thinking and their contribution to the basic work 
phenomenon could also be examined. Finally, additional research on security 
applications of SNA is required to demonstrate the relevance of the network paradigm 
for the professionalisation and scientification of criminal intelligence analysis in the 
21st century. 
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I confirm that I have read the cover letter dated 30 May 2011 for the 
above study. 
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw up to the point when the data are analysed. 
 
 
I agree to my interview being audio recorded and/or quoted verbatim. 
 
 
I agree to be quoted by a codename and the data I contribute be 
retained until successful completion of the researcher’s studies. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
Name of participant:     Date:  Signature: 
 
 
Name of person taking consent: E.Mainas Date:  Signature: 
 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher’s file 
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 Appendix C: SNA Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for participating in this questionnaire survey. Your responses would be 
valued.  
1. Are you: *  
Male 
Female 
 
2. What is your age? *  
60 and over 
50-59 
40-49 
30-39 
20-29 
 
3. Where are you from (please select your country of origin from the drop down 
list)? *  
 
4. How long have you been working in the criminal justice field (e.g. as 
investigator or analyst) prior to your Europol employment? *  
25 years and over 
20-24 years 
15-19 years 
10-14 years 
5-9 years 
Under 4 years 
 
5. What is the highest level of your educational qualifications? *  
Doctorate degree 
Master's degree 
Bachelor's degree 
Diploma 
Certificate 
Specify your own value: 
    
 
6. What is your job title (role) at Europol? *  
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 Senior Analyst 
Analyst 
Analytical Assistant 
Seconded National Expert (SNE) 
 
7. How long have you been working as a Europol analyst? *  
10 years and over 
7-9 years 
4-6 years 
Under 3 years 
 
8. Which Unit do you work for? *  
O1 Operational Centre & Coordination 
O2 Analysis & Knowledge 
O3 Criminal Finances & technology 
O4 Counter Terrorism 
O5 Forgery of Money 
O6 Criminal Networks (WE Hub) 
O7 Criminal Networks (NE Hub) 
O8 Criminal networks (SE Hub) 
O9 Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme 
 
9. How would you rate the frequency of delivery of the following types of analytical 
products to the clients of your operational project? *  
    Never  Average 
 Very 
frequentl
y 
    1 2 3 4 5 
 
Hit notifications                                                           
Intelligence 
notifications                                                           
Cross-match 
reports                                                           
Operational 
analysis reports                                                           
Knowledge 
products                                                           
 
10. How would you rate the usefulness of the following types of analytical products 
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 disseminated to the clients of your operational project? *  
    Not useful at all   Average 
 Very 
useful  
    1 2 3 4 5 
 
Hit notifications                                                            
Intelligence notifications                                                            
Cross-match reports                                                            
Operational analysis 
reports                                                            
Knowledge products                                                            
 
 
 
11. Have you undertaken or given SNA training (Please tick all relevant boxes)? *  
Five-day SNA training 2011 
Trainer EU SNA 2011 
Introductory SNA training 2009 
Trainer Introductory SNA 2009 
Analytic Technologies SNA training 2008 
Valdis Krebs SNA training 2007 
No 
Specify your own value: 
    
 
12. Have you been using SNA in your work? *  
Yes 
No 
 
13. How useful SNA is to you? *  
    Not useful at all   Average  
 Very 
useful   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don't know 
 
SNA 
usefulness                                                            
 
14. Has SNA changed the way you perform intelligence analysis? *  
Yes 
No 
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 Don’t know 
 
15. Please state any reason for your answer.  
 
 
16. In the context of what type(s) of criminal investigation have you used SNA 
tools and techniques (Please tick all relevant choices)? *  
Not applicable (NA) 
Organised crime 
Terrorism 
Unlawful drug trafficking 
Illegal money-laundering activities 
Crime connected with nuclear and radioactive substances 
Illegal immigrant smuggling 
Trafficking in human beings 
Motor vehicle crime 
Murder, grievous bodily injury 
Illicit trade in human organs and tissue 
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking 
Racism and xenophobia 
Organised robbery 
Illicit trafficking in cultural goods (incl. antiquities, works of art) 
Swindling and fraud 
Racketeering and extortion 
Counterfeiting and product piracy 
Forgery of administrative documents and trafficking 
Forgery of money and means of payment 
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 Computer crime 
Corruption 
Illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives 
Illicit trafficking in endangered animal species 
Illicit trafficking in endangered plant species and varieties 
Environmental crime 
Illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and growth promoters 
 
17. Which type(s) of network data have you analysed with the help of SNA so far 
(Please specify type of data set such as com-com, pers-pers etc)? *  
Not applicable (NA) 
Specify your own value: 
    
 
18. How would you rate the availability, quality, quantity and completeness of 
network data in your operational project? *  
    Not good at all   Average  
 Very 
good   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don''t know 
 
Availability                                                            
Quality                                                            
Quantity                                                            
Completeness                                                            
 
19. How would you rate the level of acceptance and understanding of SNA by the 
analysts of your operational project? *  
    Poor  Average   Very high   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don't know 
 
Acceptance                                                            
Understanding                                                            
 
20. How would you rate the effectiveness of analysts’ use of SNA in your 
operational project? *  
    Poor   Average   Very effective   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don't know 
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 Effectiveness of SNA 
use                                                            
 
21. Do you think that SNA reports are communicated to the clients of your 
operational project effectively? *  
    Poor   Average   Very effective   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don't know 
 
Effectiveness of 
reporting                                                            
 
22. Can you identify any barriers regarding the use of SNA by the analysts of your 
operational project? *  
Yes 
No 
 
21. Please state any reason for your answer. *  
 
 
24. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *  
    Strongly disagree   Neutral  
 Strongly 
agree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
 
Conventional link analysis is 
superior than SNA because 
of its broader application 
areas 
                                                           
SNA is just another tool in the 
analyst toolbox                                                            
SNA use has advantages 
and disadvantages; is not a 
panacea (cure-all) 
                                                           
SNA has a strong scientific 
basis and in that sense is 
superior than conventional 
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 link analysis 
SNA has the potential to 
shape the future of criminal 
intelligence analysis 
                                                           
 
23. Please state any reason for your answer.  
 
 
25. How would you rate the level of acceptance and understanding of SNA by the 
project manager and specialists of your operational project? *  
    Poor  Average   Very high   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don't know 
 
Acceptance                                                            
Understanding                                                            
 
26. How would you rate the level of acceptance and understanding of SNA by the 
clients of your operational project? *  
    Poor  Neutral   Very high   
    1 2 3 4 5 Don't know 
 
Acceptance                                                            
Understanding                                                            
 
27. How could the use of SNA by Europol analysts be improved?  
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 28. Please add any other comments you think necessary.  
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 Question types 
Variable Question type 
Gender List 
Age List 
Country List 
Criminal Justice years List 
Education List 
Europol years List 
Europol job (role) List 
Europol unit List 
Frequency of delivery of analytical products Rate scale 
Usefulness of analytical products Rate scale 
Prior SNA training List 
SNA use Y/N 
SNA usefulness Rate scale 
SNA changed intelligence analysis practice Y/N 
State any reason Open 
SNA use in criminal investigations  List 
Types of network data analysed through SNA List 
Network data (availability, quality, quantity, 
completeness) 
Rate scale 
SNA acceptance/understanding by analyst in ops 
projects 
Rate scale 
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 Effectiveness of SNA use by analysts in ops projects Rate scale 
Effectiveness of communication of SNA reports to 
clients of ops project 
Rate scale 
Barriers to SNA use by analysts of ops project Y/N 
State any reason Open 
Agreement or disagreement with SNA-related 
statements 
Likert scale 
SNA acceptance/understanding by PM and specialists  Rate scale 
SNA acceptance/understanding by project clients Rate scale 
How to improve use of SNA by analysts Open 
Any other comments Open 
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 QUAN Instrument design and use 
The creation and use of a QUAN instrument was a lengthy process that 
nonetheless helped conceptualise the research problem better. I took the time to 
critically reflect on different dimensions of the adoption and use of SNA by Europol 
analysts as an innovative approach. The overall design reflects a series of 
decisions made to obtain the best possible data quality regarding the problem in 
hand. Some decisions leading to the selection of specific questions are difficult to 
justify in the sense that a researcher cannot possibly know in advance how a 
target group will actually respond to alternative types of questions. Investigating 
this would require a disproportionately larger testing (piloting) effort, which would 
use up the limited time and resources or even go beyond the scope of this small-
scale project. As said above, I decided to target the whole population of 
operational analysts at Europol (N=77) and avoid, for instance, a probability 
sample and the risk of selection bias. For this study, a probabilistic approach 
seemed too artificial and susceptible to sampling bias. Any sampling approach 
could be misinterpreted by Europol analysts, who could then ask “why was I 
picked?” or “why wasn’t I asked?” (Gillham, 2007, p. 18). Considering the 
exploratory and descriptive nature of the study, I decided to address a natural 
group of respondents (Gorard, 2003, p. 95). In so doing, a purposive and 
representative sample would emerge naturally from their responses. Of course, 
there was some risk involved because there was no guarantee that the target 
group would respond as one unit and behave as a typical “captive” group giving a 
high response rate up to 100 per cent (Gillham, 2007, p. 9). After all, Europol 
analysts worked rather independently in small project teams of nine different units 
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 of the Operations Department. Even so, I took this risk and focused my attention 
on constructing a good questionnaire, mindful of the fact that bias can affect a 
survey in several ways. Since there is no textbook approach to questionnaire or 
sampling design, and each solution is context-dependent, my goal as researcher 
was to achieve the best compromise given the conditions of research 
(Oppenheim, 1992).  
As regards the ethical dimension of my approach, I respected at all times – 
especially when in doubt about the likely outcomes of the research process – the 
need to protect respondents’ interests (see Denscombe, 2010b, p. 3) and the 
“ground rules” of objectivity, open-mindedness and reflexivity. Avoiding bias and 
respecting the merits of alternative points of view underpinned my pragmatist 
philosophy and the selection of MM design. To gain access to the group of 77 
operational analysts, I addressed an e-mail to Europol Assistant Director Delivery 
(ADD), Troels Oerting, on 5 April 2011 where I explained the research purpose 
and methodology emphasising that anonymity and confidentiality would be fully 
respected and that the intention was to analyse non-personal data. On 8 April 
2011, the ADD granted permission to approach the group. On 14 April 2011, I 
submitted an ethics self-assessment form to Dr Phil Clements, Professional 
Doctorate Course Leader, and immediately got approval to proceed with the 
study.  
The method of delivery involved a self-administered questionnaire using MS 
Sharepoint, which was Europol’s Intranet-based survey tool. This corporate survey 
tool was very useful because it gave a professional quality to the instrument; 
better control of the questionnaire’s length; flexibility in design and delivery; and, 
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 ease and speed of completion by respondents. Following the survey’s closure, the 
completed questionnaires were obtained in MS Excel form for subsequent 
statistical analysis – a major advantage compared to all other methods of delivery. 
The face-to-face method, for example,  was ruled out from the beginning as very 
time-consuming  and unrealistic (see e.g. Gorard, 2003, p. 92). In line with an 
internal policy, permission was obtained from the Corporate Communications Unit 
to use MS Sharepoint and function as SNA survey manager at the Europol Survey 
Portal. Learning how to use the tool was very easy. Reading a quick reference 
guide and some tips from an colleague were sufficient to create an Intranet 
survey. Certain software features proved very helpful in practice, such as create 
and modify questions; create respondents list; create survey sections by adding 
page separators between questions; change order of questions; branching of 
questions; enforce question answering requirement; test instrument; publish 
survey; and, response statistics. The types of survey questions and answers 
available were: single / multiple lines of plain / formatted text; choice of radio 
buttons, drop-down menu or check boxes; rating scales; yes / no; and lookup. This 
simple survey tool did not offer the sophisticated functions of other software 
packages and web-based tools (see e.g.  De Vaus, 2002, pp. 124-125). 
Nonetheless, it fully covered the needs and requirements of the study. As a 
contingency measure, a questionnaire version was created in MS Word format to 
be able to launch the survey, in case of serious service interruption, either via 
internal post or MS Outlook e-mail.  
Questionnaire development followed the practical steps suggested by De Vaus 
(2002) and Gillham (2007, 2008). Pre-piloting took place during the second half of 
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 April 2011 where an initial list of questions and ideas was tested obtaining the 
views of five senior analysts with managerial responsibilities and no direct 
involvement in operational analysis work. Gillham (2007, pp. 20-22) suggests to 
use a focus / discussion group, a semi-structured interview / questionnaire or a 
combination of these methods to identify important themes and clarify issues. The 
approach taken was informal but kept the essence of a discussion group providing 
an opportunity to interact, ask questions and obtain comments. I addressed 
individual e-mail messages to which they responded with helpful comments. We 
also met in person and exchanged views on the subject. These discussions lasted 
between 20-30 minutes. With some of them I met again and had shorter follow-up 
conversations. Obtaining the views of experienced insiders (who were not 
members of the target population) enhanced my own perspective and confidence 
that the survey was on the right track. This support group facilitated the research 
process a lot and some of those individuals assisted in piloting the questionnaire 
later on. Next, attention shifted to further developing the questionnaire. Based on 
pre-pilot feedback, the wording and order of several questions was improved. As 
regards questionnaire length, I opted for the maximum (i.e. up to seven pages in 
MS Word) knowing that it might backfire in practice. Basically, I took the risk of 
putting off a number of respondents versus the need to include variables of 
interest that would offer broader coverage of important aspects of the research 
problem. Undoubtedly, faced with this dilemma, different researchers would have 
made different decisions.  
The draft questionnaire was piloted on 11 May 2011 and participants were 
asked to return the completed questionnaires by 17 May 2011. The pilot group 
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 consisted of seven officers of the Operations Department. That is, three senior 
analysts (responsible for strategic analysis, training and quality assurance) from 
the pre-pilot group, three members of the target group (senior analyst, analyst and 
analytical assistant) and a specialist. The three members of the main group were 
included in the pilot to give an early indication of how operational analysts would 
respond to the questionnaire. A specialist was also included because as a non-
analyst would bring a different perspective helping improve the questionnaire 
further. The participants received the questionnaire in MS Word format plus a few 
questions regarding their experience with the instrument. Their answers were 
promising because variation was noticed. All participants said it took them 
between 10-15 minutes to complete the survey. Very helpful and detailed 
comments were received to remove certain questions, improve the wording and 
sort out a few omissions concerning list items. Based on their comments, three 
questions (variables) were removed because they could possibly influence 
analysts’ perceptions about SNA (i.e. how challenging and satisfying is their work 
and their thinking processes-style). Certain participants felt that job satisfaction 
and cognitive processes play a role but asking these questions would complicate 
things for respondents. Other than that, their responses suggested the instrument 
was fit-for-purpose.  
Both in trialling initial questions and piloting the questionnaire, the instrument 
was evaluated by checking against the criteria proposed by De Vaus (2002, pp. 
115-119). Piloting the questionnaire is absolutely necessary for improving the 
instrument, but one cannot predict the actual behaviour of respondents in relation 
to the instrument. This challenge highlights the classical encounter between the 
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 researcher, the researched and the participants of research within a complex real-
world setting. This means that prior experience with small-scale studies and use of 
survey instruments may or may not prove useful as each survey project poses 
unique difficulties. The development of survey questions involves “descending the 
ladder of abstraction” (De Vaus, 2002, p. 48) and “finding a variable’s 
measurements” (Bouma & Atkinson, 1995, p. 65). It involves a move from abstract 
concepts to concrete, measurable variables and indicators. The process of finding 
empirical measures for concepts is called operationalisation (Bouma & Atkinson, 
1995, p. 50). In selecting variables for the questionnaire survey, emphasis was put 
on the need to map out the topic appropriately and facilitate broad exploration. 
Fewer items could have been selected at the cost of limited coverage of the 
research problem.  
The final version of the instrument consisted of 28 questions in total (24 closed 
questions and four open ones). The closed questions included: 11 list items; three 
“yes / no”; nine rate (items) scales; and, a Likert scale with five “agree / disagree 
with” statements (see Appendix C). The instrument included both substantive and 
background questions that produced nominal and ordinal data. The list items 
captured demographic and certain SNA-related categories of data. The yes / no 
questions captured analyst responses relative to SNA use, possible changes in 
intelligence analysis practices, and barriers to SNA use. The rate items captured 
responses about work and SNA-related variables that were necessary in 
investigating different dimensions of the research problem. As a multiple-indicator 
measure, the Likert scale captured the intensity of feelings with five statements 
specially worded to range from strongly negative to strongly positive toward SNA 
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 (see e.g. Bryman, 2004, pp. 67-68). For the 10 scale questions (i.e. rate items and 
Likert scale), I used five-point scales as a compromise solution between three- 
and seven-point scales. Typically, a score of five indicated a very positive 
perception and a score of one a very negative perception about an indicator. Two 
of the four open questions, sought clarification of responses in closed questions. 
As Gorard (2003, p. 104) suggests, open questions can be most effective when 
used to explain statistical patterns. The other two open questions were placed at 
the end, asking respondents for ways to improve the use of SNA by analysts and 
any other comments. Open-ended responses provided QUAL material to facilitate 
theme identification and interpretation. Branching questions were avoided by 
using “don’t know” or “not applicable (N/A)” choices (Gorard, 2003, p. 101). All 
closed questions were set as mandatory, whereas answers to open questions 
were left to the discretion of respondents. Initially, the Intranet-based version of 
the instrument was divided in three sections (introduction, work-related questions, 
and SNA-related questions). Afterwards, however, the first two sections were 
merged into one, as it was aesthetically better and more efficient. The first section 
consisted of eight demographic questions and the second section of all other 
questions (see Appendix C). The two-page Intranet-based questionnaire gave the 
impression of a smaller survey instrument – in comparison to the seven-page MS 
Word version – and sped up the process of answering questions.  
At the end of May 2011, the QUAN instrument was completed. Then, a major 
issue emerged that could affect the response rate. It was the planned move of 
Europol to its new headquarters location that was going to be implemented in two 
time periods (2-5 June and 11-13 June 2011). This meant a great deal of 
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 preparation and disruption of normal work activity both before and after the move. 
Since the survey had to be launched for practical reasons during this unsettling 
period, the expectations regarding the survey response rate were very modest. On 
30 May 2011, an e-mail was sent to all members of the target group with a link to 
the questionnaire published at the Intranet (EurOps) Survey Portal as well as a 
covering letter with a consent form for interview (see Appendix B). These 
documents provided overall guidance about the Europol-approved survey and 
information on ethics in line with National Research Ethics Service (NRES) 
guidance (University of Portsmouth, n.d). The initial deadline to provide their 
responses was 15 June 2011. Following the only information available to me in 
the Europol Survey Portal was the response statistics (i.e. number of completed 
and incomplete questionnaires). By 15 June 2011, 26 completed questionnaires 
(33%) had been received. Then, a reminder was sent out extending the deadline 
by a week. After the deadline, only eight additional questionnaires were received 
raising the total to 34 completed questionnaires (44%). On 27 June 2011, a final 
reminder was sent to all analysts to provide their responses by 1 July 2011. The 
response rate improved dramatically the last week before the survey’s closure; 24 
completed questionnaires were received raising the total to 58 questionnaires 
(75%).  
The reason for this was two-fold. First, the majority of analysts had completed 
the move and finally settled in their new offices. After dealing with high priority 
tasks (e.g. drafting reports and supporting law enforcement actions), they were 
able to resume normal activities and deal with lower priority tasks and requests, 
such as participation in the SNA survey. This together with the final reminder 
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 seemed to produce a significant effect. Second, to encourage respondents, I tried 
to call all analysts on the phone the last week. This was neither a convenient nor 
planned solution. It was a practical, last resort solution that worked. Many analysts 
said they had already completed the survey. But, many other analysts appreciated 
my call because it gave them an opportunity to ask some questions and clarify 
things. Importantly, it served as a much-needed personal invitation to participate in 
the survey – a simple human gesture missing up to this point. Apparently, certain 
analysts did not know how to behave in a situation where a colleague approached 
them as researcher and even though they had questions they hesitated to ask 
directly. This was surprising. The lesson learned was that forwarding a global 
request to a group of respondents is only half an invitation. Addressing a target 
group in a de-personalised, distanced and “objective” way might backfire or 
achieve limited results. In this case, respondents wished to be treated as 
individuals and appreciated a “normal” form of communication. The covering letter 
and professional look of the questionnaire were essential, but a textbook approach 
to survey research might still fail to motivate respondents. The approach taken 
shows a possible solution to this problem.  
Following the survey’s closure, the electronic data set in MS Excel format was 
exported from the Europol Survey Portal. Since manual data entry was not 
required, there was no room for error. Nonetheless, checking and validation 
became a parallel activity during the whole process of inspecting the data 
(Denscombe, 2010a, pp. 267-269). As said, 58 out of 77 analysts participated in 
the survey achieving a relatively high response rate (75%). This served well the 
research purpose because a complete target group had been addressed and the 
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 anonymous respondents represented a purposive and exploratory sample. This 
data set provided a factual basis for description, exploration and explanation.  
Now, 19 analysts did not participate in the survey. This raised the question of 
whether their responses could change the empirical findings (e.g. via changes in 
the demographic make-up of population, presence of outliers, and other sub-group 
patterns)? Of course, it is impossible to know if and how the opinions of non-
participants could change the results. It could be claimed that the 58 participants 
are not a representative sample of the target population. Considering however the 
job title (role) and unit data, the sample seems to be representative to a large 
extent and the findings can be generalised to the population of 77 Europol 
analysts with caution. In any case, such a purposive and exploratory sample is a 
better fit compared to a probability sample that might be superior in theory, but in 
practice gets a poor response rate that makes it unrepresentative and thus 
unworkable (Gillham, 2008, p. 22). The disadvantage of an exploratory approach 
where respondents are anonymous is that one cannot distinguish between the 
characteristics of those who responded and those who did not. It is presumed that 
several of the 19 non-respondents – of which only the job title (role) and unit can 
be known by comparing the sample to the total population – were non-SNA users 
and that was the main reason why they did not participate. Perhaps they felt that 
their contributions would be of limited value to the survey since they lacked SNA 
knowledge and experience.  
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 Appendix D: Semi-structured interview guide 
 
Questions and possible prompts 
 
1. What is it like working in an AWF? Can you describe what you do? 
Purpose/nature of work? Demanding/challenging?  
Similarities/differences between AWFs (analysis, operational objectives)?  
Changes over time? 
 
2. How do you analyse data and produce reports for your clients? 
Europol’s analysis toolbox?  
Fit-for-purpose? State of the art?  
Is it put to best use? 
 
3. Do you use SNA? 
Since when? How frequent? Reports? Types of data?  
Can you describe how you became a SNA user? (easy/difficult?)  
Did it change the way you perform intelligence analysis? 
 
4. Can you give an example that involved analysis and reporting using SNA 
(or link analysis)? 
Can you describe it?  
How do you decide which analytical method to use (objective, data set)?  
Similarities/differences between methods? 
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 5. (Suppose) You are a senior analyst in charge of an operational project and 
the analysts present their findings to you. Some of them use SNA and others 
use link analysis techniques. How do you assess their analytical work? How 
do you distinguish quality reporting?  
Is the assessment of quality more difficult when analysts deploy different 
techniques (esp. scientific ones)?  
To what extent the use of method affects the quality and results of analysis 
(i.e. analytical performance)?  
Do you see these techniques as competing or complementing ones? Would 
you say one is more effective/better than the other or not? 
 
6. Could you describe in as much detail as possible the benefits and 
limitations of SNA? 
Feedback from colleagues, manager, clients?  
Impact of business change?  
What advice would you give to a newcomer analyst? 
 
7. Are there any barriers regarding the adoption and use of SNA? On the 
other hand, are there any factors that facilitate SNA integration? 
Objectives? Data? Manager? Clients? Occupational culture? Innovation? 
SNA training? Theoretical knowledge and practical experience?  
Compatibility of SNA with conventional link analysis?  
Can all analysts become SNA-savvy? What factors determine this? 
Positive/negative perceptions? 
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8. How to improve the use of SNA by Europol analysts? 
 
9. How do you see the intelligence analysis profession in the future?  
Changes due to scientification of intelligence analysis (professional analyst 
as social scientist)?  
SNA’s impact on professional knowledge and practice?  
Are you/the analysts ready for change? 
 
10. I have no further questions. Do you have any comments before we finish 
the interview? 
Anything else you would like to bring up, or ask me about? 
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 QUAL Instrument design and use 
The requirement for high quality and ethical research is linked, among others, to 
the selection of appropriate QUAL interview method. Researchers know very well that 
the collection and analysis of quality interview data will likely produce valuable 
insights. Crucial in this knowledge-generation process is the choice of interviewing 
method. Each one has advantages and disadvantages so a researcher should 
determine which one is best for their research purpose. There are face-to-face (i.e. 
structured, semi-structured, and unstructured); focus group; and, technology-based 
(e.g. video, telephone and e-mail) methods (Gillham, 2005; Robson, 2002). The main 
three face-to-face methods range along a QUAN-QUAL continuum (May, 2001; 
Seidman, 2006). Specifically, the structured interview is similar to a questionnaire 
administered in-person; the unstructured interview is akin to a free dialogue between 
interviewer-interviewee; and, the semi-structured interview represents a mixed 
approach with both structured and unstructured elements. Other face-to-face types 
are the elite and ethnographic interviews (see e.g. Gillham, 2005). The group 
interview and the technology-based methods have gained popularity these days due 
to their flexibility, efficiency, and lower costs (Robson, 2002). Moreover, these 
techniques can be conducted by distance. The aforementioned distinction between 
interviewing types might give the impression that the choices are rather clear-cut. In 
reality, however, the choice of method depends on researcher skills, preferences and 
imagination and the practice of interviewing is far more diverse than textbook 
definitions and challenging.  
Following the QUAN survey, a structured interview was immediately ruled out to 
avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication because this technique involves a 
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 standardised interview schedule, which is characteristic of its positivistic orientation. 
The focus group and technology-based techniques were also ruled out because – 
even though they are more suitable in capturing group dynamics (see e.g. May, 2001) 
– they are less sensitive to individual perspectives than face-to-face methods. Group 
interviewing, in particular, has a number of limitations that usually require 
considerable effort and resources to overcome. Focus groups are difficult to organise 
and interviewers may experience negative effects (e.g. dominant / shy participants or 
participants expressing culturally-appropriate views); practical issues with recording 
and transcription; and, difficulties in analysing the data (Bryman, 2004, pp. 359-360). 
Consequently, the selection was limited down to the semi-structured and unstructured 
interview methods. The unstructured interview is an open discussion between the 
interviewer and interviewee about a research topic. The interviewee is actually in-
charge and steers the discussion to the most interesting points, with minimum 
guidance or direction from the interviewer, who has to listen carefully and understand 
the interviewee’s viewpoint without imposing his / her beliefs or influencing the 
answers (Gillham, 2005; May, 2001). A free flowing dialogue is particularly suitable in 
eliciting information from participants. But, a serious disadvantage of this approach is 
the lack of structure to allow for the comparison of interview data (May, 2001, p. 122).  
In contrast to other interview types, the semi-structured interview is a flexible 
solution that helps in finding the right balance between structure and open dialogue. 
Since it has a structure it meets the comparability criterion. When an investigator 
seeks clarification, elaboration and latitude in probing beyond standardised question / 
answer sequels, the semi-structured interview offers significant benefits (May, 2001, 
p. 123). When the intention is to gain a deeper understanding of individual 
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 perceptions / behaviours and the associated social context, this type of interview is fit-
for-purpose. Successful deployment of semi-structured interviewing depends on how 
a researcher handles the open-ended (unstructured) part of the interview. Appropriate 
use of non-directive and probing questions helps interviewees to critically reflect on 
their situation; go into detail and explain their attitudes; find linkages between sub-
topics; and, give a truthful and thorough account of their experiences. That is why I 
adopted Spradley’s (1979) phased-approach, where the interviewer starts with 
descriptive questions and proceeds through exploration, cooperation and participation 
to structural (substantive) questions (cited in May, 2001, pp. 131-133). This 
technique, which is similar to progressive focussing (see p. 48), underpinned my 
interviewing strategy.  
A key issue is whether distance / neutrality (implying objectivity) or engagement 
(implying subjectivity) makes for an effective and ethical interview. Neither approach 
however is exclusively linked to objectivity / subjectivity or guarantees the success of 
an interview. A good investigator should be able to employ an appropriate 
interviewing style depending on the research topic, the characteristics of 
interviewees, and the interview context in general. In this case, I opted for 
engagement because I felt it would be more fair, sensitive and appreciative of the 
contributions of Europol participants than disengagement (May, 2001, pp. 135-136). 
In the field, a danger for interviewers is to appear oddly detached, passive and 
insensitive to interviewees. Instead of establishing rapport, such “unnatural” 
behaviour may contribute to interviewee frustration resulting in unwillingness to 
cooperate. On the other hand, involved interviewers (e.g. willing to listen to personal 
concerns, answer questions or offer advice) should be aware of the implications of 
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 their decision. Not all interviewers have the skills to take responsibility for interviewee 
distress and treatment, for instance. And, they should not allow the interviewer-
interviewee relationship turn into a therapeutic one (Seidman, 2006, pp. 107-108). A 
fine line demarcates the boundaries of an inter-subjective interview situation. In 
practice, engagement / disengagement decisions may have to be made during the 
interview to position the interviewer-interviewee relationship appropriately. Compared 
to ordinary social encounters, there is a much stronger requirement for an element of 
control in semi-structured interviews. 
For the selection of interviewees purposive sampling was employed on the basis 
of five criteria: job title (role); age; gender; country of origin; and, user / non-user of 
SNA. The first criterion, for example, required consideration of the hierarchy of 
operational posts – that is, senior analysts (SA), analysts (A), analytical assistants 
(AA), and seconded national experts (SNE) – to ensure a balanced role 
representation. Otherwise, the selection could  potentially affect the kind of 
information collected (May, 2001, pp. 127-128). This sampling approach fit well with 
the exploratory focus of the study. The decision on the number of in-depth interviews 
was mainly influenced by time constraints. Hence, the original idea to conduct eight 
interviews was abandoned even though this is the recommended sample size, 
according to McCracken (1988), for exploring a topic sufficiently and making 
generalisability claims (cited in  Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 58). However, opinions are 
divided in relation to this issue. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, p. 113) note that: (a) the 
number of interviewees is a decision that should be taken with the purpose of study 
and the law of diminishing returns in mind (i.e. a saturation point where additional 
subjects add very little to what the researcher needs to know); (b) interviewers usually 
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 decide to interview 15 plus / minus 10 subjects; (c) a small or large number of 
interviews creates problems in generalising or analysing the data respectively; and, 
(d) such studies would benefit from fewer interviews. These points suggest that a 
smaller QUAL sample can still be instrumental in capturing important themes and 
facilitating the comparison of QUAL and QUAN findings. So, I decided to conduct five 
interviews and, in parallel, check for saturation.  
Since the preparation phase for the QUAL interviews had actually started with the 
QUAN survey (with a consent form for interview attached to the covering letter) an 
analyst had already offered to be interviewed. Besides known key interviewees (i.e. 
experienced SNA users), the availability of other analysts was checked to give them 
an opportunity to be heard (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 57). A practical constraint in the 
selection of interviewees was the fact that many analysts were on vacation during 
August 2011. Despite that five subjects were recruited with the following 
characteristics: one interviewee per job category (with the exception of two AA); four 
male / one female subjects; subject ages representing the three age ranges (30-39; 
40-49; 50-59) of the majority of QUAN survey respondents (i.e. 54 out of 58 or 93%); 
countries of origin representing the broad geographical outline of the European Union 
(i.e. North, South, East, West); and, two SNA users and three non-users. 
Interviewing is a labour-intensive exercise that involves several decision points. All 
stages of the interview process – that is, creating the interview guide; conducting the 
interviews; transcribing the audio files; analysing the collected material; and, writing 
up (Gillham, 2005, pp. 26-28; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 102) – are very 
demanding. In particular, the creation of the interview schedule, interview 
transcription and analysis are very time-consuming. Throughout this process, which is 
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 characterised by the inter-subjectivity of the interviewer / interviewees and the 
uniqueness of the operating environment, data reliability and validity were the main 
preoccupations. As said above, the QUAN survey responses helped in preparing the 
interview questions. Only after consideration of the QUAN material it became possible 
to construct the interview guide. To create an effective instrument, an initial list of 
questions was drafted and comments were sought from two senior analysts, who had 
similar backgrounds with the target group members but no longer worked in 
operational analysis projects. Their feedback helped reduce the number of questions 
make modifications in the wording and order of questions. Having a draft guide, a 
pilot interview was conducted on 17 August 2011 that lasted 45 minutes. Participant 
was an experienced analyst and SNA user. During the live interview situation, I 
realised which questions could be deleted and how the wording and order of other 
questions and prompts could be further modified. After completing all instrument 
changes, I visited the five participants in their offices. There they read, signed off the 
consent form for interview and received a copy of it. Those informal pre-meetings also 
served the purpose of explaining further the study’s purpose, process and ethics (e.g. 
how the audio recording, transcription and analysis of interviews will be done) as well 
as responding to questions. Then, a room was reserved for the interviews and 
meeting requests were sent via MS Outlook to participants.  
The five interviews were conducted in the period 18-24 August 2011 following an 
appropriate procedure (University of Portsmouth, n.d). At the beginning of each 
interview, personal details (i.e. name, gender, age, country of origin, educational 
qualifications, total / Europol years of service, and Europol unit) noted down before 
switching on the recorder with their consent and proceeding with the interview. With 
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 one exception, the interviews lasted longer than anticipated (i.e. 46, 65, 75, 82 and 85 
minutes). In my opinion, this was because most interviewees found the topic 
interesting and were eager to discuss it. At the end, participants were asked how they 
felt during the interview with the recorder switched off. After each interview, my 
impressions and thoughts of the interview, including the tone of voice and body 
language of participants were noted down (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 129-130). 
Each interviewee was given an electronic copy of the recorded interview as part of 
the ethical responsibility of the researcher toward them. 
Viewing all research participants as potentially vulnerable is a good starting point 
for researchers sensitised to matters of ethics and willing to protect their interests. 
The unique power of interviewing creates a fundamental ethical dilemma. How can an 
interviewer be effective and respectful without causing harm to participants (Fog, 
2004 cited by Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 174)? Or, how can one keep asking 
questions without being intrusive? This dilemma faced by all interviewers relates to 
the extraction of information from interviewees and the production of knowledge. The 
mere fact of getting to know the answers of interviewees, and the interviewees 
through their responses, can create a tension between research purpose and ethics. 
How can a researcher uphold both responsibilities? In all interviews, I felt more or 
less the same power experienced in the past as crime investigator. Of course, 
interrogating suspects, conducting a therapeutic interview and conducting a research 
interview are different types of interviewing. All forms of interviewing, however, share 
a common characteristic: the interviewer occupies a power position by definition. In 
this situation, the subjects are fully exposed and vulnerable. In a research interview 
context, subjects provide their consent to participate but are not fully aware of their 
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 role in co-producing knowledge and the implications, or possible dangers, of their 
openness. Metaphorically, the interview could be described as a “scanning 
instrument” with which an interviewer can potentially detect any small discrepancy 
between what is said by interviewees and what their implied meanings and bodily and 
facial expressions reveal. Irrespective of whether interviewees are willing and able to 
voice their true feelings and views on a subject during an interview (or not), it is very 
difficult for them to hide their subjective truth. There is no privacy in an interview 
situation. For example, a simple yes or no response can convey rich meaning and 
generate researcher interpretations interviewees may not agree with. As a result, the 
most important factor in resolving the effectiveness / ethics-dilemma is how a 
researcher manages their power role or how this role gets balanced. Interviewers 
should seek a compromise and make clear to interviewees that the interview is a 
social encounter of equals who co-produce knowledge (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
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 Appendix E: Descriptive statistics 
SNA training 
 
The vast majority of respondents surveyed have been trained in SNA (see Figure 
1). Only nine analysts (15.5%) did not receive training. The 49 analysts (84.5%) 
attended in-house and/or external training courses, including academic workshops, 
between 2007 and 2011. Several analysts attended a series of introductory and 
tailored-made SNA courses by an experienced consultant (Krebs, 2001) and the 
University of Kentucky in 2007 and 2008. Early adopters attended SNA workshops at 
the University of Kentucky, the University of Konstanz and the Free University of 
Amsterdam as well as conferences of the International Network of Social Network 
Analysts (INSNA). Advanced training in combination with academic-workplace 
research facilitated the testing and validation of several SNA metrics; academic 
outreach and opportunities to tap into the expertise of knowledgeable actors; and, the 
development of in-house SNA courses (Europol, 2008b, 2009a, 2010a, 2011c). 
Driven by the need to improve the quality of operational analysis and the 
effectiveness of investigative targeting, a core team of experienced analyst-trainers 
was set up in Europol to spearhead the SNA integration through specialized training 
courses. As a result of these efforts, the SNA team delivered introductory one-day 
and five-day SNA courses to almost all Europol analysts between 2009 and 2011. 
The analyst-trainers blended academic theory with professional knowledge and 
practices creating exercises – using anonymized data from real operational cases – 
to offer a valuable learning experience to their colleagues. All operational analysts 
were given access to specialized software tools such as UCINET, NetDraw and 
KeyPlayer for operational use. These academic software tools became part of 
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 Europol’s “analyst toolbox” and were regularly updated with the newest versions 
(Europol, 2008b). 
 
Figure 1: SNA Training 
 
 
 
 
The training team made improvements to the five-day SNA course (both in terms 
of delivery and content) mainly based on participant feedback and practical 
experiences gained from SNA fieldwork. Significantly, the SNA trainers also provided 
on-the-job advice and technical support to individual analysts. This practice proved 
successful and mutually beneficial, helping Europol analysts reinforce learning and 
SNA trainers gain valuable experience across operational projects. Post-training 
advice and support created crucial links between SNA training and day-to-day 
operational work as well as between the analysts themselves. Having trained almost 
all its analysts, Europol started delivering SNA courses to its partners in EU Member 
States. From 2013 the highly sought after five-day SNA training course was jointly run 
with, and funded by, the European Police Academy (CEPOL), reaching a wider 
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 audience (CEPOL, 2013, p. 21; 2014, p. 23). The intention behind this important 
initiative was to broaden the wider community of EU police analysts to facilitate 
sharing of this best practice and adoption of the network paradigm. Apparently, the 
problematic integration of SNA into Europol’s analysis environment is not due to a 
lack of effective and specialised training in network analysis techniques and 
applications. Hence, the SNA training variable is not a barrier. Rather, it should be a 
facilitating factor that enables efficient exploitation of network data and production of 
useful operational reports. Considering the current state of analysis inside Europol, 
however, it should be asked whether (advanced) network analysis training is 
compatible with the work processes, priorities and training needs of a criminal 
information-processing hub. Data processing and crosschecking are elementary tasks 
that probably suggest a de-skilling of the analyst workforce. Certainly, completion of 
these simple and repetitive tasks does not require the diverse skill set of a criminal 
intelligence analyst (Peterson, 1998; Peterson et al., 2000) or social scientist 
(Prunchun, 2010; Prunchun Jr, 1996). 
 
Network data 
 
Significant numbers of participants rated the availability (18 analysts or 31%), 
quality (13 analysts or 22.4%), quantity (17 analysts or 29.3%) and completeness (24 
analysts or 41.3%) of network data in their projects as not good / not good at all (see 
Figure 2 below).16 Moreover, the majority of participants rated each of the above 
variables as average. Quality, in particular, received the highest average percentage 
(25 analysts or 43.1%) in comparison to any other factor. Overall, the participants’ 
16 Network data are defined as relational and attributional data suitable for social network analysis 
applications. 
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 responses suggest that the quality and completeness of network data is somewhat 
worse than their availability and quantity. Completeness, in particular, seems to be 
the most problematic of the four variables describing network data. Taken together, 
analysts’ responses raise serious concerns about the appropriateness of network 
data for SNA applications. Apparently, the existing data collection plans would need 
to be reviewed in order to facilitate better collection of network data. Since the method 
relies heavily on complete data, the identified issues could be another barrier in the 
adoption and use of SNA influencing analysts’ perceptions accordingly. The analysis 
of incomplete data certainly increases the complexity of the whole analysis process 
(i.e. data analysis, interpretation and reporting) and compounds the difficulties in 
piecing together a comprehensive intelligence picture in support of EU-wide 
investigations.  
In general, weak data limits analytical ambition and leads to partial understanding 
of the crime problems to be solved. Nonetheless, caution should be exercised with 
the interpretation of these results. Since the survey represents a snapshot into 
Europol’s analysis environment, and since variations in network data are experienced 
as new cases are brought in for analysis, it is difficult to confirm that network data is a 
persistent problem over time. Moreover, it should be noted that any data issues would 
not be peculiar to SNA but would affect conventional link analysis too. 
Nonetheless, there might be a relationship between the issues of network data 
collection and operational analysis and reporting previously discussed. The strategic 
orientation of Europol and the specific type of operational support provided to EU law 
enforcement since 2010 probably affected the type of data collected. Being an 
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 information-processing hub, Europol gathers a great variety and volume of 
operational data mainly for crosschecking (and less for crime analysis) purposes. 
 
Figure 2: The completeness of network data in operational projects 
 
 
 
Lacking executive powers, Europol is totally dependent on EU Member States 
regarding the supply of crime data in general. EU law enforcement agencies 
independently decide what to disclose (or not) to Europol. Consequently, Europol 
analysts constantly deal with data imperfections, as they can neither select the right 
data sets nor control the data flows. Their responses reflect the complexity of an 
analysis environment where project teams deal with diverse caseloads and a great 
number of requests for operational support across the mandated crime areas. 
Apparently, the availability, quality, quantity and completeness of operational data 
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 vary considerably across project teams. It seems plausible therefore that the reported 
network data issues are an effect of Europol’s primary role as a criminal information-
processing platform, which increasingly handles large data flows and puts emphasis 
on low level analysis and reporting. Again, this implies that Europol’s operational 
teams – in line with their EU partners’ expectations – focus less on proper collection 
of network data and comprehensive case analysis.  
Arguably, analysts’ responses would have been different if the main strategic 
objective of this EU Agency was to support the best pan-European investigations and 
cooperate with EU Member States’ elite organised crime units. Most likely, the 
reported data-related issues stem from Europol’s strategic decision to widen the 
scope of data collection and provide analysis products and services to potentially all 
EU law enforcement agencies. Hence, Europol’s access to voluminous and relatively 
weak data sets seems to be strongly correlated with its notion of intelligence 
customer and orientation towards low-level operational analysis and reporting. So, 
differing ideas about the intelligence customer and type of operational support should 
affect the crime data handled by Europol analysts accordingly. Nevertheless, 
analysts’ responses to this question may also reveal – albeit to a smaller degree – 
skepticism towards SNA, lack of confidence in handling network data and perhaps an 
excuse for the limited production of SNA reports. After all, in-house SNA training 
courses have covered the topic of network data collection extensively and on-the-job 
support and advice has routinely dealt with such issues offering effective solutions.  
Next, SNA tools and techniques were used to analyse network data across 14 
different categories of investigations, as shown in Figure 3 below. This important 
finding demonstrates the wide scope of network analysis applications across the 
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 mandated crime areas of Europol as well as the usefulness of SNA in practice. The 
method was mostly applied in the context of organised crime and drug trafficking 
investigations. Relatively frequent use of SNA was also made in investigations 
against terrorism, people smuggling and organised robberies. Yet, a significant 
number of analysts (36.2%) did not report any SNA applications in their projects.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Use of SNA in different types of investigations 
 
 
 
The participants analysed seven types of network data in total (see Figure 4). The 
most frequently analysed crime data sets related to communication and person 
263 
 
 networks in 34 and 21 cases, respectively. The fact that SNA was mainly applied on 
communication data (i.e. itemized billings) is not surprising because electronically 
registered data are usually complete and easily gathered in all major inquiries. Since 
they are a very good proxy for person networks they are preferred by most 
operational analysts. Analysis of billing data using conventional link analysis is also 
one of the most frequent types of analytical support provided to intelligence 
customers (Europol, 2011c; Peterson, 1998).  
 
Figure 4: Types of network data analysed with SNA 
 
 
 
Person-by-person data were the second most frequently analysed type of network 
data most likely due to the inherent limitations of such analyses. The creation of 
complete person networks requires tremendous effort to collect person-by-person 
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 links from all sources. To be sure, revealing a criminal network from the ground up 
presupposes painstaking fieldwork and prolonged investigations. Person data are 
usually less complete and accurate than communication data. As a result, the 
analysts are very careful when analysing such data sets because any missing links 
among persons of interest may lead to less valid and reliable results compared to 
network analysis of communication data. Even so, person-by-person data were 
frequently analysed by Europol analysts with the help of SNA. Obviously, this signifies 
analysts’ confidence about the completeness of such data in specific cases. Besides 
communication and person data, network data pertaining to financial transactions, 
events and Internet-based interactions and activities were also analysed (see Figure 
4 above). This is another key finding as it demonstrates potential for widening the 
scope of SNA applications and generating insights from a great variety of sources 
and types of data. This means that there are numerous opportunities for 
experimentation as well. Here too, however, a significant number of analysts (32.7%) 
did not identify any SNA applications of network data.  
Careful examination of the network data variable reveals a mixed picture 
therefore. Europol’s role as an information-processing hub, and its preoccupation with 
lower level analysis and reporting, possibly has an impact on advanced operational 
analysis and associated processes such as the collection of network data. This 
strategic orientation limits the scope, process and effectiveness of crime analysis. At 
the same time, it is clear that Europol can benefit from a broad range of SNA 
applications, but which depend on the completeness of crime data, to support major 
pan-European investigations. Although SNA is presented as a “game-changer” in 
terms of improving the quality and effectiveness of operational support, a significant 
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 number of Europol analysts did not exploit the opportunity to analyse network data in 
their projects.  
 
Managers and specialists 
 
Project managers and specialists work for different units of the Serious & 
Organised Crime Department of Europol and traditionally led the operational analysis 
projects (“Focal Points”) across the mandated crime areas following the period of 
2005-2006. Before the managing role was assigned to senior analysts only. The 
managers and specialists are mainly responsible for the external dimension of 
operational work and frequently meet with EU Member States’ representatives to 
discuss, promote and review Focal Point activities. Operational tasking and 
coordination meetings usually result in new assignments for the analysts of their 
project teams. The internal dimension of managers and specialists’ work mainly 
entails administrative tasks and managerial supervision and steering. Very few 
specialists, and even fewer project managers, are directly involved in the broad array 
of crime analysis matters however. The whole analysis process and operational 
reporting remain the responsibility of analysts. Hence, the exposure of managers and 
specialists to operational analysis is limited to general awareness level – yet sufficient 
for the execution of their duties. Despite their limited role in analysis itself, their 
managing position and external activities determine to a large extent the direction of 
analysis work.  
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 Figure 5: Manager and specialists’ SNA acceptance and understanding 
 
 
 
According to Europol analysts (as shown in Figure 5), the acceptance of SNA by 
project managers and specialists is much higher than their understanding of SNA. In 
comparison, 32 respondents (55.2%) rated the acceptance of SNA as high / very high 
and 16 (27.6%) rated understanding of SNA as high / very high. Below average and 
poor ratings for acceptance and understanding were much lower compared to the 
aforementioned positive ones. The overall pattern is similar to the one pertaining to 
analysts (see Chapter 3, Figure 7) with the exception of the higher number of “don’t 
know” responses observed here. A significant qualitative difference should be noted 
however. The understanding of SNA by managers and specialists is very limited and 
cannot be compared to the level of SNA knowledge of analysts. Since the managers 
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 and specialists have not received any formal training whatsoever, their understanding 
of network analysis is rather superficial. Nevertheless, as in the case of analysts 
above, relatively high acceptance should be seen as a facilitator and limited 
understanding as a barrier to SNA integration in the workplace.  
 
 
 
Clients 
 
The law enforcement agencies of EU Member States are the clients of Europol.  
They are the key stakeholders because Europol operational projects exist to serve 
their operational needs and priorities exclusively. By default, therefore, the clients are 
in a leading position. For example, they may request through their police 
representatives the opening (and closure) of Focal Points or may join an existing 
operational project whenever it is deemed appropriate. EU Member States’ requests 
for operational support and their specific contributions vary depending on the crime 
area. This reflects to an extent the particular problems they encounter and their 
crime-fighting priorities. After joining a particular Focal Point, the clients formally 
nominate certain officers as members of its Analysis Group. The Analysis Group 
comprises duly appointed Europol staff (i.e. project manager, specialists, and 
analysts) and EU law enforcement officers who work together to achieve specific 
operational objectives. Each Focal Point has an Opening Order, Project Plan and 
Data Collection Plan that define its objectives, priorities and activities. EU Member 
States’ representatives together with Focal Point managers (and specialists) assume 
responsibility for all tasking and coordination activities in the framework of pan-
European investigations. In effect, the clients determine the scope and nature of 
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 Focal Point work; supply crime data for analysis purposes; identify suspect targets in 
their jurisdictions; and, take intelligence and enforcement measures in the field.  
 
Figure 6: Clients’ SNA acceptance and understanding 
 
 
 
So, the operational engagement of Focal Points depends entirely on the 
willingness, level of cooperation and specific operational initiatives of EU law 
enforcement. According to Europol analysts (see Figure 6), the acceptance of SNA by 
the clients is higher than their understanding of the method. Namely, 16 participants 
(27.6%) rated SNA acceptance as high / very high and just 4 (6.9%) rated SNA 
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 understanding as high / very high. The pattern is similar to the ones pertaining to 
analysts (see Chapter 3, Figure 7) and managers and specialists (Figure 5 above). 
But, there is a significant difference as most analysts rated both SNA acceptance and 
understanding as average or simply stated “don’t know”. Most probably, the 
acceptance, and particularly the understanding, of SNA by clients are weaker than 
the acceptance and understanding of the other Analysis Group members. 
Overall, the limited understanding of SNA by the key actors (i.e. analysts, 
managers, specialists and clients) is a significant barrier that exacerbates the 
practical difficulties of the adoption and further integration of the method into the 
analysis environment of Europol. Of course, the operational analysts have a much 
better understanding of SNA (at least the SNA users sub-group) compared to all other 
actors. This is not surprising due to the different role of managers, specialists and 
clients and their distance from analysis activities. The relatively higher rate of SNA 
acceptance by all actors should be a facilitating factor. 
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 Table 1: Frequencies and percentages for the whole sample 
    Counts Percentage 
Total   58 100.00% 
Are you: Total 58 100.00% 
  Female 13 22.40% 
  Male 45 77.60% 
        
What is your age? Total 58 100% 
  20-29 3 5.20% 
  30-39 26 44.80% 
  40-49 23 39.70% 
  50-59 5 8.60% 
  60 and over 1 1.70% 
       
Where are you from?  Total 58 100% 
  Argentina 1 1.70% 
  Belgium 2 3.40% 
  Czech Republic 1 1.70% 
  Finland 3 5.20% 
  France 9 15.50% 
  Germany 2 3.40% 
  Greece 3 5.20% 
  Hungary 1 1.70% 
  Italy 5 8.60% 
  Netherlands 9 15.50% 
  Poland 4 6.90% 
  Portugal 1 1.70% 
  Romania 8 13.80% 
  Slovakia 1 1.70% 
  Slovenia 2 3.40% 
  Spain 3 5.20% 
  Sweden 3 5.20% 
       
How long have you been 
working in the criminal justice 
field (e.g., as investigator or Total 58 100% 
analyst) prior to your Europol 
employment? Under 4 years 4 6.90% 
  5-9 years 13 22.40% 
  10-14 years 13 22.40% 
  15-19 years 14 24.10% 
  20-24 years 7 12.10% 
  25 years and over 7 12.10% 
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 What is the highest level of 
your educational 
qualifications? Total 58 100% 
    1 1.70% 
  Bachelors degree 13 22.40% 
  Certificate 3 5.20% 
  Diploma 12 20.70% 
  Masters degree 29 50% 
       
What is your job title (role) at 
Europol? Total 58 100% 
  Analyst 19 32.80% 
  Analytical Assistant 22 37.90% 
  
Seconded National Expert 
(SNE) 2 3.40% 
  Senior Analyst 15 25.90% 
       
How long have you been 
working as a Europol 
analyst? Total 58 100% 
  10 years and over 5 8.60% 
  4-6 years 20 34.50% 
  7-9 years 16 27.60% 
  Under 3 years 17 29.30% 
       
Which Unit do you work for? Total 58 100% 
  
O1 Operational Centre 
and Coordination 1 1.70% 
  
O3 Criminal Finances and 
Technology 12 20.70% 
  O4 Counter Terrorism 9 15.50% 
  O5 Forgery of Money 6 10.30% 
  
O6 Criminal Networks 
(WE Hub) 13 22.40% 
  
O7 Criminal Networks (NE 
Hub) 6 10.30% 
  
O8 Criminal networks (SE 
Hub) 10 17.20% 
  
O9 Terrorist Financing 
Tracking Programme 1 1.70% 
       
How would you rate the 
frequency of delivery of the 
following types of  Total 58 100% 
analytical products to the 
clients of your operational Never 2 3.40% 
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 project? 
Hit  notifications Rarely 14 24.10% 
  Average 22 37.90% 
  Frequently 7 12.10% 
  Very frequently 13 22.40% 
       
How would you rate the 
frequency of delivery of the 
following types of  Total 58 100% 
analytical products to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Never 9 15.50% 
Intelligence notifications Rarely 24 41.40% 
  Average 18 31% 
  Frequently 7 12.10% 
       
How would you rate the 
frequency of delivery of the 
following types of  Total 58 100% 
analytical products to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Rarely 5 8.60% 
Cross-match reports Average 15 25.90% 
  Frequently 18 31% 
  Very frequently 20 34.50% 
       
How would you rate the 
frequency of delivery of the 
following types of  Total 58 100% 
analytical products to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Rarely 18 31% 
Operational analysis reports Average 21 36.20% 
  Frequently 12 20.70% 
  Very frequently 7 12.10% 
       
How would you rate the 
frequency of delivery of the 
following types of  Total 58 100% 
analytical products to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Never 4 6.90% 
Knowledge products Rarely 25 43.10% 
  Average 20 34.50% 
  Frequently 7 12.10% 
  Very frequently 2 3.40% 
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How would you rate the 
usefulness of the following 
types of analytical  Total 58 100% 
products disseminated to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Not useful at all 3 5.20% 
Hit  notifications Not useful 22 37.90% 
  Average 19 32.80% 
  Useful 10 17.20% 
  Very useful 4 6.90% 
       
How would you rate the 
usefulness of the following 
types of analytical  Total 58 100% 
products disseminated to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Not useful at all 1 1.70% 
Intelligence notifications Not useful 7 12.10% 
  Average 25 43.10% 
  Useful 18 31% 
  Very useful 7 12.10% 
       
How would you rate the 
usefulness of the following 
types of analytical  Total 58 100% 
products disseminated to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Not useful 6 10.30% 
Cross-match reports Average 18 31.00% 
  Useful 22 37.90% 
  Very useful 12 20.70% 
       
How would you rate the 
usefulness of the following 
types of analytical  Total 58 100% 
products disseminated to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Not useful 1 1.70% 
Operational analysis reports Average 5 8.60% 
  Useful 25 43.10% 
  Very useful 27 46.60% 
       
How would you rate the 
usefulness of the following 
types of analytical  Total 58 100% 
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 products disseminated to the 
clients of your operational 
project? Not useful at all 1 1.70% 
Knowledge products Not useful 4 6.90% 
  Average 18 31% 
  Useful 25 43.10% 
  Very useful 10 17.20% 
       
Have you undertaken or 
given SNA training (please 
tick all relevant boxes)? Total 58 100% 
 
Analytic Technologies 
SNA training 2008 2 3.40% 
  
Five-day SNA training 
2011 7 12.10% 
  
Five-day SNA training 
2011, Introductory SNA 
training 2009 9 15.50% 
  
Five-day SNA training 
2011, Introductory SNA 
training 2009, Valdis 
Krebs SNA training 2007 1 1.70% 
  
Five-day SNA training 
2011, Trainer EU SNA 
2011 1 1.70% 
  
Five-day SNA training 
2011, Valdis Krebs SNA 
training 2007 1 1.70% 
  
Introductory SNA training 
2009 15 25.90% 
  
Introductory SNA training 
2009, Analytic 
Technologies SNA training 
2008 2 3.40% 
  
Introductory SNA training 
2009, Analytic 
Technologies SNA training 
2008, Valdis Krebs SNA 
training 2007 2 3.40% 
  
Introductory SNA training 
2009, Valdis Krebs SNA 
training 2007 1 1.70% 
  No 8 13.80% 
  
Not trained but studied a 
lot of reading material 1 1.70% 
  
Trainer EU SNA 2011, 
Analytic Technologies 1 1.70% 
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 SNA training 2008 
  
Trainer EU SNA 2011, 
Analytic Technologies 
SNA training 2008, Valdis 
Krebs SNA training 2007 1 1.70% 
  
Trainer EU SNA 2011, 
Introductory SNA training 
2009 3 5.20% 
  
Trainer EU SNA 2011, 
Introductory SNA training 
2009, Trainer Introductory 
SNA 2009, Analytic 
Technologies SNA training 
2008, University of 
Kentucky and University of 
Konstanz 1 1.70% 
  
Trainer Introductory SNA 
2009 1 1.70% 
  
Valdis Krebs SNA training 
2007 1 1.70% 
       
Have you been using SNA in 
your work? Total 58 100% 
  No 20 34.50% 
  Yes 38 65.50% 
       
How useful SNA is to you? Total 58 100% 
  Not useful at all 1 1.70% 
  Not useful 4 6.90% 
  Average 13 22.40% 
  Useful 12 20.70% 
  Very useful 17 29.30% 
  N/A 11 19% 
       
Has SNA changed the way 
you perform intelligence 
analysis? Total 58 100% 
  Don’t know 17 29.30% 
  No 13 22.40% 
  Yes 28 48.30% 
       
How would you rate the 
availability, quality, quantity 
and completeness of network 
data in your operational 
project? Total 58 100% 
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 Availability Not good at all 5 8.60% 
  Not good 13 22.40% 
  Average 15 25.90% 
  Good 14 24.10% 
  Very good 5 8.60% 
  N/A 6 10.30% 
       
How would you rate the 
availability, quality, quantity 
and completeness of network 
data in your operational 
project? Total 58 100% 
Quality Not good at all 6 10.30% 
  Not good 7 12.10% 
  Average 25 43.10% 
  Good 10 17.20% 
  Very good 5 8.60% 
  N/A 5 8.60% 
       
How would you rate the 
availability, quality, quantity 
and completeness of network 
data in your operational 
project? Total 58 100% 
Quantity Not good at all 3 5.20% 
 Not good 14 24.10% 
  Average 17 29.30% 
  Good 8 13.80% 
  Very good 11 19% 
  N/A 5 8.60% 
       
How would you rate the 
availability, quality, quantity 
and completeness of network 
data in your operational 
project? Total 58 100% 
Completeness Not good at all 6 10.30% 
 Not good 18 31% 
  Average 20 34.50% 
  Good 4 6.90% 
  Very good 4 6.90% 
  N/A 6 10.30% 
       
How would you rate the level 
of acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by the Total 58 100% 
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 analysts of your 
operational project? Poor 1 1.70% 
Acceptance Below average 4 6.90% 
  Average 20 34.50% 
  High 17 29.30% 
  Very high 9 15.50% 
  N/A 7 12.10% 
       
How would you rate the level 
of acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by the 
analysts of your Total 58 100% 
operational project? Poor 4 6.90% 
Understanding Below average 6 10.30% 
  Average 25 43.10% 
  High 12 20.70% 
  Very high 5 8.60% 
  N/A 6 10.30% 
       
How would you rate the 
effectiveness of analysts’ use 
of SNA in your operational 
project? Total 58 100% 
Effectiveness of SNA use Poor 4 6.90% 
 Below average 8 13.80% 
  Average 15 25.90% 
  Effective 11 19% 
  Very effective 7 12.10% 
  N/A 13 22.40% 
       
How would you rate the 
effectiveness of analysts’ use 
of SNA in your operational 
project? Total 58 100% 
Effectiveness of reporting Poor 4 6.90% 
 Below average 5 8.60% 
  Average 15 25.90% 
  Effective 13 22.40% 
  Very effective 5 8.60% 
  N/A 16 27.60% 
       
Can you identify any barriers 
regarding the use of SNA by 
the analysts of your 
operational  Total 58 100% 
project? No 28 48.30% 
278 
 
   Yes 30 51.70% 
       
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements? Total 58 100% 
Conventional link analysis is 
superior than SNA because 
of its broader application 
areas Strongly disagree 5 8.60% 
 Disagree 18 31% 
  Neutral 24 41.40% 
  Agree 9 15.50% 
  Strongly agree 2 3.40% 
       
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements? Total 58 100% 
SNA is just another tool in the 
analyst toolbox Strongly disagree 1 1.70% 
  Disagree 6 10.30% 
  Neutral 14 24.10% 
  Agree 24 41.40% 
  Strongly agree 13 22.40% 
       
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements? Total 58 100% 
SNA use has advantages 
and disadvantages; is not a 
panacea (cure-all) Strongly disagree 1 1.70% 
  Disagree 3 5.20% 
  Neutral 13 22.40% 
  Agree 23 39.70% 
  Strongly agree 18 31% 
       
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements? Total 58 100% 
SNA has a strong scientific 
basis and in that sense is 
superior than conventional Strongly disagree 6 10.30% 
link analysis Disagree 19 32.80% 
  Neutral 20 34.50% 
  Agree 10 17.20% 
  Strongly agree 3 5.20% 
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 How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements?  Total 58 100% 
SNA has the potential to 
shape the future of criminal 
intelligence analysis Strongly disagree 1 1.70% 
  Disagree 5 8.60% 
  Neutral 29 50% 
  Agree 20 34.50% 
  Strongly agree 3 5.20% 
       
How would you rate the level 
of acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by the 
project manager and Total 58 100% 
specialists of your operational 
project? Poor 2 3.40% 
Acceptance Below average 3 5.20% 
  Average 11 19% 
  High 19 32.80% 
  Very high 13 22.40% 
  N/A 10 17.20% 
       
How would you rate the level 
of acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by the 
project manager and Total 58 100% 
specialists of your operational 
project? Poor 8 13.80% 
Understanding Below average 7 12.10% 
  Average 18 31% 
  High 11 19% 
  Very high 5 8.60% 
  N/A 9 15.50% 
       
How would you rate the level 
of acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by the 
clients of your operational Total 58 100% 
project? Poor 3 5.20% 
Acceptance Below average 4 6.90% 
  Average 20 34.50% 
  High 11 19% 
  Very high 5 8.60% 
  N/A 15 25.90% 
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 How would you rate the level 
of acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by the 
clients of your Total 58 100% 
operational project? Poor 7 12.10% 
Understanding Below average 11 19% 
  Average 23 39.70% 
  High 3 5.20% 
  Very high 1 1.70% 
  N/A 13 22.40% 
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Table 2:  Analysts’ perceptions of operational reporting (frequency of delivery) 
Question: How would you rate the frequency of delivery of the following types of 
analytical products to the clients of your operational project? 
 Frequency 
Never Rarely Average Frequently Very 
frequently 
Hit notifications 
 
2 14 22 7 13 
Intelligence notifications 9 24 18 7 - 
Cross-match reports 
 
- 5 15 18 20 
Operational analysis reports 
 
- 18 21 12 7 
Knowledge products 
 
4 25 20 7 2 
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Table 3:  Analysts’ perceptions of operational reporting (usefulness) 
Question:  How would you rate the usefulness of the following types of 
analytical products disseminated to the clients of your operational project? 
 Frequency 
Not 
useful 
at all 
Not 
useful 
Average Useful Very 
useful 
Hit notifications 
 
3 22 19 10 4 
Intelligence notifications 1 7 25 18 7 
Cross-match reports 
 
- 6 18 22 12 
Operational analysis reports 
 
- 1 5 25 27 
Knowledge products 
 
1 4 18 25 10 
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Table 4: Total number of new operational cases and exchanged 
                messages per year (2000-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Cases Information exchange 
2000 1919 35366 
2001 2267 45093 
2002 3442 70079 
2003 5383 96860 
2004 6388 155050 
2005 6761 183526 
2006 7246 210268 
2007 7618 260463 
2008 8377 283820 
2009 10487 303613 
2010 11738 250978 
2011 13697 330633 
2012 15949 414334 
2013 18310 456598 
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Table 5:  SNA training 
Question:  Have you undertaken or given 
SNA training? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 49 84.5 
No 9 15.5 
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Table 6:  Network data in operational projects 
Question:  How would you rate the availability, quality, quantity and completeness of 
network data in your operational project? 
 Frequency 
Not good 
at all 
Not 
good 
Average Good Very 
good 
Don’t 
know 
Availability 5 13 15 14 5 6 
Quality 6 7 25 10 5 5 
Quantity 3 14 17 8 11 5 
Completeness 6 18 20 4 4 6 
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Table 7:  Use of SNA in investigations 
Question: In the context of what type(s) of criminal 
investigation have you used SNA tools and techniques 
(Please tick all relevant choices)? 
 Frequency 
Organised crime  22 
Drug trafficking 14 
Terrorism 7 
People smuggling 6 
Organised robbery  5 
Trafficking in human beings  4 
Illegal money-laundering activities  4 
Forgery of money and means of 
payment  
4 
Computer crime  3 
Kidnapping, illegal restraint and 
hostage taking 
3 
 
Swindling and fraud  3 
Murder, grievous bodily injury  2 
Corruption  1 
Racketeering and extortion  1 
Not applicable 21 
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Table 8:  Types of network data analysed with 
SNA 
 
Question:  Which type(s) of network data have 
you analysed with the help of SNA so far (Please 
specify type of data set such as com-com, pers-
pers, etc.)? 
Type of network data Frequency 
Communication-by-communication 34 
Person-by-person  21 
Person-by-communication 3 
Person-by-event 3 
Account-by-account 2 
E-mail-by-e-mail 1 
IP number-by-IP number 1 
Not applicable 19 
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Table 9:  Analysts’ use of SNA 
Question:  Have you been using SNA in 
your work? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 38 65.5 
No 20 34.5 
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Table 10:  Analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness 
Question:  How useful SNA is to you? 
 Frequency 
Not useful 
at all 
Not 
useful 
Average Useful Very 
useful 
Don’t 
know 
SNA 
usefulness 
1 4 13 12 17 11 
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Table 11:  Analysts’ perceptions of SNA-
induced change in intelligence analysis 
Question:  Has SNA changed the way you 
perform intelligence analysis? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 28 48.3 
No 13 22.4 
Don’t know 17 29.3 
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Table 12:  Analysts’ acceptance and understanding of SNA  
Question:  How would you rate the level of acceptance and understanding of SNA by 
the analysts of your operational project? 
 Frequency 
Poor Below 
average 
Average High Very 
high 
Don’t 
know 
Acceptance 1 4 20 17 9 7 
Understanding 4 6 25 12 5 6 
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Table 13:  Analysts’ effectiveness of SNA use 
Question:  How would you rate the effectiveness of analysts’ use of SNA in your 
operational project? 
 Frequency 
Poor Below 
average 
Average Effective Very 
effective 
Don’t 
know 
Effectiveness of 
SNA use 
4 8 15 11 7 13 
Effectiveness of 
reporting 
4 5 15 13 5 16 
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Table 14:  Barriers in the use of SNA 
Question:  Can you identify any barriers regarding 
the use of SNA by the analysts of your operational 
project? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 30 51.7 
No 28 48.3 
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Table 15:  Analysts’ ‘link analysis vs. SNA’-perceptions 
Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 Frequency 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
A. Conventional link analysis is 
superior to SNA because of its 
broader application areas 
 
5 18 24 9 2 
B. SNA is just another tool in the 
analyst toolbox 
 
1 6 14 24 13 
C. SNA use has advantages and 
disadvantages; is not a 
panacea (cure-all) 
 
1 3 13 23 18 
D. SNA has a strong scientific 
basis and in that sense is 
superior to conventional link 
analysis 
 
6 19 20 10 3 
E. SNA has the potential to shape 
the future of criminal 
intelligence analysis 
 
1 5 29 20 3 
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Table 16:  Manager and specialists’ acceptance and understanding of SNA  
Question:  How would you rate the level of acceptance and understanding of SNA by 
the project manager and specialists of your operational project? 
 Frequency 
Poor Below 
average 
Average High Very 
high 
Don’t 
know 
Acceptance 2 3 11 19 13 10 
Understanding 8 7 18 11 5 9 
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Table 17:  Clients’ acceptance and understanding of SNA  
Question:  How would you rate the level of acceptance and understanding of SNA by 
the clients of your operational project? 
 Frequency 
Poor Below 
average 
Average High Very 
high 
Don’t 
know 
Acceptance 3 4 20 11 5 15 
Understanding 7 11 23 3 1 13 
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 Figure 7: Correspondence analysis of analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-
perceptions by Role 
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Table 18:  Crosstabulation - What is your job title (role) at Europol? 
* Have you been using SNA in your work? 
Count   
 
Have you been using SNA 
in your work? 
Total Yes No 
What is your job 
title (role) at 
Europol? 
Seconded 
National Expert 
(SNE) 
2 0 2 
Analytical 
Assistant 
12 10 22 
Analyst 14 5 19 
Senior Analyst 10 5 15 
Total 38 20 58 
303 
 
 Appendix F: Inferential statistics 
Inferential analysis 
Demographic variables and analysts’ perceptions 
Besides the role function, how other demographic variables (i.e. age, gender, total 
years of service prior to Europol employment, education, Europol years of service and 
unit) related to the analysts’ “link analysis vs. SNA”-perceptions? Were there any 
differences within the sample based on demographics? Which associations were (or 
not) significant and why?  
A one-way ANOVA did not find any statistically significant relationships between 
the five different age groups of the sample. An independent samples t test, with 
gender as the independent variable, did not reveal any significant relationships. A 
one-way ANOVA of years of service prior to Europol employment found only one 
statistically significant result pertaining to statement C (F = 4.111, p < .01). This 
pattern showed a relative drop of means as participants’ years of experience 
increased (see Figure 6 below). Despite that, however, the patterning of responses to 
the five statements revealed a rather mixed picture. Figure 7 below illustrates the 
variability of years of experience prior to Europol employment by Role. Interested 
readers could also consider the cross tabulations in Table 7 (Years of experience 
prior to Europol by Role) and Table 8 (Years of Europol experience by Role) at the 
end of this section. 
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 Figure 6: Means plot of analysts’ responses to five statements by years of 
service prior to Europol employment 
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Figure 7: Bar chart of Years of experience prior to Europol employment by Role 
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Figure 8: Bar chart of Years of Europol experience by Role 
      
 
Surprisingly, a series of other tests did not find significant associations (with two 
exceptions). A one-way ANOVA between analysts’ perceptions and the five levels of 
educational qualifications characterising them did not find statistically significant 
relationships. A one-way ANOVA between analysts’ perceptions and their years of 
Europol service found one statistically significant result pertaining to statement E (F = 
4.692, p < .01) and one non-statistically significant result pertaining to statement D (F 
= 2.446, p = .074) close to the significance level p < .05.  Parenthetically, Figure 8 
above illustrates the variability of years of Europol experience by analyst role. A one-
way ANOVA between analysts’ perceptions and their Units did not find statistically 
significant relationships. Furthermore, two independent sample t tests, with SNA 
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 training and barriers to SNA use as independent variables, did not reveal any 
significant differences.   
So, the analysis did not find significant associations and differences between 
several demographic variables (i.e. age, gender, education, and unit) and analysts’ 
link analysis vs SNA perceptions. The results suggest that most demographic 
variables exerted relatively minor influence, if any, on analysts’ perceptions. The only 
exceptions were found to be associated with the analysts’ role and years of 
experience (i.e. years prior to Europol employment and Europol years of service), 
which produced statistically significant findings. This suggests that only Europol 
analysts’ role and experience had some influence on their link analysis vs. SNA 
perceptions. This interpretation is strengthened by an examination of the relationship 
between demographic variables and SNA use, using one-way ANOVA and chi-square 
tests, which did not find statistically significant differences within the sample. Hence, it 
appears that analysts’ perceptions were mainly affected by the SNA innovation itself, 
which also changed intelligence analysis practices and SNA use. In other words, SNA 
positively influenced professional knowledge and practices inside Europol, SNA use 
and Europol analysts’ SNA-related perceptions more than any demographic variable.  
 
 
Further analysis 
A t test of the frequency and usefulness of operational reporting by SNA use, as 
the independent variable, did not produce statistically significant results. 
Next, a t test of variables pertaining to network data, analysts, PM/specialists and 
clients’ perceptions of SNA, and analysts’ effectiveness of SNA use/reporting by SNA 
use, as the independent variable, generated statistically significant results, as shown 
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 in Table 9 at the end of this section. As regards the availability of network data, the 
analysis found a significant value t(56) = 4.514, p < .001, 95% CI [.855, 2.219]. An 
examination of the means showed that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 3.24) 
than those of non-users (M = 1.70). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of 
the non-users group (SD = 1.342) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.173). 
As regards the quality of network data, the analysis found a significant value t(56) = 
3.136, p < .05, 95% CI [.391, 1.773]. An examination of the means showed that SNA 
users’ responses were higher (M = 3.13) than those of non-users (M = 2.05). The 
variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users group (SD = 1.395) was 
higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.166). As regards the quantity of network data, 
the analysis found a significant value t(56) = 3.835, p < .001, 95% CI [.666, 2.123]. An 
examination of the means showed that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 3.39) 
than those of non-users (M = 2.00). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of 
the non-users group (SD = 1.376) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.285). 
As regards the completeness of network data, the analysis found a significant value 
t(56) = 2.881, p < .05, 95% CI [.293, 1.628]. An examination of the means showed 
that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 2.71) than those of non-users (M = 
1.75). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users group (SD = 
1.209) was almost identical with that of SNA users (SD = 1.206). So, the null 
hypothesis that the means of the two groups were not significantly different was 
rejected. The t test suggested the existence of an important relationship between the 
four characteristics of network data and SNA use.  
As regards the acceptance of SNA by analysts, the analysis found a significant 
value t(56) = 3.439, p = .001, 95% CI [.534, 2.024]. An examination of the means 
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 showed that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 3.58) than those of non-users 
(M = 2.30). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users group 
(SD = 1.525) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.244). As regards the 
understanding of SNA by analysts, the analysis found a significant value t(56) = 
2.917, p < .05, 95% CI [.324, 1.745]. An examination of the means showed that SNA 
users’ responses were higher (M = 3.18) than those of non-users (M = 2.15). The 
variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users group (SD = 1.461) was 
higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.182). So, the null hypothesis that the means of 
the two groups were not significantly different was rejected. The t test suggested the 
existence of an important relationship between the acceptance and understanding of 
SNA by analysts and SNA use.  
As regards the acceptance of SNA by project managers and specialists, the 
analysis found a significant value t(29.455) = 2.732, p < .05, 95% CI [.341 , 2.369]. An 
examination of the means showed that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 3.61) 
than those of non-users (M = 2.25). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of 
the non-users group (SD = 1.970) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.405). 
As regards the understanding of SNA by project managers and specialists, the 
analysis found a significant value t(56) = 3.058, p < .05, 95% CI [.421, 2.021]. An 
examination of the means showed that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 2.92) 
than those of non-users (M = 1.70). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of 
the non-users group (SD = 1.593) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.363). 
So, the null hypothesis that the means of the two groups were not significantly 
different was rejected. The t test suggested the existence of an important relationship 
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 between the acceptance and understanding of SNA by project managers and 
specialists and SNA use.  
As regards the acceptance of SNA by clients, the analysis found a non-statistically 
significant difference t(56) = 1.712, p = .092, 95% CI [-.134, 1.702]. As regards the 
understanding of SNA by clients, the analysis found a significant difference t(56) = 
2.504, p < .05, 95% CI [.178, 1.601].  An examination of the means showed that SNA 
users’ responses were higher (M = 2.29) than those of non-users (M = 1.40). The 
variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users group (SD = 1.353) was 
higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.250). So, the null hypothesis that the means of 
the two groups were not significantly different was rejected. The t test suggested the 
existence of an important relationship between the understanding of SNA by clients 
and SNA use.  
As regards the effectiveness of SNA use by analysts, the analysis found a 
significant value t(56) = 3.946, p < .001, 95% CI [.814, 2.492]. An examination of the 
means showed that SNA users’ responses were higher (M = 3.05) than those of non-
users (M = 1.40). The variation (standard deviation) of responses of the non-users 
group (SD = 1.667) was higher than that of SNA users (SD = 1.432). As regards the 
effectiveness of SNA reporting, the analysis found a significant value t(56) = 3.654, p 
= .001, 95% CI [.720, 2.469]. An examination of the means showed that SNA users’ 
responses were higher (M = 2.89) than those of non-users (M = 1.30). The variation 
(standard deviation) of responses of the non-users group (SD = 1.720) was higher 
than that of SNA users (SD = 1.503). So, the null hypothesis that the means of the 
two groups were not significantly different was rejected. The t test suggested the 
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 existence of an important relationship between the effectiveness of SNA use and 
reporting by analysts and SNA use.  
Finally, the attention turned to the results of correlation analysis of several 
variables. That is, the frequency and usefulness of operational reporting, network 
data, analysts, PM/specialists and clients’ perceptions of SNA, and analysts’ 
effectiveness of SNA use/reporting and analysts’ perceptions of SNA usefulness’. 
Table 10 at the end of this section lists the results of correlation analysis of the 
frequency and usefulness of operational reporting and analysts’ perceptions of SNA 
usefulness. A rather weak negative association was found between SNA usefulness 
and the frequency of delivery of hit notifications (r = -.274, p < .05). Moreover, SNA 
usefulness was positively associated with the usefulness of operational analysis 
reports (r = .293, p < .05). These findings made sense because SNA reports are 
always analytically ambitious and fall under the category of operational analysis 
reports. This also reflected on their usefulness compared to hit notifications. 
Furthermore, some relatively stronger positive correlations were found between the 
frequency and usefulness of certain operational products; for example, the frequency 
of delivery and usefulness of operational analysis reports (r = .448, p < .001); the 
frequency of delivery and usefulness of knowledge products (r = .546, p < .001); and, 
the usefulness of hit notifications and cross-match reports (r = .619, p < .001). These 
results pointed to the usefulness of operational analysis reports and knowledge 
products and the stronger relationship between hit notifications and cross match 
reports due to the similarity of their content. 
Table 11 lists the results of correlation analysis of network data and analysts’ 
perceptions of SNA usefulness. The latter variable was modestly positively 
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 associated with all four features of network data. Moreover, there were quite strong 
positive correlations (r = .76 up to .87, p < .001) between the availability, quality, 
quantity and completeness of network data. As shown in Table 12, SNA usefulness 
was modestly positively correlated with the acceptance and understanding of SNA as 
well as the effectiveness of SNA use and reporting by analysts. Stronger positive 
correlations (r = .63 up to .82, p < .001) were found between the acceptance and 
understanding of SNA and the effectiveness of SNA use and reporting by analysts. 
As shown in Table 13, SNA usefulness was modestly positively correlated with the 
acceptance (r = .516, p < .001) and understanding (r = .392, p < .001) of SNA by 
project managers and specialists. Acceptance and understanding of SNA by project 
managers and specialists, in turn, were strongly correlated (r = .786, p < .001). 
Finally, as shown in Table 14, there was a modest positive correlation between SNA 
usefulness and the acceptance and understanding of SNA by clients. 
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 Table 1:  Student’s t test of the perceptions of SNA usefulness of users and 
non-users of SNA  
 
Group Statistics 
 
Have you been 
using SNA at 
work? 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
How 
useful 
SNA is to 
you?  
Yes 38 3.79 1.318 .214 
No 20 1.85 1.954 .437 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
How 
useful 
SNA 
is to 
you? 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
10.693 .002 4.491 56 .000 1.939 .432 1.074 2.805 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.987 28.359 .000 1.939 .486 .944 2.935 
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 Table 2: Chi-square test of SNA changed intelligence analysis 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Has SNA changed the 
way you perform 
intelligence analysis? * 
Have you been using 
SNA in your work? 
58 100.0% 0 0.0% 58 100.0% 
 
 
Has SNA changed the way you perform intelligence analysis? * Have you been 
using SNA in your work? Cross tabulation 
 Have you been using 
SNA in your work? 
Total 
Yes No 
Has SNA changed the 
way you perform 
intelligence analysis? 
Don't 
know 
Count 3 14 17 
% within  
Has SNA changed the 
way you perform 
intelligence analysis? 
17.6% 82.4% 100.0% 
% within Have you been 
using SNA in your work? 7.9% 70.0% 29.3% 
% of Total 5.2% 24.1% 29.3% 
Yes 
 
Count 
 
26 
 
2 
 
28 
% within Has SNA 
changed the way you 
perform intelligence 
analysis? 
92.9% 7.1% 100.0% 
% within Have you been 
using SNA in your work? 68.4% 10.0% 48.3% 
% of Total 44.8% 3.4% 48.3% 
No 
 
Count 
 
9 
 
4 
 
13 
% within Has SNA 
changed the way you 
perform intelligence 
analysis? 
69.2% 30.8% 100.0% 
% within Have you been 
using SNA in your work? 23.7% 20.0% 22.4% 
% of Total 15.5% 6.9% 22.4% 
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Total 
 
Count 
 
38 
 
20 
 
58 
% within Has SNA 
changed the way you 
perform intelligence 
analysis? 
65.5% 34.5% 100.0% 
% within Have you been 
using SNA in your work? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 65.5% 34.5% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.587a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 28.423 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.876 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 58   
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
4.48. 
 
 
 
Directional Measures 
 Value Asymp. 
Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal 
by 
Nominal 
Lambda 
Symmetric .460 .114 3.193 .001 
Has SNA changed the 
way you perform 
intelligence analysis? 
Dependent 
.400 .103 3.264 .001 
Have you been using 
SNA in your work?  
Dependent 
.550 .138 2.848 .004 
Goodman 
and Kruskal 
tau 
Has SNA changed the 
way you perform 
intelligence analysis? 
Dependent 
.261 .082 
 
.000c 
Have you been using 
SNA in your work?  
Dependent 
.458 .124 
 
.000c 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
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Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi .677 .000 
Cramer's V .677 .000 
N of Valid Cases 58  
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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 Table 3:  Student’s t test of the perceptions of SNA usefulness and change in 
analysis practices 
 
Group Statistics 
 Has SNA changed the way you perform intelligence analysis? 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
How useful SNA 
is to you? 
SNA usefulness 
Yes 28 4.18 1.056 .200 
No 13 2.54 1.330 .369 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality 
of 
Variances 
t test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of 
the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
How 
useful 
SNA is to 
you? 
SNA 
usefulness 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.405 .528 4.259 39 .000 1.640 .385 .861 2.419 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.910 19.315 .001 1.640 .419 .763 2.517 
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 Table 4: Correlation analysis of analysts’ link analysis vs. SNA perceptions and 
SNA usefulness 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
SNA usefulness 3.12 1.807 58 
 
Statement A: 
Conventional link analysis is superior than SNA because of 
its broader application areas 
2.74 .947 58 
 
Statement B:  
SNA is just another tool in the analyst toolbox 
3.72 .988 58 
 
Statement C:  
SNA use has advantages and disadvantages; is not a 
panacea (cure-all) 
3.93 .953 58 
 
Statement D: 
SNA has a strong scientific basis and in that sense is 
superior than conventional link analysis 
2.74 1.036 58 
 
Statement E:  
SNA has the potential to shape the future of criminal 
intelligence analysis 
3.33 .781 58 
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Correlations 
 SNA 
usefulness 
Statement A: 
Conventional 
link analysis 
is superior 
than SNA 
because of 
its broader 
application 
areas 
Statement 
B: SNA is 
just 
another 
tool in the 
analyst 
toolbox 
Statement C: 
SNA use has 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages; 
is not a 
panacea (cure-
all) 
Statement 
D: 
SNA has a 
strong 
scientific 
basis and in 
that sense is 
superior 
than 
conventional 
link analysis 
Statement 
E: SNA 
has the 
potential to 
shape the 
future of 
criminal 
intelligence 
analysis 
SNA 
usefulness 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.289* -.079 .035 .242 .245 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.028 .554 .791 .067 .064 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Statement A: 
Conventional 
link analysis is 
superior than 
SNA because 
of its broader 
application 
areas 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.289* 1 .335* .077 -.409** -.405** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.028 
 
.010 .565 .001 .002 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Statement B:  
SNA is just 
another tool in 
the analyst 
toolbox 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.079 .335* 1 .203 -.345** -.313* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.554 .010 
 
.126 .008 .017 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Statement C:  
SNA use has 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages; 
is not a 
panacea (cure-
all) 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.035 .077 .203 1 -.125 .078 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.791 .565 .126 
 
.349 .560 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
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Statement D: 
SNA has a strong scientific  
basis and in that sense is  
superior than conventional  
link analysis 
 
Pearson Correlation .242 -.409** -.345** -.125 1 .454** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .067 .001 .008 .349  .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Statement E:  
SNA has the potential to  
shape the future of criminal  
intelligence analysis 
 
Pearson Correlation 
.245 -.405** -.313* .078 .454** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .064 .002 .017 .560 .000  
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 5: One-way ANOVA of analysts’ link analysis vs. SNA perceptions by job 
(role) 
 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Statement A: 
Conventional 
link analysis is 
superior than 
SNA because 
of its broader 
application 
areas 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
2 2.50 .707 .500 -3.85 8.85 2 3 
Analytical 
Assistant 
22 2.64 .790 .168 2.29 2.99 1 4 
Analyst 19 2.53 1.073 .246 2.01 3.04 1 5 
Senior 
Analyst 
15 3.20 .941 .243 2.68 3.72 2 5 
Total 58 2.74 .947 .124 2.49 2.99 1 5 
Statement B: 
SNA is just 
another tool in 
the analyst 
toolbox 
 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
2 3.50 .707 .500 -2.85 9.85 3 4 
Analytical 
Assistant 
22 3.64 .848 .181 3.26 4.01 2 5 
Analyst 19 3.68 1.003 .230 3.20 4.17 2 5 
Senior 
Analyst 
15 3.93 1.223 .316 3.26 4.61 1 5 
Total 58 3.72 .988 .130 3.46 3.98 1 5 
Statement C: 
SNA use has 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages; 
is not a 
panacea (cure-
all) 
 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
2 5.00 .000 .000 5.00 5.00 5 5 
Analytical 
Assistant 
22 3.91 .811 .173 3.55 4.27 3 5 
Analyst 19 3.84 .898 .206 3.41 4.28 2 5 
Senior 
Analyst 
15 3.93 1.223 .316 3.26 4.61 1 5 
Total 58 3.93 .953 .125 3.68 4.18 1 5 
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Statement D: 
SNA has a 
strong 
scientific basis 
and in that 
sense is 
superior than 
conventional 
link analysis 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
2 3.50 .707 .500 -2.85 9.85 3 4 
Analytical 
Assistant 
22 2.77 1.020 .218 2.32 3.23 1 5 
Analyst 19 2.79 1.228 .282 2.20 3.38 1 5 
Senior 
Analyst 
15 2.53 .834 .215 2.07 3.00 1 4 
Total 58 2.74 1.036 .136 2.47 3.01 1 5 
 
Statement E:  
SNA has the 
potential to 
shape the 
future of 
criminal 
intelligence 
analysis 
 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
2 4.50 .707 .500 -1.85 10.85 4 5 
Analytical 
Assistant 
22 3.45 .510 .109 3.23 3.68 3 4 
Analyst 19 3.47 .772 .177 3.10 3.85 2 5 
Senior 
Analyst 
15 2.80 .862 .223 2.32 3.28 1 4 
Total 58 3.33 .781 .103 3.12 3.53 1 5 
 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Statement A: 
Conventional link analysis is superior than 
SNA because of its broader application areas 
Between 
Groups 
4.393 3 1.464 1.692 .180 
Within 
Groups 
46.728 54 .865 
  
Total 51.121 57    
Statement B:  
SNA is just another tool in the analyst toolbox 
 
Between 
Groups 
.957 3 .319 .315 .814 
Within 
Groups 
54.630 54 1.012 
  
Total 55.586 57    
 
Statement C:  
SNA use has advantages and disadvantages; 
 
Between 
Groups 
2.446 3 .815 .894 .450 
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 is not a panacea (cure-all) Within 
Groups 
49.278 54 .913 
  
Total 51.724 57    
Statement D: 
SNA has a strong scientific basis and in that 
sense is superior than conventional link 
analysis 
 
Between 
Groups 
1.866 3 .622 .567 .639 
Within 
Groups 
59.255 54 1.097 
  
Total 61.121 57    
Statement E:  
SNA has the potential to shape the future of 
criminal intelligence analysis 
 
Between 
Groups 
7.684 3 2.561 5.106 .003 
Within 
Groups 
27.091 54 .502 
  
Total 34.776 57    
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 Table 6: Cross tabulation of analysts’ link analysis vs. SNA perceptions by Role 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National 
Expert 
(SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
Statement A: 
Conventional link 
analysis is superior 
than SNA because of 
its broader application 
areas 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 2 3 0 5 
Disagree 1 6 7 4 18 
Neutral 1 12 6 5 24 
Agree 0 2 2 5 9 
Strongly 
agree 
0 0 1 1 2 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
Statement B: SNA 
is just another tool 
in the analyst 
toolbox 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 1 1 
Disagree 0 2 3 1 6 
Neutral 1 7 4 2 14 
Agree 1 10 8 5 24 
Strongly 
agree 0 3 4 6 13 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National 
Expert 
(SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
Statement C:  
SNA use has 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 1 1 
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 advantages and 
disadvantages; is not 
a panacea (cure-all) 
Disagree 0 0 2 1 3 
Neutral 0 8 3 2 13 
Agree 0 8 10 5 23 
Strongly 
agree 
2 6 4 6 18 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National 
Expert 
(SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
 
Statement D: 
SNA has a strong 
scientific basis and in 
that sense is superior 
than conventional link 
analysis 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 3 2 1 6 
Disagree 0 4 8 7 19 
Neutral 1 11 3 5 20 
Agree 1 3 4 2 10 
Strongly 
agree 0 1 2 0 3 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
Statement E:  
SNA has the 
potential to shape 
the future of criminal 
intelligence analysis 
Strongly 
disagree 0 0 0 1 1 
Disagree 0 0 1 4 5 
Neutral 0 12 10 7 29 
Agree 1 10 6 3 20 
Strongly 
agree 
1 0 2 0 3 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
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 Table 7: Cross tabulation of Years of experience prior to Europol employment 
by Role 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National 
Expert (SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
Years of 
experience prior to 
Europol 
employment 
Under 4 
years 
0 2 1 1 4 
5-9 
years 
1 7 3 2 13 
10-14 
years 1 5 6 1 13 
15-19 
years 
0 3 3 8 14 
20-24 
years 
0 3 2 2 7 
25 
years 
and 
over 
0 2 4 1 7 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
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 Table 8: Cross tabulation of Years of Europol experience by Role 
 
 Job (role) Total 
Seconded 
National Expert 
(SNE) 
Analytical 
Assistant 
Analyst Senior 
Analyst 
Years of 
Europol 
experience 
Under 3 
years 
2 12 2 1 17 
4-6 years 0 7 7 6 20 
7-9 years 0 2 8 6 16 
10 years 
and over 0 1 2 2 5 
Total 2 22 19 15 58 
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 Table 9: Student’s t test of several variables by SNA use 
 
Group Statistics 
 SNA 
use 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Availability of network data 
Yes 38 3.24 1.173 .190 
No 20 1.70 1.342 .300 
 
Quality of network data 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
3.13 
 
1.166 
 
.189 
No 20 2.05 1.395 .312 
 
Quantity of network data 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
3.39 
 
1.285 
 
.208 
No 20 2.00 1.376 .308 
 
Completeness of network data 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
2.71 
 
1.206 
 
.196 
No 20 1.75 1.209 .270 
 
Acceptance of SNA by analysts  
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
3.58 
 
1.244 
 
.202 
No 20 2.30 1.525 .341 
 
Understanding of SNA by analysts 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
3.18 
 
1.182 
 
.192 
No 20 2.15 1.461 .327 
 
Acceptance of SNA by project 
manager and specialists 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
3.61 
 
1.405 
 
.228 
No 20 2.25 1.970 .441 
 
Understanding of SNA by project 
manager/specialists 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
2.92 
 
1.363 
 
.221 
No 20 1.70 1.593 .356 
 
Acceptance of SNA by clients  
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
2.68 
 
1.596 
 
.259 
No 20 1.90 1.774 .397 
 
Understanding of SNA by clients 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
2.29 
 
1.250 
 
.203 
No 20 1.40 1.353 .303 
 
Effectiveness of  SNA use by analysts 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
3.05 
 
1.432 
 
.232 
No 20 1.40 1.667 .373 
 
Effectiveness of SNA reporting 
 
Yes 
 
38 
 
2.89 
 
1.503 
 
.244 
No 20 1.30 1.720 .385 
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Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Availability of 
network data 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.973 .328 4.514 56 .000 1.537 .340 .855 2.219 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
4.326 34.485 .000 1.537 .355 .815 2.258 
Quality of network 
data 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.432 .125 3.136 56 .003 1.082 .345 .391 1.773 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.965 33.253 .006 1.082 .365 .340 1.823 
Quantity of network 
data 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.100 .753 3.835 56 .000 1.395 .364 .666 2.123 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.752 36.481 .001 1.395 .372 .641 2.148 
Completeness of 
network data 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.152 .699 2.881 56 .006 .961 .333 .293 1.628 
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 Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.879 38.680 .006 .961 .334 .286 1.636 
Acceptance of SNA 
by analysts 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.857 .178 3.439 56 .001 1.279 .372 .534 2.024 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.227 32.584 .003 1.279 .396 .472 2.086 
Understanding of 
SNA by analysts 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.286 .136 2.917 56 .005 1.034 .355 .324 1.745 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.730 32.379 .010 1.034 .379 .263 1.805 
Acceptance of SNA 
by project manager 
and specialists 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
8.267 .006 3.030 56 .004 1.355 .447 .459 2.251 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.732 29.455 .011 1.355 .496 .341 2.369 
Understanding of 
SNA by project 
manager/specialists 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.365 .130 3.058 56 .003 1.221 .399 .421 2.021 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.913 33.889 .006 1.221 .419 .369 2.073 
Acceptance of SNA 
by clients 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.044 .158 1.712 56 .092 .784 .458 -.134 1.702 
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 Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.656 35.335 .107 .784 .474 -.177 1.746 
Understanding of 
SNA by clients 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.671 .201 2.504 56 .015 .889 .355 .178 1.601 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.442 36.151 .020 .889 .364 .151 1.628 
Effectiveness of  
SNA use by analysts 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.562 .217 3.946 56 .000 1.653 .419 .814 2.492 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.763 33.995 .001 1.653 .439 .760 2.545 
Effectiveness of 
SNA reporting 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.883 .175 3.654 56 .001 1.595 .436 .720 2.469 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
3.502 34.482 .001 1.595 .455 .670 2.520 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
333 
 
 Table 10: Correlation analysis of the frequency and usefulness of operational 
reporting by SNA usefulness 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
SNA usefulness 3.12 1.807 58 
 
Frequency of delivery of Hit notifications 
 
3.26 
 
1.163 
 
58 
 
Frequency of delivery of Intelligence notifications 
 
2.40 
. 
897 
 
58 
 
Frequency of delivery of Cross-match reports 
 
3.91 
 
.978 
 
58 
 
Frequency of delivery of Operational analysis reports 
 
3.14 
 
.999 
 
58 
 
Frequency of delivery of Knowledge products 
 
2.62 
 
.914 
 
58 
 
Usefulness of Hit notifications 
 
2.83 
 
1.011 
 
58 
 
Usefulness of Intelligence notifications 
 
3.40 
 
.917 
 
58 
 
Usefulness of Cross-match reports 
 
3.69 
 
.922 
 
58 
 
Usefulness of Operational analysis reports 
 
4.34 
 
.715 
 
58 
 
Usefulness of Knowledge products 
 
3.67 
 
.906 
 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
334 
 
 Correlations 
 SNA 
useful
ness 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of Hit  
notificat
ions 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of 
Intellige
nce 
notificat
ions 
Frequ
ency 
of 
deliver
y of 
Cross-
match 
reports 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of 
Operati
onal 
analysi
s 
reports 
Freque
ncy of 
deliver
y of 
Knowle
dge 
produc
ts 
Usefuln
ess of 
Hit  
notificat
ions 
Usefuln
ess of 
Intellige
nce 
notificat
ions 
Useful
ness of 
Cross-
match 
reports 
Usefuln
ess of 
Operati
onal 
analysi
s 
reports 
Useful
ness of 
Knowle
dge 
produc
ts 
SNA 
usefuln
ess 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
1 -.274* .132 -.004 .224 .145 -.084 .045 .149 .293* .057 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.038 .322 .977 .091 .278 .529 .739 .263 .025 .672 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of Hit  
notificat
ions 
 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
-.274* 1 .186 .436** -.273* .044 .322* .034 .125 -.046 .082 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.038 
 
.163 .001 .038 .741 .014 .801 .349 .733 .542 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.132 .186 1 .080 .173 .251 .173 .317* .024 .057 .012 
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 Intellige
nce 
notificat
ions 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.322 .163 
 
.553 .195 .058 .193 .015 .857 .673 .932 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of 
Cross-
match 
reports 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
-.004 .436** .080 1 -.006 -.194 -.122 -.020 .009 -.007 -.171 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.977 .001 .553 
 
.967 .144 .363 .882 .948 .959 .199 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of 
Operati
onal 
analysi
s 
reports 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.224 -.273* .173 -.006 1 .231 -.011 .188 .104 .448** .128 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.091 .038 .195 .967 
 
.081 .936 .157 .435 .000 .337 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Freque
ncy of 
delivery 
of 
Knowle
dge 
product
s 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.145 .044 .251 -.194 .231 1 .289* .099 .212 .123 .546** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.278 .741 .058 .144 .081 
 
.028 .460 .111 .357 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
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 Usefuln
ess of 
Hit  
notificat
ions 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
-.084 .322* .173 -.122 -.011 .289* 1 .359** .619** .157 .263* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.529 .014 .193 .363 .936 .028 
 
.006 .000 .240 .046 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Usefuln
ess of 
Intellige
nce 
notificat
ions 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.045 .034 .317* -.020 .188 .099 .359** 1 .252 .350** .265* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.739 .801 .015 .882 .157 .460 .006 
 
.056 .007 .045 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Usefuln
ess of 
Cross-
match 
reports 
 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.149 .125 .024 .009 .104 .212 .619** .252 1 .299* .254 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.263 .349 .857 .948 .435 .111 .000 .056 
 
.023 .054 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
 
 
Usefuln
ess of 
Operati
onal 
analysi
s 
reports 
 
 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.293* -.046 .057 -.007 .448** .123 .157 .350** .299* 1 .340** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.025 .733 .673 .959 .000 .357 .240 .007 .023 
 
.009 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
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 Usefuln
ess of 
Knowle
dge 
product
s 
Pearso
n 
Correla
tion 
.057 .082 .012 -.171 .128 .546** .263* .265* .254 .340** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.672 .542 .932 .199 .337 .000 .046 .045 .054 .009 
 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 11: Correlation analysis of network data by SNA usefulness 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
SNA usefulness 3.12 1.807 58 
Availability of network data 2.71 1.427 58 
Quality of network data 2.76 1.342 58 
Quantity of network data 2.91 1.466 58 
Completeness of network data 2.38 1.282 58 
 
Correlations 
 SNA 
usefu
lness 
Availability 
of network 
data 
Quality 
of 
network 
data 
Quantity 
of 
network 
data 
Completeness 
of network data 
SNA 
usefulness 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .538** .533** .501** .449** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Availability of 
network data 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.538** 1 .806** .784** .858** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
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 Quality of 
network data 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.533** .806** 1 .872** .840** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
Quantity of 
network data 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.501** .784** .872** 1 .764** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
Completeness 
of network data 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.449** .858** .840** .764** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 58 58 58 58 58 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 12: Correlation analysis of analysts’ acceptance / understanding of SNA 
and effectiveness of SNA use / reporting by SNA usefulness  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
SNA usefulness 3.12 1.807 58 
Acceptance of SNA 3.14 1.468 58 
Understanding of 
SNA 
2.83 1.365 58 
Effectiveness of SNA 
use 
2.48 1.699 58 
Effectiveness of SNA 
reporting 
2.34 1.743 58 
 
Correlations 
 SNA 
usefulne
ss 
Acceptance 
of SNA 
Understanding 
of SNA 
Effectiveness 
of SNA use 
Effectiveness 
of SNA 
reporting 
SNA 
usefulness 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .476** .407** .541** .505** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .002 .000 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
 
 
Acceptance of 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.476** 1 .826** .641** .653** 
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 SNA Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Understanding 
of SNA 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.407** .826** 1 .672** .630** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000  .000 .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
Effectiveness 
of SNA use 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.541** .641** .672** 1 .778** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
 
Effectiveness 
of SNA 
reporting 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.505** .653** .630** .778** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 58 58 58 58 58 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 13: Correlation analysis of managers and specialists’ acceptance and 
understanding of SNA by SNA usefulness  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
SNA usefulness 3.12 1.807 58 
Acceptance of SNA 
by project manager 
and specialists 
3.14 1.732 58 
Understanding of 
SNA by project 
manager and 
specialists 
2.50 1.547 58 
 
Correlations 
 SNA 
useful
ness 
Acceptance of 
SNA by project 
manager and 
specialists 
Understanding of 
SNA by project 
manager and 
specialists 
SNA usefulness 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .516** .392** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .002 
N 58 58 58 
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 Acceptance of SNA 
by project manager 
and specialists 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.516** 1 .786** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 
N 58 58 58 
 
Understanding of 
SNA by project 
manager and 
specialists 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.392** .786** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .000  
N 58 58 58 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 14: Correlation analysis of clients’ acceptance and understanding of SNA 
by SNA usefulness  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
SNA usefulness 3.12 1.807 58 
Acceptance of SNA 
by clients 
2.41 1.686 58 
Understanding of 
SNA by clients 
1.98 1.344 58 
 
Correlations 
 SNA 
usefulness 
Acceptance 
of SNA by 
clients 
Understandi
ng of SNA by 
clients 
SNA usefulness 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .461** .384** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .003 
N 58 58 58 
 
Acceptance of SNA by 
clients 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.461** 1 .739** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 
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 N 58 58 58 
Understanding of SNA 
by clients 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.384** .739** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000  
N 58 58 58 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Appendix G: Metaphors used by interviewees 
 
Table 1: Metaphors used by Interviewee 1 
Metaphor Context (summary of 
interviewee’s account) 
Theme (conceptual 
category)  
“We have it in the pipeline; 
we try to do something 
with that.” 
Huge amounts of financial 
data in the system. A team 
of three analysts cannot 
cope with the workload 
and the need to detect 
patterns and trends in the 
data. resource limitations, 
work pressure, operational 
support and prioritisation 
Information overload 
creates backlogs. 
“So, I think we’re just, the 
majority of time, in a 
specific shell and don’t 
want to get out. For 
different reasons.” 
Reluctance on behalf of 
most operational analysts 
to use the existing 
software tools better and 
improve their knowledge 
and skills. 
Elementary approaches to 
criminal intelligence 
analysis 
“We don’t look at it on the 
surface, we’re looking 
below.” 
Looking at the data from a 
financial angle (network of 
financial transactions). 
In-depth analysis is a 
crucial element of effective 
operational support. 
“I am really looking 
forward, if I can use all 
information dumped in 
SNA and see what comes 
out.” 
Testing the reliability and 
validity of SNA analysis 
and output. 
Overly simplistic (agnostic) 
approach to SNA. 
“Analyst’s Notebook shows 
you what it is, what the 
investigator in the field 
wants to see. SNA is a bit 
more delicate and analysts 
have to describe it.” 
Comparing software tools 
used for link analysis (i.e. 
Analyst’s Notebook) and 
SNA.   
Analysts’ link analysis vs 
SNA-related perceptions. 
Natural thinking mode vs 
systematic, rule-based 
approach. SNA guidance. 
“You can try to do 
everything but you cannot 
get a rabbit out of the hat if 
the information is very poor 
and limited…If they don’t 
reply, or if the information 
is still poor, say ‘look we 
To what extent the use of 
different analytical 
methods affects work 
quality and performance in 
general. Normally the 
analysts decide what 
method to apply on the 
Limitations of collected 
crime data. Image of 
analyst as a “magician”. 
Relationship between 
Europol and its customers 
in EU Member States. 
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 try to do our best but we’re 
not magicians’.” 
data. 
“It’s like you’re talking with 
some person of a specific 
nationality, they see it as 
black or white. But they 
never consider to see it as 
grey. So take everything 
into consideration and put 
it all in one pot and see 
what comes out.” 
Analytic methods are 
complementary, not 
competing ones. Use of 
different techniques 
facilitates analysis and 
investigation. 
Elementary approaches to 
criminal intelligence 
analysis. Image of analysts 
who “put it all in a pot 
[database] and see what 
comes out”. 
“Previously we were 
flexible, one analyst could 
move from drugs into 
financial, into child 
pornography, into 
whatever. Even to open 
your mind, Now you’re 
working on one field and 
that’s it… We are more in 
a box. I’m on the financial 
box, colleagues on the 
drugs box, synthetic drugs. 
I don’t know how they are 
working…” 
Disadvantages of analysts’ 
specialisation in particular 
crime areas. 
Generalist analyst vs 
specialist analyst. Image of 
crime area as a “box”. 
“If you give me Analyst’s 
Notebook I can turn it 
around, twist it around to 
see what it can do. If you 
give me SNA, I will see 
what SNA can do. The 
only thing is the will. Some 
people, you give them a 
task, they don’t do more, 
they don’t do less, that’s it. 
If you give me a task I will 
try to do even more than 
that, to see what I can 
discover. It depends on the 
person.” 
Analysts are different; not 
everyone can become 
SNA-savvy (user). 
Individual analyst 
differences, preferences 
and skill sets. 
“Well, if we continue like 
this, honestly speaking, the 
figure of an analyst will die 
very soon. We are on 
Europol analyst concerns 
that their profession is in a 
state of decline due to the 
developments inside 
Decline of intelligence 
analysis at Europol. Image 
of “real” operational 
analyst. 
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 paper around 100 analysts 
and actively 
working…maybe 50. Let’s 
consider them real 
analysts working on the 
data, analysing really the 
data”. 
Europol (restructuring). 
Image of. “real” operational 
analysts vs other types of 
analysts (operational, 
strategic, “techies” and 
those performing 
administrative tasks). 
 
 
Table 2: Metaphors used by Interviewee 2 
Metaphor Context (summary of 
interviewee’s account) 
Theme (conceptual 
category) 
“I have been luckier than 
others because the AWF… 
was a welcoming family for 
me when I started….It was 
quite easy to adapt. Now, 
after one and a half years, 
I could say that I’m still 
happy…sometimes the 
work gets boring because 
it’s more repetitive but 
still…” 
The starting point for 
newcomer analysts 
matters. Get used to the 
system; start data 
processing; be involved 
from the beginning in 
important cases; draft 
reports; and, attend 
meetings. Data processing 
is mechanistic and 
“boring”. Different 
opportunities for 
professional growth. 
Different Europol team 
environments influence the 
career progression of 
analysts. 
“They have this commodity 
orientated type of services, 
they don’t have everything 
in the same pot because 
it’s really impossible for an 
analyst or investigator to 
know it all… We are like 
hubs in the Member 
States, hubs here 
…between the different 
work files.” 
Europol’s restructuring 
involves the creation of a 
centralised database on 
organised crime. This is in 
contrast to the commodity-
based approach 
(specialisation) of law 
enforcement agencies in 
EU Member States.  
Single analysis 
environment vs 
specialisation “silos”. 
Generalist analyst vs 
specialist analyst. Image of 
crime database as a “pot”.  
“You get information from 
the other work file. You get 
it through reports and you 
get it through his view, his 
filter. The police world is a 
special type of world. 
There are a lot of filters 
and people not willing to 
Communication and 
information sharing 
barriers (“filters”) between 
the operational project 
teams of Europol and 
between Europol and its 
EU partners.  
Operational analysis 
performance is affected by 
analysis and police 
barriers (“filters”). 
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 share or communicate. It’s 
also because of the 
sensitive work we are 
dealing with.” 
“Some [AWFs] could be 
merged together. I’m not 
really a fan of this regional 
structuring of Europol on 
regional hubs. I don’t see 
the use of just dividing 
work files, three in one 
unit, one in another unit. 
Why not keep it under the 
same umbrella? 
Europol’s operational 
support followed a regional 
hubs approach. 
Operational restructuring 
attempts to merge projects 
into fewer ones (or just 
one). 
Single analysis 
environment vs 
specialisation “silos”.  
“I really like to be different 
because I don’t want to be 
like a robot. An analyst has 
to be different. Of course, if 
you get the same core 
results it’s just perfect. But 
if we have ten analysts and 
every analyst with a 
different idea…it’s 
wonderful.” 
The benefit of different 
analysts’ views for data 
interpretation and the 
generation of useful ideas. 
Individual analyst 
differences, preferences 
and skill sets. 
Benefits of pluralistic 
intelligence analysis vs the 
image of analyst as a 
“robot”. 
“Making it logically sound 
for an investigator because 
he’s not really going to 
shallow everything you 
write in the report. Maybe 
he already knows more 
than you. It’s so many 
factors…make it easy to 
read…I mean it’s really 
frustrating to work for a 
month and a report is 30 
pages and you think 
you’ve solved a case…an 
investigator say ‘Oh God 
so complicated’ and put it 
in a drawer.” 
Investigators assess the 
usefulness, relevance and 
quality of analysis findings 
in practice. For effective 
operational support, 
intelligence reports should 
be logically sound, realistic 
and easy to read. 
Effectiveness of 
intelligence reporting.  
“You have to recreate the 
hub, the structure… 
sometimes you get the 
wrong results. I get to see 
Recreating and 
understanding the criminal 
structure is difficult and 
entails interpretation 
Exploratory / inductive 
analysis entails risk.  
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 a lot of links to one number 
and it’s the pizza guy or 
the taxi driver.” 
errors. There’s a need to 
validate the findings of 
analysis. 
“It’s like you’re in high 
school and sometimes you 
like a subject because of 
the people who are 
teaching it.” 
The complex interaction 
between trainer and 
training effects and the 
individual preferences and 
attitudes of analysts 
toward learning has an 
influence on the adoption 
and use of SNA. 
Individual analyst attitudes 
toward learning as barrier 
or facilitator. 
“If you don’t master SNA 
as you should, it’s simply 
two clicks away…it’s not 
rocket science.” 
All analysts can become 
SNA-savvy because it is 
easy to learn. SNA is not 
“rocket science”. 
SNA can be established as 
a corporate standard (easy 
to master).  
 
 
Table 3: Metaphors used by Interviewee 3 
Metaphor Context (summary of 
interviewee’s account) 
Theme (conceptual 
category) 
“There are some baby bits 
after 17 years. Europol is 
not a baby anymore…it’s 
an adolescent.” 
Problematic areas still 
exist in Europol’s 
operational functioning 
many years after its 
establishment. 
Uneven operational 
development of Europol. 
“To connect the dots is 
relatively easy. You should 
take the steps with 
interpretation and many 
work files don’t take that 
step. Because it’s more 
challenging, it’s more 
difficult, it’s…” 
Data processing and 
reporting of cross matches 
is the objective of many 
operational project teams 
at Europol. However, 
analysis should go beyond 
merely “connecting the 
dots” to draw a hypothesis 
or inference.  
Data interpretation entails 
ambitious and difficult 
inductive analysis. 
“A bit fuzzy I would say 
…it’s different software 
tools and then you lose a 
bit of track. Some more 
software tools and then it 
gets a bit grey.” 
The use of different 
software tools by Europol 
analysts adds to the 
complexity of intelligence 
analysis work. 
Complicated (software 
tool-driven) analysis 
environment. 
“Only when there is Member States’ requests Basic operational support 
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 awareness by that 
investigation team and it’s 
also not a thing that comes 
out of the blue sky.” 
to Europol mainly involve 
data input and cross 
checks. SNA is rarely 
requested and only when 
they know what is does. 
requests (data input and 
cross check). 
“…one dot is connecting 
two clusters. And you think 
‘Ah that is a brilliant 
connector’. And then you 
dig, you look into this 
connector and you see it’s 
not a connection because 
It’s a sort of misuse of the 
system.” 
The ability of analysts to 
detect real patterns in 
crime data using software 
tools. Structural analysis 
with limited contextual 
information poses 
difficulties and increases 
likelihood of false 
positives.   
 
Limitations of structural 
analysis with limited 
contextual information.  
“So you have all your data, 
you dump it in a system, 
and then you click a few 
buttons and you get a 
scoring. Then you have 
your interpretation…” 
A non-user’s description of 
how SNA works in 
practice. 
Simplistic view of SNA by 
non-users. 
“So it shouldn’t become 
too academic, I would 
say.” 
The analysis product 
should fit the customer and 
meet their expectations.  
Elementary intelligence 
reporting vs academic 
products. 
“Take MS WORD, with just 
typing you can use the 
programme, but you can 
almost fly to the moon with 
MS WORD but basically 
using it for 95% is just 
typing.” 
Basic and expert training in 
the use of software tools.  
Focus on intelligence 
analysis “basics”. 
“What I see in this 
organisation is an 
emphasis on figures and 
statistics and numbers of 
seizures. So we are going 
down instead of – at the 
moment I am not positive 
about the future.” 
Declining state of the 
management of 
operational analysis 
projects.  
Decline of intelligence 
analysis at Europol. 
“The kingdom of analysis 
or something…it’s now 
spread all over the place. I 
Developments in the 
function of intelligence 
analysis at Europol over 
Decline of intelligence 
analysis at Europol. 
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 think intelligence policing 
and intelligence analysis 
should go so well together. 
So if you perform 
intelligence analysis not in 
the context of intelligence 
policing then it floats away. 
It floats away because the 
new commerce 
(notifications and cross 
matches) …analysis with 
an aim to solve the 
problem is floating away.” 
time. Declining state of the 
management of 
operational analysis 
projects.  
“I have not too much view 
anymore on the outside 
world.” 
Analysis-related 
developments in the world. 
Differences between 
Europol intelligence 
analysis and other 
intelligence organisations. 
Unclear professional 
standards for criminal 
intelligence analysis. 
“You shouldn’t alienate 
from the work. The whole 
level should raise, but if 
the gap gets too big, you 
get products which are 
very academic, and you 
use social science 
techniques, but in the end 
you alienate from basic 
work. So it becomes 
objective in itself to create 
a product, it doesn’t solve 
the problem or support the 
solving of the problem.” 
Huge gap between 
Europol and Member 
States’ law enforcement 
agencies in terms of 
analysis methods and 
capabilities. The gap 
between Europol products 
and analysis level and 
practices of Member 
States requires Europol to 
focus on elementary 
intelligence reporting. SNA 
(scientific method) and 
basic work are 
Incompatible. 
Focus on intelligence 
analysis “basics”. Basic 
work phenomenon. 
“Everything in the police 
goes in an evolutionary 
way, not revolutionary way. 
It’s not a revolution, it’s an 
evolution with that specific 
tool.” 
SNA use inside Europol 
will go through a long 
phase of evolution before it 
becomes fully integrated in 
normal work. 
Evolution vs revolution in 
intelligence analysis. 
“You get to sociology or 
psychology on little 
kingdoms, we have little 
kingdoms in AWFs, we will 
The new AWF concept will 
not change the reality of 
power games, silos and 
occupational sub-cultures 
Decline of intelligence 
analysis at Europol. 
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 get little kingdoms in either 
units or in focal points or in 
target groups.” 
at Europol.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Metaphors used by Interviewee 4 
Metaphor Context (summary of 
interviewee’s account) 
Theme (conceptual 
category) 
“The classical method is to 
find a tree and go to the 
forest. But I like to see the 
forest first and go to the 
tree which is an SNA 
approach.” 
SNA entails a top-down 
intelligence analysis 
approach. Understanding 
the criminal network before 
focussing on specific 
nodes. 
SNA-induced change in 
intelligence analysis 
practices. 
“What is the tasking and 
what are the expectations? 
Then I have to take my tool 
kit and look at whether it’s 
a screwdriver or a wrench.” 
Tasking, customer 
expectations and 
intelligence analysis 
objectives determine the 
use of specific analysis 
technique(s). 
Analysts’ discretion to 
employ different analysis 
techniques from their 
‘toolkit’. 
“Which comes first, the 
egg or the hen? ... Social 
network analysis has 
helped me to become a 
better analyst… If I only 
had one chance of learning 
either link charting or SNA 
I would say SNA because 
it goes much further as an 
analytical tool and as an 
analytical method.” 
To what extent the use of 
different methods (i.e. link 
analysis or SNA) 
influences the results of 
intelligence analysis. 
SNA-induced change in 
intelligence analysis 
practices. 
“There are some analysts 
who think that it’s black 
and white like that… 
competing. And maybe 
they do not understand the 
concept of SNA and 
maybe [don’t have the] 
willingness to think of it, I 
don’t know.” 
Interviewee believes that 
link analysis and SNA are 
complementary (not 
competing) approaches. 
Other analysts however 
have a different view. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
the adoption and use of 
SNA. 
“I would start from my The managers of Barriers and facilitators to 
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 personal experience – I 
would say that the project 
manager is a key person 
… because his willingness, 
his support of the use of 
new methodologies which 
at first need some time to 
get familiar and to test and 
to try out. And to have this 
support from the project 
manager is crucial…It may 
kill initiative if you go as a 
newcomer and you say, 
“There’s this SNA and I’ve 
heard very good things 
about it,” and your first 
response from your line 
manager is, “Ah, forget 
about it, concentrate on 
this and this.” It kills 
immediately any –“  
operational projects may 
encourage or not the 
adoption and use of SNA 
by their analysts. 
the adoption and use of 
SNA. 
““Of course as an 
analytical assistant, my 
senior analyst support is 
also crucial, that he is 
willing and sees the 
benefits. But the peer 
support is also very – 
because if in the team 
you’re working in there is 
an atmosphere of rejection 
of any new things it infects 
even if you’re willing to try 
it out. If the atmosphere is 
bad, whatever reason, is it 
some analyst who doesn’t 
want anybody to try new 
things, this is something 
that affects it a lot. So first 
support from the 
supervisor but then 
support from your 
colleagues…when you’re a 
newcomer…you’re not 
going to fight the windmills 
at first. So there’s crucial 
moments in the first 
The support from senior 
analysts and peers is also 
crucial regarding the 
adoption and use of SNA 
by operational analysts. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
the adoption and use of 
SNA. 
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 months when you come in 
house, how will you 
professionally start 
developing here.” 
“Analytical work should be 
creative work. And the 
organisation to support 
creativity is crucial… 
Creativity is that you have 
a critical mind and you 
have to criticise things to 
sharpen things up. This is 
my perception of creativity. 
So you have to be 
constructively critical, a 
critical person. I would say 
that the organisation, as a 
whole, is not ready to face 
persons who are 
constructively critical and 
this is why I would say in 
the bigger picture the 
organisation – people want 
to go for the easiest 
solutions…familiar 
solutions.” 
Interviewee’s response to 
a question about the role 
of occupational culture in 
the adoption of innovation. 
The climate inside Europol 
does not support new 
approaches to intelligence 
analysis. Familiar solutions 
are preferred.  
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“As I understood the 
director is giving support 
and I would say this is a 
facilitating factor of course, 
when you have a director 
to give you support, so it of 
course always gives you a 
lift to go forward.” 
Top management support 
of SNA innovation. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“I would say intelligence 
analysis, my perception is 
that the role of it will grow 
from what it is now, 
because my perception 
generally – if you look at 
the European wide 
perspective on intelligence 
analysis – it is so scattered 
around. There are 
advanced countries and 
Intelligence analysis in the 
EU is characterised by 
fragmented approaches 
and significant differences 
between EU law 
enforcement agencies. It is 
expected however that the 
profession of intelligence 
analysis will develop in the 
future.  
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
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 there are countries that are 
not very advanced in 
utilising this kind of 
approach”. 
“Now it’s up to the 
management to 
understand that maybe we 
should take the intelligence 
analysis path and seek 
innovations in…crime 
preventing measures. The 
classical methods that we 
have used so far are 
becoming a bit inefficient... 
I would say the project 
manager level… they are 
in that sense in a crucial 
position to give support for 
the use of analysis in 
everyday life to make it a 
snowball effect for the 
bigger picture.”  
Organisational support at 
directorate and line 
management level is 
necessary to promote SNA 
as a principal analysis 
method (or corporate 
standard). 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
 
 
Table 5: Metaphors used by Interviewee 5 
Metaphor Context (summary of 
interviewee’s account) 
Theme (conceptual 
category) 
“For instance you might be 
completely misled because 
maybe this guy has 100 
times called the pizza 
service. This is something 
of course you have to 
state, you make clear that 
this is a possibility but – a 
big but behind – 
nevertheless it should give 
the investigator the 
possibility to look into this 
direction. And also maybe 
to search for other things 
he has noted already and 
say, “Oh, this confirms it.” 
There is tentativeness and 
risk involved in structural 
analysis with limited 
contextual information. 
Context and content of 
relationships matters and 
is ultimately checked by 
case officers in the field. 
Limitations of structural 
analysis with limited 
contextual information. 
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 “I’m quite sure in many 
situations may help you to 
have this, “Aha!” moment 
and which might cause you 
…  to dig a bit deeper into 
a new direction to come to 
new findings.” 
Use of different intelligence 
analysis techniques affects 
the quality and results of 
analysis because it helps 
to see crime data from 
different angles and 
identify new elements. 
Benefits of exploratory / 
inductive intelligence 
analysis. 
“I would say these are 
things that could be 
combined …  using this 
and this might lead to 
different conclusions …  
and you have to see them 
altogether and also maybe 
then think out of the box … 
is always necessary.” 
Link analysis and SNA are 
complementary (not 
competing) approaches. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“At the moment it is difficult 
to assess this … because 
really I have never used it, 
and it might be blind 
guessing.” 
A non-SNA user cannot 
assess the benefits and 
limitations of SNA. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“I got two days ago a CD 
with telephone data and it 
was…completely new. 
Thank God there was a 
guy from IT next door who 
helped me and already 
installed everything on my 
PC. I was delighted about 
the things that are possible 
and I showed it also to my 
project manager and to my 
expert and they said, 
“Great stuff,” but I think for 
them it’s, “Great stuff, 
okay, good to know but 
you know how to deal with 
this and we leave it in your 
hands.” I think even in the 
future if they were 
informed about this there 
might be something left 
behind but in the end it’s 
other things they focus on, 
There is a need to raise 
SNA awareness among 
project managers and 
specialists. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
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 other tasks and they – how 
can I put it? I think they’re 
also convinced – which is 
also not that bad – that it’s 
still maybe in best hands – 
when we take care of 
these things that we are in 
the position to know what 
to use... it’s also our part to 
suggest to the 
investigators what we can 
do, what sort of data we 
expect from their side.” 
“When I changed work file 
– because we got 
completely different sorts 
of data…– I don’t want to 
say I had to start from 
scratch but…new data and 
a new approach. How do I 
work with this data? And 
this is still very challenging 
for me and sometimes it’s 
a bit frustrating, what do I 
do with this, because 
you’re not used to this sort 
of data. But when the data 
is different, even if you 
maybe know in general 
how the techniques work, 
then you’re a bit – how 
does it work? It’s a 
continuous permanent 
process of learning and it’s 
difficult to say if other work 
files cover all the 
possibilities which I doubt.” 
One of the challenges 
faced by analysts involves 
the handling of different 
types of crime data and the 
use of appropriate 
software tools and 
techniques. Hence, the 
need for continuous 
learning. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“I think so. So it will be 
interesting to see because 
in October I will follow this 
one week training but I am 
quite sure after the training 
– so this is always the 
thing, you get training and 
maybe the next six months 
or so you don’t even have 
Europol analysts can 
become SNA users 
following their training. 
However, lack of practice, 
lack of network data and 
reliance of known link 
analysis techniques 
prevents analysts from 
using SNA in practice. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
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 the data to play with this, 
to use it again and if it’s 
only pressing a button let 
me put it simple. Then of 
course it might be after the 
time you have used it that 
you – “Oh, shall I still use 
it? Oh no,” I would rely on 
the things I know. But in 
general I think everybody 
should be and will be in a 
position after such a 
training to use it. 
““Oh that’s good, I’ve never 
thought of this,” and 
already are pulling the 
trigger for future data to 
come.” 
To improve the use of SNA 
by Europol analysts, 
meetings should be 
organised to present and 
discuss best practices and 
SNA-related experiences. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“An interesting case where 
I used telephone data 
regarding pattern analysis 
– I came to certain 
hypotheses which I 
forwarded to the 
investigators and this has 
been something where at 
first maybe when you 
present all the links 
everybody says, “Jesus, 
what do you do with this, 
12,000 links.” But when 
you explain to them what 
you did, why you sorted 
out certain – and focused 
on certain communication. 
And how you played then 
with the data, they’re 
completely stunned, like 
“Oh really?” And this is 
something that in the end 
really helps, “Oh now I also 
will contribute telephone 
data,” for instance.” 
An example of operational 
intelligence analysis 
involving communication 
data. Once the case 
officers became aware of 
the analytic capabilities 
they decided to contribute 
additional crime data for 
analysis purposes. 
Barriers and facilitators to 
SNA adoption and use. 
“I hope so because we In response to present and Barriers and facilitators to 
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 can’t stand still otherwise 
there will be lots of 
information bypassing us 
and then…you won’t be 
able to come up with a 
clear picture for the 
investigators of what’s 
going on. So you have to 
be ready for the next step 
for the future. 
future challenges, Europol 
analysts should develop 
their knowledge and skills. 
That includes the adoption 
of the SNA innovation.  
SNA adoption and use. 
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 Appendix H: Note on research experience 
Overall, the research experience can be summarised in Hamlet’s reflection: “by 
indirections find directions out” (cited by Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 163). The study 
employed a MM design that facilitated exploration of a real-world problem. That is, the 
problematic adoption and integration of the SNA innovation inside the analysis 
environment of Europol. A questionnaire survey followed by in-depth interviews 
facilitated the systematic examination of the perceptions of Europol analysts on the 
use and usefulness of Social Network Analysis (SNA) as an analytical approach. The 
different philosophical perspectives underpinning these techniques were integrated by 
the researcher’s pragmatist perspective. This was done smoothly and effectively 
without experiencing problems of incompatibility. The overall experience led to an 
appreciation of the fact that the researcher is the “key research instrument” (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009, p. 166). In the QUAN survey, this was somewhat obscured by the 
distance, questionnaire structure, coding of responses and the positivistic nature of 
research. Figures too are socially constructed and statistical analyses cannot change 
that (C. Lewis, personal communication, 25 March 2011). Respondents interact with 
the QUAN instrument’s logic, which forms a subjective script reflecting back to the 
researcher. When people start responding to survey questions an inter-subjective 
situation is created by which reality appears factual and co-authored at the same 
time. In contrast, the lived reality of face-to-face interviews emphasised the 
researcher’s role as research instrument and the process behind the social 
construction of reality. Metaphorically speaking, however, the extent to which one 
acts as “miner” (searching for elements of pre-existing knowledge), “traveller” (seeing 
knowledge as socially constructed) or both remains unclear (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
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 2009, pp. 197-198). In essence, “all research is a compromise” (Arksey & Knight, 
1999, p. 171) and, as Popper argues, nothing can definitely be proved (Magee, 
1975). Yet, a pragmatist researcher sees elements of truth in these perspectives and 
takes action (Dewey, 1991). Hence, it is up to the investigator to demonstrate the 
truth-value of research and provide credible empirical evidence. 
Besides textbook approaches to social research, that usually imply a positivistic, 
hypothesis testing orientation, there are many examples of real-world phenomena 
becoming theoretically interesting these days. In this case, the research problem was 
so under-researched that no relevant literature could be identified. Initially, the 
researcher struggled with thoughts about how to carry out this project since he was 
breaking new ground. Afterwards, he was constantly checking progress in order to 
stay on the right track. Completed research gives the illusion of linearity, but the 
reality behind it is iterative and “messy” (Gorard, 2003, p. 91). This is especially so 
with MM research because it is more demanding than single-method research in 
almost every aspect of the research process. Several practical issues were 
encountered in the course of this assignment. At times, it was difficult to deal with the 
occupational culture of analysts and the “hidden side of organisational life” (Fox, 
Martin, & Green, 2007, p. 59). This was mainly felt in the questionnaire survey phase 
but also during the interviews where participants expressed their views and voiced 
some of their concerns. Honesty and working for an ideal purpose helped a lot in the 
circumstances of the research. The researcher tried to anticipate potential problems, 
make sense of those that materialised and mitigate or minimise their impact. The 
research design and data collection process worked very well (e.g. the QUAN survey 
achieved a 75% response rate) and this reflected on the reliability and validity of 
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 findings. Comprehensive analysis and the integration of MM results produced better 
understanding. This, in turn, increased the possibilities of theoretically interesting 
explanation and the discovery of grounded theory, which are actually two of the main 
advantages of MM research. 
One of the biggest challenges was the social science framing and value 
commitments of this research (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006). Being the 
main research instrument the researcher managed the sources of his bias: academic 
researcher (epistemic) and former Europol "insider" (practitioner). As professional 
doctorate student, he addressed these biases to deal with a complex real-world 
problem, and the difficulties of workplace research, to eventually provide an 
independent, dispassionate and honest account. He gave voice to Europol analysts to 
express their views about the research problem, their role and Europol and then 
discussed the key themes and offered interpretation. He emphasised his outsider role 
at all times and worked as insider-Outsider in the research setting. Significantly, the 
research had an effect on how he perceived himself as researcher and indicated his 
developmental needs (Boyatzis & Akrivou, 2006). Now, he has a deeper 
understanding of MM research and a plan to gradually develop a stronger skill set. 
The doctoral research improved his knowledge of the ethical difficulties that lie at 
every step of the research process and the decisions required to align research 
purpose and ethics. And, when he faced personal and work-related difficulties, he 
drew inspiration from Karl Weick’s ideas about the “dynamics of renewal” (Weick, 
2004a). All the above, illustrate the important effects the research experience had on 
the researcher. 
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